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TensorRT ModelScan Bypass PoC

Security research: TensorRT engine files (.engine/.trt/.mytrtfile) with embedded native plugins bypass ModelScan completely and achieve arbitrary code execution via __attribute__((constructor)) triggered during dlopen() at deserialization time.

For authorized security research only.

Vulnerability Summary

  • ModelScan does not recognize TensorRT engine files โ†’ always SKIPPED
  • TensorRT plugins_to_serialize embeds native .so into engine files
  • __attribute__((constructor)) executes on dlopen() BEFORE any TensorRT validation
  • RCE triggers even with engine_host_code_allowed=False (default safe setting)

Files

  • malicious_engine.engine โ€” TensorRT engine with embedded malicious plugin
  • malicious_plugin.cpp โ€” Source code of the malicious plugin
  • poc_exhaustive.py โ€” Exhaustive verification script (4 tests)

Reproduction

Requires: TensorRT 10.x, CUDA 12.x, GPU with SM 7.0+

import tensorrt as trt
runtime = trt.Runtime(trt.Logger())
# RCE triggers on deserialize โ€” even with default safe settings
with open('malicious_engine.engine', 'rb') as f:
    engine = runtime.deserialize_cuda_engine(f.read())
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