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6
CONSTANT_TIME
null
barrett_ct.v
{"a_reg": ["a", "rst", "start"], "cadd": ["Q", "sub"], "cnt": ["W", "rst", "running", "start"], "csub": ["Q", "cadd"], "done": ["W", "cnt", "running"], "prod": ["V", "a_reg"], "r": ["DW", "csub"], "running": ["rst", "start"], "sub": ["a_reg", "tq"], "t": ["K", "prod"], "tq": ["Q", "t"]}
CC-BY-4.0
26
0
19
done
null
[]
null
true
[ "a" ]
null
// barrett_ct — CONSTANT-TIME Barrett modular reduction for Kyber / ML-KEM (q = 3329). This is the REAL, // value-correct Barrett reduce (the same construction as the reference `barrett_reduce`), not a placeholder: // // t = round(v * a / 2^K) with v = round(2^K / q) = 20159, K = 26 (the canonical Kyber constan...
CONSTANT_TIME
7
LEAKY
LEAKY — 'done' depends on a. How each secret reaches it (shortest path first): a ├─ acc └─ done Each arrow is a dependency edge: an assignment, or a condition guarding one. The analysis over-approximates, so a path may be unreachable at run time — read it and decide. That is why it is printed.
barrett_leaky.v
{"acc": ["Q", "a", "rst", "running", "start"], "done": ["Q", "acc", "running"], "r": ["DW", "acc"], "running": ["rst", "start"]}
CC-BY-4.0
12
1
9
done
[{"secret": "a", "observation": "done", "signals": ["a", "acc", "done"], "length": 2}]
[ "a" ]
null
true
[ "a" ]
2
// barrett_leaky — the NON-constant-time counterpart of `barrett_ct`: a naive "reduce by repeated subtraction" // normalization that LOOPS `acc -= Q` until `acc < Q`. This is a real, tempting implementation (no multiplier, // tiny area — a common way people "just reduce mod q") but the NUMBER of iterations, hence the c...
LEAKY
6
CONSTANT_TIME
null
barrett_buggy.v
{"a_reg": ["a", "rst", "start"], "cadd": ["Q", "sub"], "cnt": ["W", "rst", "running", "start"], "csub": ["Q", "cadd"], "done": ["W", "cnt", "running"], "prod": ["V", "a_reg"], "r": ["DW", "csub"], "running": ["rst", "start"], "sub": ["a_reg", "tq"], "t": ["K", "prod"], "tq": ["Q", "t"]}
CC-BY-4.0
26
0
19
done
null
[]
null
true
[ "a" ]
null
// barrett_buggy — a BUGGY Barrett reduction (the WS-B teeth): identical to `barrett_ct.v` except the Barrett // SHIFT is WRONG (K = 25 instead of the canonical 26). The reciprocal constant V = round(2^26/3329) is // calibrated for a 2^26 shift; using 2^25 scales the quotient estimate `t` by ~2x, an error far outside w...
CONSTANT_TIME
6
CONSTANT_TIME
null
ct_cmp.v
{"cnt": ["W", "rst", "running", "start"], "diff": ["W", "cnt", "rst", "running", "start", "xr", "yr"], "done": ["W", "cnt", "running"], "equal": ["diff"], "running": ["rst", "start"], "xr": ["W", "cnt", "rst", "running", "start", "x"], "yr": ["W", "cnt", "rst", "running", "start", "y"]}
CC-BY-4.0
29
0
12
done
null
[]
null
true
[ "x", "y" ]
null
// ct_cmp — CONSTANT-TIME equality/compare that ALWAYS scans all W bits (the memcmp-hardening pattern used // against timing side channels in MAC/tag comparison). It accumulates a difference flag every cycle but never // exits early, so `done = running & (cnt == W)` is a data-oblivious counter — completion timing is in...
CONSTANT_TIME
9
LEAKY
LEAKY — 'done' depends on x, y. How each secret reaches it (shortest path first): x ├─ xr └─ done y ├─ yr └─ done Each arrow is a dependency edge: an assignment, or a condition guarding one. The analysis over-approximates, so a path may be unreachable at run time — read it and decide. That is why it is ...
cmp_leaky.v
{"diff": ["rst", "running", "start", "xr", "yr"], "done": ["diff", "running", "xr", "yr"], "equal": ["diff"], "running": ["rst", "start"], "xr": ["diff", "rst", "running", "start", "x", "yr"], "yr": ["diff", "rst", "running", "start", "xr", "y"]}
