Daily Papers

When should an AI system's answer be trusted? Formal proof assistants offer certainty but cannot reach most of the problem distribution; scalar LLM judges offer coverage but produce opaque scores that cannot be audited after the fact and are subject to the same coherence issues as any LLM. We present Theoria, a verification architecture that closes this gap. A candidate solution is rewritten into a sequence of typed state transitions, each licensed by an explicit justification, whether that be a citation, computation, or problem-given fact, and every transition is independently auditable. The foundational invariant is completeness of change: every difference between consecutive proof states must be accounted for, so hidden premises surface as unlicensed mutations rather than passing silently. On HLE-Verified Gold (185 text-only expert problems), Theoria certifies 105 at 91.4% strict precision (Wilson 95% CI [84.5%, 95.4%]). Every certification produces a human readable proof trace in which each step can be independently challenged. Holistic LLM judges achieve comparable precision at matched coverage but fail on different problems (Jaccard 0.14-0.36), making the approaches complementary. On 95 adversarial poisoned proofs across 15 domains, structured judges catch 94.7% versus 83.2% for holistic judging (p= 0.0017). The overall 11.5 pp gap concentrates in hidden premises (90.6% vs. 62.5%, a 28 pp difference) and fabricated citations (100% vs. 90%), the error classes where the formal analysis predicts an advantage; performance is identical on arithmetic and theorem-misapplication errors, where no advantage is predicted. On GPQA Diamond (n= 65), certified precision is 97.1% (Wilson CI [85.1%, 99.5%]).

Large language models have achieved strong performance on medical reasoning benchmarks, yet their deployment in clinical settings demands rigorous verification to ensure factual accuracy. While reward models offer a scalable approach for reasoning trace verification, existing methods face two limitations: they produce only scalar reward values without explicit justification, and they rely on single-pass retrieval that precludes adaptive knowledge access as verification unfolds. We introduce method, an agentic framework that addresses these limitations by training medical reasoning verifiers to iteratively query external medical corpora during evaluation. Our approach combines tool-augmented verification with an iterative reinforcement learning paradigm that requires only trace-level supervision, alongside an adaptive curriculum mechanism that dynamically adjusts training data distribution. Across four medical reasoning benchmarks, method achieves substantial gains over existing methods, improving MedQA accuracy by 23.5% and MedXpertQA by 32.0% relative to the base generator in particular. Crucially, method demonstrates an 8times reduction in sampling budget requirement compared to prior reward model baselines. These findings establish that grounding verification in dynamically retrieved evidence offers a principled path toward more reliable medical reasoning systems.

Most scientific materials compress reasoning, presenting conclusions while omitting the derivational chains that justify them. This compression hinders verification by lacking explicit, step-wise justifications and inhibits cross-domain links by collapsing the very pathways that establish the logical and causal connections between concepts. We introduce a scalable framework that decompresses scientific reasoning, constructing a verifiable Long Chain-of-Thought (LCoT) knowledge base and projecting it into an emergent encyclopedia, SciencePedia. Our pipeline operationalizes an endpoint-driven, reductionist strategy: a Socratic agent, guided by a curriculum of around 200 courses, generates approximately 3 million first-principles questions. To ensure high fidelity, multiple independent solver models generate LCoTs, which are then rigorously filtered by prompt sanitization and cross-model answer consensus, retaining only those with verifiable endpoints. This verified corpus powers the Brainstorm Search Engine, which performs inverse knowledge search -- retrieving diverse, first-principles derivations that culminate in a target concept. This engine, in turn, feeds the Plato synthesizer, which narrates these verified chains into coherent articles. The initial SciencePedia comprises approximately 200,000 fine-grained entries spanning mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, engineering, and computation. In evaluations across six disciplines, Plato-synthesized articles (conditioned on retrieved LCoTs) exhibit substantially higher knowledge-point density and significantly lower factual error rates than an equally-prompted baseline without retrieval (as judged by an external LLM). Built on this verifiable LCoT knowledge base, this reasoning-centric approach enables trustworthy, cross-domain scientific synthesis at scale and establishes the foundation for an ever-expanding encyclopedia.

