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May 19

Attack as Defense: Run-time Backdoor Implantation for Image Content Protection

As generative models achieve great success, tampering and modifying the sensitive image contents (i.e., human faces, artist signatures, commercial logos, etc.) have induced a significant threat with social impact. The backdoor attack is a method that implants vulnerabilities in a target model, which can be activated through a trigger. In this work, we innovatively prevent the abuse of image content modification by implanting the backdoor into image-editing models. Once the protected sensitive content on an image is modified by an editing model, the backdoor will be triggered, making the editing fail. Unlike traditional backdoor attacks that use data poisoning, to enable protection on individual images and eliminate the need for model training, we developed the first framework for run-time backdoor implantation, which is both time- and resource- efficient. We generate imperceptible perturbations on the images to inject the backdoor and define the protected area as the only backdoor trigger. Editing other unprotected insensitive areas will not trigger the backdoor, which minimizes the negative impact on legal image modifications. Evaluations with state-of-the-art image editing models show that our protective method can increase the CLIP-FID of generated images from 12.72 to 39.91, or reduce the SSIM from 0.503 to 0.167 when subjected to malicious editing. At the same time, our method exhibits minimal impact on benign editing, which demonstrates the efficacy of our proposed framework. The proposed run-time backdoor can also achieve effective protection on the latest diffusion models. Code are available.

  • 7 authors
·
Oct 18, 2024

A Benchmark Time Series Dataset for Semiconductor Fabrication Manufacturing Constructed using Component-based Discrete-Event Simulation Models

Advancements in high-computing devices increase the necessity for improved and new understanding and development of smart manufacturing factories. Discrete-event models with simulators have been shown to be critical to architect, designing, building, and operating the manufacturing of semiconductor chips. The diffusion, implantation, and lithography machines have intricate processes due to their feedforward and feedback connectivity. The dataset collected from simulations of the factory models holds the promise of generating valuable machine-learning models. As surrogate data-based models, their executions are highly efficient compared to the physics-based counterpart models. For the development of surrogate models, it is beneficial to have publicly available benchmark simulation models that are grounded in factory models that have concise structures and accurate behaviors. Hence, in this research, a dataset is devised and constructed based on a benchmark model of an Intel semiconductor fabrication factory. The model is formalized using the Parallel Discrete-Event System Specification and executed using the DEVS-Suite simulator. The time series dataset is constructed using discrete-event time trajectories. This dataset is further analyzed and used to develop baseline univariate and multivariate machine learning models. The dataset can also be utilized in the machine learning community for behavioral analysis based on formalized and scalable component-based discrete-event models and simulations.

  • 4 authors
·
Aug 17, 2024

Revisiting Backdoor Threat in Federated Instruction Tuning from a Signal Aggregation Perspective

Federated learning security research has predominantly focused on backdoor threats from a minority of malicious clients that intentionally corrupt model updates. This paper challenges this paradigm by investigating a more pervasive and insidious threat: backdoor vulnerabilities from low-concentration poisoned data distributed across the datasets of benign clients. This scenario is increasingly common in federated instruction tuning for language models, which often rely on unverified third-party and crowd-sourced data. We analyze two forms of backdoor data through real cases: 1) natural trigger (inherent features as implicit triggers); 2) adversary-injected trigger. To analyze this threat, we model the backdoor implantation process from signal aggregation, proposing the Backdoor Signal-to-Noise Ratio to quantify the dynamics of the distributed backdoor signal. Extensive experiments reveal the severity of this threat: With just less than 10\% of training data poisoned and distributed across clients, the attack success rate exceeds 85\%, while the primary task performance remains largely intact. Critically, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art backdoor defenses, designed for attacks from malicious clients, are fundamentally ineffective against this threat. Our findings highlight an urgent need for new defense mechanisms tailored to the realities of modern, decentralized data ecosystems.

  • 3 authors
·
Feb 17