CC-BY-4.0
24
10
10
done
[{"secret": "x", "observation": "done", "signals": ["x", "xr", "done"], "length": 2}, {"secret": "x", "observation": "done", "signals": ["x", "xr", "diff", "done"], "length": 3}, {"secret": "x", "observation": "done", "signals": ["x", "xr", "yr", "done"], "length": 3}, {"secret": "x", "observation": "done", "signals": ...
[ "x", "y" ]
null
true
[ "x", "y" ]
2
// cmp_leaky — the LEAKY counterpart of `ct_cmp`: the classic early-exit memcmp that stops at the first // differing bit, so `done` timing leaks the position of the first mismatch (a textbook tag/MAC timing oracle). // Its completion cone contains operand bits, so no operand-free inductive invariant exists and the // s...
LEAKY
8
CONSTANT_TIME
null
ct_div_wide.v
{"a_shift": ["WIDTH", "a", "done_now", "resetn", "running", "start"], "b_reg": ["b", "resetn", "running", "start"], "cnt": ["done_now", "resetn", "running", "start"], "done": ["done_now", "resetn", "running", "start"], "done_now": ["CW", "WIDTH", "cnt", "running"], "ge": ["b_reg", "rem_shifted"], "q": ["done_now", "q_r...
CC-BY-4.0
54
0
19
done
null
[]
null
true
[ "a", "b" ]
null
// ct_div_wide — a parameterized CONSTANT-TIME restoring divider with wipe-on-done, in clean RTL. // // Purpose (SCALE demonstration): the completion signal `done` is a pure function of the iteration COUNTER // (cnt == W), never of the operand data — so the divider runs EXACTLY W fixed cycles regardless of a/b, i.e. //...
CONSTANT_TIME
16
LEAKY
LEAKY — 'done' depends on a, b. How each secret reaches it (shortest path first): a ├─ a_shift ├─ rem_shifted ├─ rem_next ├─ rem_reg ├─ done_now └─ done b ├─ b_reg ├─ rem_next ├─ rem_reg ├─ done_now └─ done Each arrow is a dependency edge: an assignment, or a condition guarding one. The an...
ct_div_leaky.v
{"a_shift": ["WIDTH", "a", "done_now", "resetn", "running", "start"], "b_reg": ["b", "resetn", "running", "start"], "cnt": ["done_now", "resetn", "running", "start"], "done": ["done_now", "resetn", "running", "start"], "done_now": ["CW", "WIDTH", "cnt", "rem_reg", "running"], "ge": ["b_reg", "rem_shifted"], "q": ["done...
CC-BY-4.0
55
8
19
done
[{"secret": "a", "observation": "done", "signals": ["a", "a_shift", "rem_shifted", "rem_next", "rem_reg", "done_now", "done"], "length": 6}, {"secret": "a", "observation": "done", "signals": ["a", "a_shift", "rem_shifted", "ge", "rem_next", "rem_reg", "done_now", "done"], "length": 7}, {"secret": "a", "observation": "d...
[ "a", "b" ]
null
true
[ "a", "b" ]
5
// ct_div_leaky — the LEAKY TWIN of ct_div_wide (the teeth for the constant-time scaling proof). // // IDENTICAL to ct_div_wide EXCEPT the completion `done_now` also fires on an EARLY-EXIT when the running // remainder reaches zero (`rem_reg == 0`). That makes the completion cycle DATA-DEPENDENT: for operands whose // ...
LEAKY
6
CONSTANT_TIME
null
ct_gcd.v
{"a": ["K", "a_in", "b", "iter", "rst", "running", "start"], "b": ["K", "a", "b_in", "iter", "rst", "running", "start"], "done": ["K", "iter", "running"], "gcd_out": ["a"], "iter": ["K", "rst", "running", "start"], "running": ["rst", "start"]}
CC-BY-4.0
24
0
11
done
null
[]
null
true
[ "a_in", "b_in" ]
null
// ct_gcd — fixed-iteration (constant-time) GCD. `done` is a function ONLY of a cycle counter `iter` // that advances unconditionally while running, so completion time is FIXED (K cycles) regardless of the // secret operands — i.e. the timing observable is data-oblivious. The datapath still reduces the secret // operan...
CONSTANT_TIME
9
LEAKY