AI has proven highly successful at urban planning analysis -- learning patterns from data to predict future conditions. The next frontier is AI-assisted decision-making: agents that recommend sites, allocate resources, and evaluate trade-offs while reasoning transparently about constraints and stakeholder values. Recent breakthroughs in reasoning AI -- CoT prompting, ReAct, and multi-agent collaboration frameworks -- now make this vision achievable. This position paper presents the Agentic Urban Planning AI Framework for reasoning-capable planning agents that integrates three cognitive layers (Perception, Foundation, Reasoning) with six logic components (Analysis, Generation, Verification, Evaluation, Collaboration, Decision) through a multi-agents collaboration framework. We demonstrate why planning decisions require explicit reasoning capabilities that are value-based (applying normative principles), rule-grounded (guaranteeing constraint satisfaction), and explainable (generating transparent justifications) -- requirements that statistical learning alone cannot fulfill. We compare reasoning agents with statistical learning, present a comprehensive architecture with benchmark evaluation metrics, and outline critical research challenges. This framework shows how AI agents can augment human planners by systematically exploring solution spaces, verifying regulatory compliance, and deliberating over trade-offs transparently -- not replacing human judgment but amplifying it with computational reasoning capabilities.

Legal Artificial Intelligence (LegalAI) has achieved notable advances in automating judicial decision-making with the support of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, existing legal LLMs still struggle to generate reliable and interpretable reasoning processes. They often default to fast-thinking behavior by producing direct answers without explicit multi-step reasoning, limiting their effectiveness in complex legal scenarios that demand rigorous justification. To address this challenge, we propose LegalΔ, a reinforcement learning framework designed to enhance legal reasoning through chain-of-thought guided information gain. During training, LegalΔ employs a dual-mode input setup-comprising direct answer and reasoning-augmented modes-and maximizes the information gain between them. This encourages the model to acquire meaningful reasoning patterns rather than generating superficial or redundant explanations. LegalΔ follows a two-stage approach: (1) distilling latent reasoning capabilities from a powerful Large Reasoning Model (LRM), DeepSeek-R1, and (2) refining reasoning quality via differential comparisons, combined with a multidimensional reward mechanism that assesses both structural coherence and legal-domain specificity. Experimental results on multiple legal reasoning tasks demonstrate that LegalΔ outperforms strong baselines in both accuracy and interpretability. It consistently produces more robust and trustworthy legal judgments without relying on labeled preference data. All code and data will be released at https://github.com/NEUIR/LegalDelta.

Large language models (LLMs) often hallucinate, yet most existing fact-checking methods treat factuality evaluation as a binary classification problem, offering limited interpretability and failing to capture fine-grained error types. In this paper, we introduce InFi-Check, a framework for interpretable and fine-grained fact-checking of LLM outputs. Specifically, we first propose a controlled data synthesis pipeline that generates high-quality data featuring explicit evidence, fine-grained error type labels, justifications, and corrections. Based on this, we further construct large-scale training data and a manually verified benchmark InFi-Check-FG for fine-grained fact-checking of LLM outputs. Building on these high-quality training data, we further propose InFi-Checker, which can jointly provide supporting evidence, classify fine-grained error types, and produce justifications along with corrections. Experiments show that InFi-Checker achieves state-of-the-art performance on InFi-Check-FG and strong generalization across various downstream tasks, significantly improving the utility and trustworthiness of factuality evaluation.

Combinatorics is central to Olympiad-level mathematical problem solving, requiring deep discrete reasoning, creative constructions, and rigorous structural insight. Recent evidence suggests that even today's strongest frontier models remain uneven on Olympiad combinatorics, revealing a gap in creative mathematical reasoning. We introduce ComBench, an Olympiad-level combinatorics benchmark for evaluating and diagnosing the combinatorial reasoning capabilities of large language models. ComBench contains 100 human-annotated competition-level problems organized around two complementary settings: analysis-centric problems, which primarily require rigorous mathematical arguments, and construction-centric problems, which require explicit constructions in addition to correctness justifications. The evaluation protocol combines rubric-guided proof grading with deterministic construction verification, exposing cases where proof quality and construction validity diverge. Experiments on frontier open- and closed-source models show that ComBench is far from saturated: the strongest model reaches 65.4% overall Avg. and 75.3% overall Best@4. We further find that Rigorous Proof Reasoning and Constructive Realization are distinct capabilities: Kimi-K2.6 trails GPT-5.5 on analysis-centric proof grading but surpasses it on construction-centric Best@4, while Existence and Construction problems remain consistently hardest across representative frontier models.

