Daily Papers

JEPA-family world models use a static predictor whose weights do not adapt when test-time dynamics diverge from training. We compare two mechanisms for incorporating accumulated experience into a JEPA predictor under distribution shift: operand-side injection, where a compressed experience representation is added as a residual to the predictor's hidden state (EI-JEPA), and operator-side modulation, where the same representation generates low-rank weight deltas via LoRA applied to the predictor's weights (EPM-JEPA). On a pre-registered comparison (Moving MNIST, gravity shift), EPM-JEPA (D_shift^{n=50} = 0.7848 +/- 0.0078, three seeds) differs from EI-JEPA (0.8238) by delta = 4.74% - Outcome C: a null result - by our stated criterion, a valid outcome. As a secondary, non-pre-registered observation, EPM-JEPA improves 1.90% over a no-memory baseline (0.8000), consistently across seeds, while EI-JEPA underperforms the baseline, indicating the benefit is specific to weight-level modulation. Our primary contribution is a mechanism analysis: the D_shift^{n=50} trajectory reflects three independent dynamical processes - buffer cycling, EMA target drift, and an intrinsic LoRA settling transient of +0.021 - rather than convergence to equilibrium. These findings motivate PEM-JEPA, a physics-grounded successor addressing this dynamical-peak limitation.

Inversion-based image editing in flow matching models has emerged as a powerful paradigm for training-free, text-guided image manipulation. A central challenge in this paradigm is the injection dilemma: injecting source features during denoising preserves the background of the original image but simultaneously suppresses the model's ability to synthesize edited content. Existing methods address this with fixed injection strategies -- binary on/off temporal schedules, uniform spatial mixing ratios, and channel-agnostic latent perturbation -- that ignore the inherently heterogeneous nature of injection demand across both the temporal and channel dimensions. In this paper, we present AdaEdit, a training-free adaptive editing framework that resolves this dilemma through two complementary innovations. First, we propose a Progressive Injection Schedule that replaces hard binary cutoffs with continuous decay functions (sigmoid, cosine, or linear), enabling a smooth transition from source-feature preservation to target-feature generation and eliminating feature discontinuity artifacts. Second, we introduce Channel-Selective Latent Perturbation, which estimates per-channel importance based on the distributional gap between the inverted and random latents and applies differentiated perturbation strengths accordingly -- strongly perturbing edit-relevant channels while preserving structure-encoding channels. Extensive experiments on the PIE-Bench benchmark (700 images, 10 editing types) demonstrate that AdaEdit achieves an 8.7% reduction in LPIPS, a 2.6% improvement in SSIM, and a 2.3% improvement in PSNR over strong baselines, while maintaining competitive CLIP similarity. AdaEdit is fully plug-and-play and compatible with multiple ODE solvers including Euler, RF-Solver, and FireFlow. Code is available at https://github.com/leeguandong/AdaEdit

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are increasingly integrated into clinical workflows; however, prompt injection attacks can steer these systems toward clinically unsafe or misleading outputs. We introduce the Medical Prompt Injection Benchmark (MPIB), a dataset-and-benchmark suite for evaluating clinical safety under both direct prompt injection and indirect, RAG-mediated injection across clinically grounded tasks. MPIB emphasizes outcome-level risk via the Clinical Harm Event Rate (CHER), which measures high-severity clinical harm events under a clinically grounded taxonomy, and reports CHER alongside Attack Success Rate (ASR) to disentangle instruction compliance from downstream patient risk. The benchmark comprises 9,697 curated instances constructed through multi-stage quality gates and clinical safety linting. Evaluating MPIB across a diverse set of baseline LLMs and defense configurations, we find that ASR and CHER can diverge substantially, and that robustness depends critically on whether adversarial instructions appear in the user query or in retrieved context. We release MPIB with evaluation code, adversarial baselines, and comprehensive documentation to support reproducible and systematic research on clinical prompt injection. Code and data are available at GitHub (code) and Hugging Face (data).

Automatic differentiation (AD) in reverse mode (RAD) is a central component of deep learning and other uses of large-scale optimization. Commonly used RAD algorithms such as backpropagation, however, are complex and stateful, hindering deep understanding, improvement, and parallel execution. This paper develops a simple, generalized AD algorithm calculated from a simple, natural specification. The general algorithm is then specialized by varying the representation of derivatives. In particular, applying well-known constructions to a naive representation yields two RAD algorithms that are far simpler than previously known. In contrast to commonly used RAD implementations, the algorithms defined here involve no graphs, tapes, variables, partial derivatives, or mutation. They are inherently parallel-friendly, correct by construction, and usable directly from an existing programming language with no need for new data types or programming style, thanks to use of an AD-agnostic compiler plugin.

Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents. Thus, a growing body of work have proposed a variety of defensive approaches against IPI. These can be grouped into three broad categories: 1) prompt-based (using prompting as a way to prevent agents from following malicious instructions), 2) detection-based (identifying and filtering malicious instructions), and 3) system-level (using systems insights, such as control and data isolation, for defense). However, commonly used benchmarks for evaluating defense, such as AgentDojo, are inherently static, generating a fixed distribution of IPI attacks. Consequently, static benchmarks do not usefully evaluate defense robustness to adaptive threats. We address this issue by developing AutoDojo, an adaptive extension of AgentDojo that optimizes IPI against a given defense. Using AutoDojo against state-of-the-art IPI defenses across three task suites and five target models, we make two key observations. First, many defenses offer only limited protection: a cheap, black-box adaptive attack using a frontier LLM to iteratively optimize the injection raises attack success rate (ASR) well above the level achieved by static injections against nearly all evaluated defenses. Against a filter that reduces static ASR to 0\%, AutoDojo recovers 28\% overall and 64\% on action-open tasks. Second, for prompt-level and filter-based defenses, ASR is substantially higher on action-open tasks -- where the user's request delegates the action itself to attacker-controlled content -- than on precisely specified tasks. This is a structural limit: on such tasks the injection can pose as ordinary data rather than an explicit instruction, bypassing defenses that rely on detecting instruction-like text. AutoDojo is publicly available at https://github.com/xhOwenMa/AutoDojo.