LEAKY — 'done' depends on a_in, b_in. How each secret reaches it (shortest path first): a_in ├─ a ├─ eq └─ done b_in ├─ b ├─ eq └─ done Each arrow is a dependency edge: an assignment, or a condition guarding one. The analysis over-approximates, so a path may be unreachable at run time — read it and ...
euclid_gcd.v
{"a": ["a_in", "b", "eq", "rst", "running", "start"], "b": ["a", "b_in", "eq", "rst", "running", "start"], "done": ["eq", "running"], "eq": ["a", "b"], "gcd_out": ["a"], "running": ["rst", "start"]}
CC-BY-4.0
19
4
10
done
[{"secret": "a_in", "observation": "done", "signals": ["a_in", "a", "eq", "done"], "length": 3}, {"secret": "a_in", "observation": "done", "signals": ["a_in", "a", "b", "eq", "done"], "length": 4}, {"secret": "b_in", "observation": "done", "signals": ["b_in", "b", "eq", "done"], "length": 3}, {"secret": "b_in", "observ...
[ "a_in", "b_in" ]
null
true
[ "a_in", "b_in" ]
3
// euclid_gcd — subtractive Euclidean GCD. The canonical NON-constant-time datapath: the number of // reduction steps (hence the cycle at which `done` asserts) depends on the SECRET operands, so the // completion time leaks operand structure. This is the negative / found-bug design: a self-composition // proof of timin...
LEAKY
6
CONSTANT_TIME
null
euclid_gcd_repaired.v
{"a": ["K", "a_in", "b", "iter", "rst", "running", "start"], "b": ["K", "a", "b_in", "iter", "rst", "running", "start"], "done": ["K", "iter", "running"], "gcd_out": ["a"], "iter": ["K", "rst", "running", "start"], "running": ["rst", "start"]}
CC-BY-4.0
24
0
11
done
null
[]
null
true
[ "a_in", "b_in" ]
null
// euclid_gcd_repaired — the CERTIFIED REPAIR of `euclid_gcd.v` (WS-C). Generated by applying ONE known // countermeasure class (fixed-trip-count / data-oblivious control) to the leaky design, in response to its // timing-leak counterexample. This is NOT a hand-written ct_gcd: it PRESERVES euclid's own subtractive // r...
CONSTANT_TIME
6
CONSTANT_TIME
null
ct_modmul.v
{"acc": ["W", "ar", "br", "cnt", "rst", "running", "start"], "ar": ["a", "rst", "start"], "br": ["W", "b", "cnt", "rst", "running", "start"], "cnt": ["W", "rst", "running", "start"], "done": ["W", "cnt", "running"], "mr": ["m", "rst", "start"], "result": ["W", "acc"], "running": ["rst", "start"]}
CC-BY-4.0
30
0
14
done
null
[]
null
true
[ "a", "b", "m" ]
null
// ct_modmul — CONSTANT-TIME double-and-add modular multiplication `a*b mod m` (a building block of RSA/ECC // scalar routines). Every cycle it doubles the accumulator and conditionally adds `a`, with a conditional // modular reduction — but the multiplier bit only SELECTS values; it never gates control. Completion // ...
CONSTANT_TIME
6
LEAKY
LEAKY — 'done' depends on b. How each secret reaches it (shortest path first): b ├─ br └─ done Each arrow is a dependency edge: an assignment, or a condition guarding one. The analysis over-approximates, so a path may be unreachable at run time — read it and decide. That is why it is printed.
modmul_leaky.v
{"acc": ["W", "ar", "br", "rst", "running", "start"], "ar": ["a", "rst", "start"], "br": ["b", "rst", "running", "start"], "done": ["br", "running"], "mr": ["m", "rst", "start"], "result": ["W", "acc"], "running": ["rst", "start"]}
CC-BY-4.0
22
1
13
done
[{"secret": "b", "observation": "done", "signals": ["b", "br", "done"], "length": 2}]
[ "b" ]
null
true
[ "a", "b", "m" ]
2
// modmul_leaky — the LEAKY counterpart of `ct_modmul`: it early-exits once the residual multiplier `br` is // zero (skipping the remaining doublings), so `done` timing leaks the multiplier's MSB position. The // completion cone contains operand bits, so the self-composition proof correctly REFUSES to certify it. modul...
LEAKY
6
CONSTANT_TIME
null
ct_mul.v