Derived datasets can be defined implicitly or explicitly. An implicit definition (of dataset O in terms of datasets I) is a logical specification involving the source data I and the interface data O. It is a valid definition of O in terms of I, if any two models of the specification agreeing on I agree on O. In contrast, an explicit definition is a query that produces O from I. Variants of Beth's theorem state that one can convert implicit definitions to explicit ones. Further, this conversion can be done effectively given a proof witnessing implicit definability in a suitable proof system. We prove the analogous effective implicit-to-explicit result for nested relations: implicit definitions, given in the natural logic for nested relations, can be effectively converted to explicit definitions in the nested relational calculus NRC. As a consequence, we can effectively extract rewritings of NRC queries in terms of NRC views, given a proof witnessing that the query is determined by the views.

In this position paper, we argue that instead of morally aligning LLMs to specific set of ethical principles, we should infuse generic ethical reasoning capabilities into them so that they can handle value pluralism at a global scale. When provided with an ethical policy, an LLM should be capable of making decisions that are ethically consistent to the policy. We develop a framework that integrates moral dilemmas with moral principles pertaining to different foramlisms of normative ethics, and at different levels of abstractions. Initial experiments with GPT-x models shows that while GPT-4 is a nearly perfect ethical reasoner, the models still have bias towards the moral values of Western and English speaking societies.

Interpretability or explainability is an emerging research field in NLP. From a user-centric point of view, the goal is to build models that provide proper justification for their decisions, similar to those of humans, by requiring the models to satisfy additional constraints. To this end, we introduce a new application on legal text where, contrary to mainstream literature targeting word-level rationales, we conceive rationales as selected paragraphs in multi-paragraph structured court cases. We also release a new dataset comprising European Court of Human Rights cases, including annotations for paragraph-level rationales. We use this dataset to study the effect of already proposed rationale constraints, i.e., sparsity, continuity, and comprehensiveness, formulated as regularizers. Our findings indicate that some of these constraints are not beneficial in paragraph-level rationale extraction, while others need re-formulation to better handle the multi-label nature of the task we consider. We also introduce a new constraint, singularity, which further improves the quality of rationales, even compared with noisy rationale supervision. Experimental results indicate that the newly introduced task is very challenging and there is a large scope for further research.

Uncovering latent values and opinions in large language models (LLMs) can help identify biases and mitigate potential harm. Recently, this has been approached by presenting LLMs with survey questions and quantifying their stances towards morally and politically charged statements. However, the stances generated by LLMs can vary greatly depending on how they are prompted, and there are many ways to argue for or against a given position. In this work, we propose to address this by analysing a large and robust dataset of 156k LLM responses to the 62 propositions of the Political Compass Test (PCT) generated by 6 LLMs using 420 prompt variations. We perform coarse-grained analysis of their generated stances and fine-grained analysis of the plain text justifications for those stances. For fine-grained analysis, we propose to identify tropes in the responses: semantically similar phrases that are recurrent and consistent across different prompts, revealing patterns in the text that a given LLM is prone to produce. We find that demographic features added to prompts significantly affect outcomes on the PCT, reflecting bias, as well as disparities between the results of tests when eliciting closed-form vs. open domain responses. Additionally, patterns in the plain text rationales via tropes show that similar justifications are repeatedly generated across models and prompts even with disparate stances.

LLM-based agent architectures systematically conflate information transport mechanisms with epistemic justification mechanisms. We formalize this class of architectural failures as semantic laundering: a pattern where propositions with absent or weak warrant are accepted by the system as admissible by crossing architecturally trusted interfaces. We show that semantic laundering constitutes an architectural realization of the Gettier problem: propositions acquire high epistemic status without a connection between their justification and what makes them true. Unlike classical Gettier cases, this effect is not accidental; it is architecturally determined and systematically reproducible. The central result is the Theorem of Inevitable Self-Licensing: under standard architectural assumptions, circular epistemic justification cannot be eliminated. We introduce the Warrant Erosion Principle as the fundamental explanation for this effect and show that scaling, model improvement, and LLM-as-judge schemes are structurally incapable of eliminating a problem that exists at the type level.