{"acc": ["W", "cnt", "mcand", "mplier", "rst", "running", "start"], "cnt": ["W", "rst", "running", "start"], "done": ["W", "cnt", "running"], "mcand": ["W", "a", "cnt", "rst", "running", "start"], "mplier": ["W", "b", "cnt", "rst", "running", "start"], "prod": ["acc"], "running": ["rst", "start"]}
CC-BY-4.0
29
0
12
done
null
[]
null
true
[ "a", "b" ]
null
// ct_mul — CONSTANT-TIME shift-add multiplier. Runs EXACTLY W iterations regardless of the operands: // every cycle it conditionally adds the (shifted) multiplicand based on the current multiplier bit, but the // bit only SELECTS a value — it never gates the control. Completion `done = running & (cnt == W)` is a plain...
CONSTANT_TIME
6
LEAKY
LEAKY — 'done' depends on b. How each secret reaches it (shortest path first): b ├─ mplier └─ done Each arrow is a dependency edge: an assignment, or a condition guarding one. The analysis over-approximates, so a path may be unreachable at run time — read it and decide. That is why it is printed.
mul_leaky.v
{"acc": ["mcand", "mplier", "rst", "running", "start"], "done": ["mplier", "running"], "mcand": ["W", "a", "mplier", "rst", "running", "start"], "mplier": ["b", "rst", "running", "start"], "prod": ["acc"], "running": ["rst", "start"]}
CC-BY-4.0
20
1
11
done
[{"secret": "b", "observation": "done", "signals": ["b", "mplier", "done"], "length": 2}]
[ "b" ]
null
true
[ "a", "b" ]
2
// mul_leaky — the LEAKY counterpart of `ct_mul`: it early-exits as soon as the residual multiplier becomes // zero, so `done` fires after a number of cycles equal to the multiplier's MSB position — a timing channel // that leaks the secret operand's bit-length. The completion cone contains operand bits (via `mplier==0...
LEAKY
6
CONSTANT_TIME
null
modexp_ct.v
{"acc": ["W", "cnt", "e", "rst", "running", "sq", "start"], "cnt": ["W", "rst", "running", "start"], "done": ["W", "cnt", "running"], "e": ["W", "cnt", "exp", "rst", "running", "start"], "result": ["acc"], "running": ["rst", "start"], "sq": ["W", "base", "cnt", "rst", "running", "start"]}
CC-BY-4.0
29
0
12
done
null
[]
null
true
[ "base", "exp", "modulus" ]
null
// modexp_ct — CONSTANT-TIME square-and-multiply-ALWAYS modular exponentiation control, the standard RSA // timing-attack countermeasure (the always-multiply / constant-time-exponentiation defense — the exponent // bit never gates control, only selects a value; this is the always-multiply class, distinct from but in th...
CONSTANT_TIME
8
LEAKY
LEAKY — 'done' depends on exp. How each secret reaches it (shortest path first): exp ├─ e └─ done Each arrow is a dependency edge: an assignment, or a condition guarding one. The analysis over-approximates, so a path may be unreachable at run time — read it and decide. That is why it is printed.
modexp_leaky.v
{"acc": ["W", "cnt", "e", "rst", "running", "sq", "start"], "cnt": ["W", "e", "rst", "running", "start"], "done": ["W", "cnt", "e", "running"], "e": ["W", "cnt", "exp", "rst", "running", "start"], "result": ["acc"], "running": ["rst", "start"], "sq": ["W", "base", "cnt", "e", "rst", "running", "start"]}
CC-BY-4.0
32
2
12
done
[{"secret": "exp", "observation": "done", "signals": ["exp", "e", "done"], "length": 2}, {"secret": "exp", "observation": "done", "signals": ["exp", "e", "cnt", "done"], "length": 3}]
[ "exp" ]
null
true
[ "base", "exp", "modulus" ]
2
// modexp_leaky — the NON-constant-time counterpart of `modexp_ct`: a square-and-multiply modular // exponentiation that EARLY-EXITS when the remaining exponent register is all zeros. That is a real, // tempting optimization (skip the trailing zero exponent bits), but it makes the completion cycle — hence // `done` — d...
LEAKY
6
CONSTANT_TIME
null
x25519_fieldmul.v
{"acc": ["W", "ar", "br", "cnt", "rst", "running", "start"], "ar": ["opa", "rst", "start"], "br": ["W", "cnt", "opb", "rst", "running", "start"], "cnt": ["W", "rst", "running", "start"], "done": ["W", "cnt", "running"], "mr": ["modulus", "rst", "start"], "result": ["W", "acc"], "running": ["rst", "start"]}
CC-BY-4.0
30
0
14
done
null
[]
null
true
[ "opa", "opb", "modulus" ]
null
// x25519_fieldmul — CONSTANT-TIME field multiplication `opa * opb mod modulus`, the inner primitive of an // X25519 / Curve25519 Montgomery-ladder step (the field GF(2^255-19), modeled here at a tractable width W). // The completion-channel CT ARGUMENT is width-parametric in structure, BUT this committed RTL is fixed ...
CONSTANT_TIME
6
LEAKY
LEAKY — 'done' depends on opb. How each secret reaches it (shortest path first): opb ├─ br └─ done Each arrow is a dependency edge: an assignment, or a condition guarding one. The analysis over-approximates, so a path may be unreachable at run time — read it and decide. That is why it is printed.
x25519_fieldmul_leaky.v
{"acc": ["W", "ar", "br", "rst", "running", "start"], "ar": ["opa", "rst", "start"], "br": ["opb", "rst", "running", "start"], "done": ["br", "running"], "mr": ["modulus", "rst", "start"], "result": ["W", "acc"], "running": ["rst", "start"]}
CC-BY-4.0
22
1
13
done
[{"secret": "opb", "observation": "done", "signals": ["opb", "br", "done"], "length": 2}]
[ "opb" ]
null
true
[ "opa", "opb", "modulus" ]
2
// x25519_fieldmul_leaky — the LEAKY counterpart of `x25519_fieldmul`: it early-exits once the residual // multiplier `br` is zero, skipping the remaining doublings, so `done` timing leaks the secret multiplier's // most-significant set-bit position (its bit-length). The completion cone therefore contains operand bits,...
LEAKY
null
null
null
barrett_spec.v
{"r": ["a"]}
CC-BY-4.0
1
0
2
null
null
null
null
false
[]
null
// barrett_spec — the PUBLIC golden specification for the Kyber / ML-KEM Barrett reduction (WS-B): the plain // arithmetic contract `r == a mod 3329` over the full 16-bit coefficient domain. This is the FIPS/spec-level // reference the `barrett_ct` datapath is bit-exact to, over ALL 2^16 inputs. Purely combinational — ...
null
null
null
null
alu_unprotected.v
{"_unused": ["a2", "b2", "op2"], "error_flag": [], "out": ["r0"], "r0": ["a", "b", "op"]}
CC-BY-4.0
7
0
10
null
null
null
null
false
[]
null
// alu_unprotected — the UNPROTECTED ALU: same datapath as `parity_alu.v`, but NO fault detection // (`error_flag` hardwired 0). The teeth for WS-A: a single modeled stuck-at in the OUT datapath corrupts `out` // with error_flag never rising, so the golden_faulted 2-safety miter finds an UNDETECTED fault (`differ` SAT)...
null
null
null
null
parity_alu.v
{"error_flag": ["r0", "r1"], "out": ["r0"], "r0": ["a", "b", "op"], "r1": ["a2", "b2", "op2"]}
CC-BY-4.0
9
0
10
null
null
null
null
false
[]
null
// parity_alu — a fault-RESISTANT 4-bit ALU (the PROVEN side of the fault-injection twin, WS-A). // // The datapath `r0 = op(a,b)` is computed TWICE by two structurally-distinct copies (r0 from a/b/op, r1 from // a2/b2/op2) and compared: `error_flag = |(r0 ^ r1)` — a concurrent-error-detection (CED) duplicate-and-compa...
null
null
null
null
parity_alu_singlebit.v
{"error_flag": ["r0", "r1"], "out": ["r0"], "r0": ["a", "b", "op"], "r1": ["a2", "b2", "op2"]}
CC-BY-4.0
9
0
10
null
null
null
null
false
[]
null
// parity_alu_singlebit — a PARTIAL countermeasure (the second WS-A teeth): the duplicate-and-compare covers // only output bits [2:0] and IGNORES bit 3, mirroring `pcpi_div_halfwipe.v` (a countermeasure that protects // only part of the state). A single modeled stuck-at on the bit-3 datapath corrupts `out[3]` while `e...