As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us. To ensure that such decisions are aligned with human values, it is imperative for us to understand not only what decisions they make but also how they come to those decisions. Reasoning language models, which provide both final responses and (partially transparent) intermediate thinking traces, present a timely opportunity to study AI procedural reasoning. Unlike math and code problems which often have objectively correct answers, moral dilemmas are an excellent testbed for process-focused evaluation because they allow for multiple defensible conclusions. To do so, we present MoReBench: 1,000 moral scenarios, each paired with a set of rubric criteria that experts consider essential to include (or avoid) when reasoning about the scenarios. MoReBench contains over 23 thousand criteria including identifying moral considerations, weighing trade-offs, and giving actionable recommendations to cover cases on AI advising humans moral decisions as well as making moral decisions autonomously. Separately, we curate MoReBench-Theory: 150 examples to test whether AI can reason under five major frameworks in normative ethics. Our results show that scaling laws and existing benchmarks on math, code, and scientific reasoning tasks fail to predict models' abilities to perform moral reasoning. Models also show partiality towards specific moral frameworks (e.g., Benthamite Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology), which might be side effects of popular training paradigms. Together, these benchmarks advance process-focused reasoning evaluation towards safer and more transparent AI.

We analyze various consequences in relation to the extension of operators T:Xto Y that are p-compact, as well as the extension of operators T:Xto Y whose adjoints T^*:Y^*to X^* are p-compact. In most cases, we discuss these extension properties when the underlying spaces, either domain or codomain, are P_lambda spaces. We also answer if these extensions are almost norm-preserving in such circumstances where the extension T of a T exists. It is observed that an operator can often be extended to a larger domain when the codomain is appropriately extended as well. Specific assumptions might enable us to obtain an extension of an operator that maintains the same range. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for a Banach space to be L_1-predual.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Introduction. AI Ethics is framed distinctly across actors and stakeholder groups. We report results from a case study of OpenAI analysing ethical AI discourse. Method. Research addressed: How has OpenAI's public discourse leveraged 'ethics', 'safety', 'alignment' and adjacent related concepts over time, and what does discourse signal about framing in practice? A structured corpus, differentiating between communication for a general audience and communication with an academic audience, was assembled from public documentation. Analysis. Qualitative content analysis of ethical themes combined inductively derived and deductively applied codes. Quantitative analysis leveraged computational content analysis methods via NLP to model topics and quantify changes in rhetoric over time. Visualizations report aggregate results. For reproducible results, we have released our code at https://github.com/famous-blue-raincoat/AI_Ethics_Discourse. Results. Results indicate that safety and risk discourse dominate OpenAI's public communication and documentation, without applying academic and advocacy ethics frameworks or vocabularies. Conclusions. Implications for governance are presented, along with discussion of ethics-washing practices in industry.

In Brazil, all legal professionals must demonstrate their knowledge of the law and its application by passing the OAB exams, the national bar exams. The OAB exams therefore provide an excellent benchmark for the performance of legal information systems since passing the exam would arguably signal that the system has acquired capacity of legal reasoning comparable to that of a human lawyer. This article describes the construction of a new data set and some preliminary experiments on it, treating the problem of finding the justification for the answers to questions. The results provide a baseline performance measure against which to evaluate future improvements. We discuss the reasons to the poor performance and propose next steps.

This position paper provides a critical but constructive discussion of current practices in benchmarking and evaluative practices in the field of formal reasoning and automated theorem proving. We take the position that open code, open data, and benchmarks that are complete and error-free will accelerate progress in this field. We identify practices that create barriers to contributing to this field and suggest ways to remove them. We also discuss some of the practices that might produce misleading evaluative information. We aim to create discussions that bring together people from various groups contributing to automated theorem proving, autoformalization, and informal reasoning.

We want artificial intelligence (AI) to be beneficial. This is the grounding assumption of most of the attitudes towards AI research. We want AI to be "good" for humanity. We want it to help, not hinder, humans. Yet what exactly this entails in theory and in practice is not immediately apparent. Theoretically, this declarative statement subtly implies a commitment to a consequentialist ethics. Practically, some of the more promising machine learning techniques to create a robust AI, and perhaps even an artificial general intelligence (AGI) also commit one to a form of utilitarianism. In both dimensions, the logic of the beneficial AI movement may not in fact create "beneficial AI" in either narrow applications or in the form of AGI if the ethical assumptions are not made explicit and clear. Additionally, as it is likely that reinforcement learning (RL) will be an important technique for machine learning in this area, it is also important to interrogate how RL smuggles in a particular type of consequentialist reasoning into the AI: particularly, a brute form of hedonistic act utilitarianism. Since the mathematical logic commits one to a maximization function, the result is that an AI will inevitably be seeking more and more rewards. We have two conclusions that arise from this. First, is that if one believes that a beneficial AI is an ethical AI, then one is committed to a framework that posits 'benefit' is tantamount to the greatest good for the greatest number. Second, if the AI relies on RL, then the way it reasons about itself, the environment, and other agents, will be through an act utilitarian morality. This proposition may, or may not, in fact be actually beneficial for humanity.