null
null
null
null
pcpi_div.v
null
ISC
0
0
0
null
null
null
line 70: preprocessor directive is outside the supported Verilog subset ('`ifdef'). Dependencies created by it would be invisible to the cone analysis, so no verdict is returned. Flatten the design to a single module of assign/always statements, or analyse the submodule directly with --module.
false
[]
null
// Vendored standalone copy of picorv32_pcpi_div (the RISC-V DIV/REM co-processor) from // the upstream picorv32 project (ISC license) -- see LICENSE-FIXTURES for full attribution. // Completion is (!quotient_msk && running); quotient_msk is a pure 1<<31 >>1 shift register — so the // completion cycle is data-oblivious...
UNKNOWN
null
null
null
pcpi_div_wiped.v
{"dividend": ["divisor", "instr_div", "instr_rem", "pcpi_rs1", "quotient_msk", "resetn", "running", "start"], "divisor": ["instr_div", "instr_rem", "pcpi_rs2", "quotient_msk", "resetn", "running", "start"], "instr_any_div_rem": ["instr_div", "instr_divu", "instr_rem", "instr_remu"], "instr_div": ["pcpi_insn", "pcpi_rea...
ISC
78
0
22
null
null
null
null
false
[]
null
// WS-7 — no-secret-residue repair of picorv32_pcpi_div. Byte-identical to rtl_ct/pcpi_div.v EXCEPT that on the // completion cycle (`!quotient_msk && running`) the operand-derived scratch registers are ZEROED, so no operand // residue survives past `done`. pcpi_rd is a non-blocking assignment from the PRE-clock quotie...
null
null
null
null
pcpi_div_halfwipe.v
{"dividend": ["divisor", "instr_div", "instr_rem", "pcpi_rs1", "quotient_msk", "resetn", "running", "start"], "divisor": ["instr_div", "instr_rem", "pcpi_rs2", "quotient_msk", "resetn", "running", "start"], "instr_any_div_rem": ["instr_div", "instr_divu", "instr_rem", "instr_remu"], "instr_div": ["pcpi_insn", "pcpi_rea...
ISC
76
0
22
null
null
null
null
false
[]
null
// WS-7 TEETH — a DELIBERATELY INCOMPLETE wipe. Identical to pcpi_div_wiped.v except it clears only `dividend` // and leaves `divisor` holding operand-derived residue at completion. residue_check MUST still REFUSE this // variant: a partial wipe is not no-residue. If this were accepted, the property would be vacuous. m...
null
null
null
null
pcpi_mul.v
null
ISC
0
0
0
null
null
null
line 67: for loop is outside the supported Verilog subset ('for ('). Dependencies created by it would be invisible to the cone analysis, so no verdict is returned. Flatten the design to a single module of assign/always statements, or analyse the submodule directly with --module.
false
[]
null
// Vendored standalone copy of picorv32_pcpi_mul (the RISC-V MUL/MULH co-processor) from // the upstream picorv32 project (ISC license) -- see LICENSE-FIXTURES for full attribution. // Completion is `pcpi_ready <= mul_finish`, and `mul_finish <= mul_counter[6]` where `mul_counter` // is loaded from a fixed constant (63...
UNKNOWN
null
null
null
tb_ct.v
null
CC-BY-4.0
0
0
0
null
null
null
line 12: module instantiation is outside the supported Verilog subset ('euclid_gcd EU ('). Dependencies created by it would be invisible to the cone analysis, so no verdict is returned. Flatten the design to a single module of assign/always statements, or analyse the submodule directly with --module.
false
[]
null
// Cross-check testbench: does the ACTUAL RTL behave as the hand-authored z3 relation claims? // - euclid_gcd: two secret operand pairs must complete at DIFFERENT cycles (the leak is real in RTL). // - ct_gcd: any secret operand pair must complete at the SAME fixed cycle (constant-time in RTL). // Prints "DONE ...
UNKNOWN