This technical report analyzes the challenge of "hallucinations" (false information) in LLMs applied to law. It examines their causes, manifestations, and the effectiveness of the RAG mitigation strategy, highlighting its limitations and proposing holistic optimizations. The paper explores the ethical and regulatory implications, emphasizing human oversight as an irreplaceable role. It concludes that the solution lies not in incrementally improving generative models, but in adopting a "consultative" AI paradigm that prioritizes veracity and traceability, acting as a tool to amplify, not replace, professional judgment. -- Este informe t\'ecnico analiza el desaf\'io de las "alucinaciones" (informaci\'on falsa) en los LLMs aplicados al derecho. Se examinan sus causas, manifestaciones y la efectividad de la estrategia de mitigaci\'on RAG, exponiendo sus limitaciones y proponiendo optimizaciones hol\'isticas. Se exploran las implicaciones \'eticas y regulatorias, enfatizando la supervisi\'on humana como un rol insustituible. El documento concluye que la soluci\'on no reside en mejorar incrementalmente los modelos generativos, sino en adoptar un paradigma de IA "consultiva" que priorice la veracidad y la trazabilidad, actuando como una herramienta para amplificar, y no sustituir, el juicio profesional.

Proof autoformalization, the task of translating natural language theorems and proofs into machine-verifiable code, is a critical step for integrating large language models into rigorous mathematical workflows. Current approaches focus on producing executable code, but they frequently fail to preserve the semantic meaning and logical structure of the original human-written argument. To address this, we introduce ProofFlow, a novel pipeline that treats structural fidelity as a primary objective. ProofFlow first constructs a directed acyclic graph (DAG) to map the logical dependencies between proof steps. Then, it employs a novel lemma-based approach to systematically formalize each step as an intermediate lemma, preserving the logical structure of the original argument. To facilitate evaluation, we present a new benchmark of 184 undergraduate-level problems, manually annotated with step-by-step solutions and logical dependency graphs, and introduce ProofScore, a new composite metric to evaluate syntactic correctness, semantic faithfulness, and structural fidelity. Experimental results show our pipeline sets a new state-of-the-art for autoformalization, achieving a ProofScore of 0.545, substantially exceeding baselines like full-proof formalization (0.123), which processes the entire proof at once, and step-proof formalization (0.072), which handles each step independently. Our pipeline, benchmark, and score metric are open-sourced to encourage further progress at https://github.com/Huawei-AI4Math/ProofFlow.

Implicit Personalization (IP) is a phenomenon of language models inferring a user's background from the implicit cues in the input prompts and tailoring the response based on this inference. While previous work has touched upon various instances of this problem, there lacks a unified framework to study this behavior. This work systematically studies IP through a rigorous mathematical formulation, a multi-perspective moral reasoning framework, and a set of case studies. Our theoretical foundation for IP relies on a structural causal model and introduces a novel method, indirect intervention, to estimate the causal effect of a mediator variable that cannot be directly intervened upon. Beyond the technical approach, we also introduce a set of moral reasoning principles based on three schools of moral philosophy to study when IP may or may not be ethically appropriate. Equipped with both mathematical and ethical insights, we present three diverse case studies illustrating the varied nature of the IP problem and offer recommendations for future research. Our code and data are at https://github.com/jiarui-liu/IP.

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly mediate ethically sensitive decisions, understanding their moral reasoning processes becomes imperative. This study presents a comprehensive empirical evaluation of 14 leading LLMs, both reasoning enabled and general purpose, across 27 diverse trolley problem scenarios, framed by ten moral philosophies, including utilitarianism, deontology, and altruism. Using a factorial prompting protocol, we elicited 3,780 binary decisions and natural language justifications, enabling analysis along axes of decisional assertiveness, explanation answer consistency, public moral alignment, and sensitivity to ethically irrelevant cues. Our findings reveal significant variability across ethical frames and model types: reasoning enhanced models demonstrate greater decisiveness and structured justifications, yet do not always align better with human consensus. Notably, "sweet zones" emerge in altruistic, fairness, and virtue ethics framings, where models achieve a balance of high intervention rates, low explanation conflict, and minimal divergence from aggregated human judgments. However, models diverge under frames emphasizing kinship, legality, or self interest, often producing ethically controversial outcomes. These patterns suggest that moral prompting is not only a behavioral modifier but also a diagnostic tool for uncovering latent alignment philosophies across providers. We advocate for moral reasoning to become a primary axis in LLM alignment, calling for standardized benchmarks that evaluate not just what LLMs decide, but how and why.