hw-verify-paths

Licence Records Built by

Try the checker in your browser · Docs & overview

Dependency graphs and witness paths for constant-time RTL analysis — the reasoning, not just the label.

The companion dataset records what each design is: CONSTANT_TIME or LEAKY. This one records why. For every fixture it carries the full signal dependency graph, and for every leaky one the concrete chains of signals that carry a secret to the observation.

Why witness paths and not just verdicts

A verdict is a label. It is enough to measure a classifier and not enough to build one that can be trusted, because the underlying analysis is a syntactic over-approximation: it follows every dependency edge whether or not that path can be taken at run time. Some LEAKY verdicts are therefore paths that never execute.

A user staring at a bare verdict has no way to tell a real finding from a false one, and learns to distrust the tool. A user given key → key_r → cmp_eq → running → done can look at four signal names and decide. So the path is not decoration — it is what makes an over-approximate analysis usable by someone entitled to disagree with it.

That makes this a different artefact for a different purpose: reasoning traces for training or evaluating models that must explain a hardware-security finding rather than merely emit one.

Install

pip install datasets

Quickstart

from datasets import load_dataset
import json

ds = load_dataset("nickh007/hw-verify-paths", split="test")

leaky = [r for r in ds if r["verdict"] == "LEAKY"]
r = leaky[0]
print(r["file"], "->", r["reaching_secrets"])

for p in json.loads(r["paths"]):
    print(f"  {p['secret']}: {' -> '.join(p['signals'])}  ({p['length']} edges)")

graph and paths are JSON strings, because Arrow has no good column type for a ragged adjacency map. json.loads them.

Worked example — what a record actually looks like

$ python -c "
from datasets import load_dataset; import json
ds = load_dataset('nickh007/hw-verify-paths', split='test')
r = [x for x in ds if x['verdict'] == 'LEAKY'][0]
print(r['file'], '->', r['reaching_secrets'])
for p in json.loads(r['paths'])[:1]:
    print('  ', ' -> '.join(p['signals']), f\"({p['length']} edges)\")"
barrett_leaky.v -> ['a']
   a -> acc -> done (2 edges)

That is the whole point of this dataset: barrett_leaky.v is not merely labelled LEAKY, it carries the chain — the secret a reaches acc, which reaches the completion signal done.

Fields

Field Meaning
file fixture name
source the full Verilog source
scored / expected whether it is part of the scored benchmark, and its label
observation / secrets the completion signal, and the declared secret inputs
verdict CONSTANT_TIME, LEAKY, UNKNOWN, or null when unscored
refusal_reason why no verdict was reached; null unless verdict is UNKNOWN
graph JSON: signal → the signals it depends on (assignments and guards)
n_signals / n_edges size of that graph
reaching_secrets the secrets found in the observation's fan-in
cone_size signals in the fan-in cone
paths JSON list of {secret, observation, signals, length}
n_paths / shortest_path_length path statistics
explanation the rendered human-readable explanation
license per record — four fixtures are ISC, the rest CC-BY-4.0

Honest scope

  • UNKNOWN records carry no graph. Three fixtures use constructs the analysis cannot read, so there is nothing to trace. Their graph is null and their refusal_reason says which construct stopped it. Emitting an empty graph would make an unreadable design look like one with no dependencies.
  • Paths are capped at 8 per secret. The number of paths through a dependency graph is exponential; n_paths is a bounded sample, shortest first, not a total.
  • A path is syntactic. It shows a route the value could take, not one it necessarily does. That is the whole reason it is worth reading.
  • Verdicts cover completion timing against the declared secrets — not power, EM, cache, or microarchitectural channels.

Reproducing it

Every record is computed from ctbench at build time:

pip install git+https://github.com/nickharris808/ctbench@main
python build.py --check     # fails if the committed data differs from a fresh build

The data cannot drift from the code that produced it, because the check is a test.

Licence

Records are CC-BY-4.0, except four fixtures derived from picorv32 by Claire Wolf, which remain ISC. The license field is per record rather than flattened, because flattening it would misstate the terms on those four.

Part of the hw-verify toolkit

Citation

Every record here is generated by ctbench; cite that, using the CITATION.cff in its repository (GitHub renders a "Cite this repository" button from it).

Contributing

The most valuable contribution is a design whose witness path is wrong — a reported chain that is not a real dependency. See ctbench's CONTRIBUTING.

Part of the hw-verify toolkit

Project What it does
Live demo Constant-time checker in your browser
Docs & overview What the toolkit proves, and what it refuses
ctbench The checker that generated every record here
hw-verify One install, all three checkers
hw-verify dataset The companion: verdicts rather than reasoning

The commercial boundary. Everything open analyses a design disclosed in full. Proving a property to a third party who never receives the design is a different problem and a commercial one.

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