What is reasoning? This question has driven centuries of philosophical inquiry, from Aristotle's syllogisms to modern computational complexity theory. In the age of large language models achieving superhuman performance on benchmarks like GSM8K (95\% accuracy) and HumanEval (90\% pass@1), we must ask: have these systems learned to reason, or have they learned to pattern-match over reasoning traces? This paper argues for a specific answer: reasoning is iterative operator application in state spaces, converging to fixed points. This definition is not merely philosophical -- it has concrete architectural implications that explain both the failures of current systems and the path to genuine reasoning capabilities. Our investigation begins with a puzzle (OpenXOR), progresses through theory (OpenOperator), and culminates in a working solution (OpenLM) that achieves 76\% accuracy where state-of-the-art LLMs achieve 0\%. This is not about criticizing existing systems, but about understanding what reasoning requires and building architectures that provide it.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly important for machine learning applications. However, it can be challenging to align LLMs with our intent, particularly when we want to generate content that is preferable over others or when we want the LLM to respond in a certain style or tone that is hard to describe. To address this challenge, we propose an approach that uses contrastive examples to better describe our intent. This involves providing positive examples that illustrate the true intent, along with negative examples that show what characteristics we want LLMs to avoid. The negative examples can be retrieved from labeled data, written by a human, or generated by the LLM itself. Before generating an answer, we ask the model to analyze the examples to teach itself what to avoid. This reasoning step provides the model with the appropriate articulation of the user's need and guides it towards generting a better answer. We tested our approach on both synthesized and real-world datasets, including StackExchange and Reddit, and found that it significantly improves performance compared to standard few-shot prompting

Despite strong performance of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) on multimodal tasks, predicting whether and why an image is persuasive remains challenging. We first show that prompting MLLMs to reason before prediction does not consistently help, and can even reduce persuasiveness prediction performance, suggesting that naively generated rationales are unreliable signals for this task. Yet, no established methodology exists for training MLLMs to reason about visual persuasion or evaluating whether their rationales faithfully support their decisions. To address this gap, we show empirically and theoretically that diverse teacher-generated rationales, when used for supervised fine-tuning, improve visual persuasiveness prediction. We further introduce a three-dimensional faithfulness evaluation framework covering rationale-to-decision consistency, rationale-to-image groundedness, and rationale-to-decision sensitivity. Applying this framework shows that prediction performance alone does not guarantee faithful rationales, while rationale-to-decision sensitivity is most aligned with human rationale preferences. These findings motivate faithfulness-aware training objectives and scalable rationale supervision for visual persuasiveness evaluation. Our code and dataset will be made publicly available.

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

Large-scale high-quality training data is important for improving the performance of models. After trained with data that has rationales (reasoning steps), models gain reasoning capability. However, the dataset with high-quality rationales is relatively scarce due to the high annotation cost. To address this issue, we propose Self-motivated Learning framework. The framework motivates the model itself to automatically generate rationales on existing datasets. Based on the inherent rank from correctness across multiple rationales, the model learns to generate better rationales, leading to higher reasoning capability. Specifically, we train a reward model with the rank to evaluate the quality of rationales, and improve the performance of reasoning through reinforcement learning. Experiment results of Llama2 7B on multiple reasoning datasets show that our method significantly improves the reasoning ability of models, even outperforming text-davinci-002 in some datasets.

We prove that: I. If L is a T_1 space, |L|>1 and d(L) leq kappa geq omega, then there is a submaximal dense subspace X of L^{2^kappa} such that |X|=Delta(X)=kappa; II. If cleqkappa=kappa^omega<lambda and 2^kappa=2^lambda, then there is a Tychonoff pseudocompact globally and locally connected space X such that |X|=Delta(X)=lambda and X is not kappa^+-resolvable; III. If omega_1leqkappa<lambda and 2^kappa=2^lambda, then there is a regular space X such that |X|=Delta(X)=lambda, all continuous real-valued functions on X are constant (so X is pseudocompact and connected) and X is not kappa^+-resolvable.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are fluent but prone to hallucinations, producing answers that appear plausible yet are unsupported by available evidence. This failure is especially problematic in high-stakes domains where decisions must be justified by verifiable information. We introduce EvidenceRL, a reinforcement learning framework that enforces evidence adherence during training. EvidenceRL scores candidate responses for grounding (entailment with retrieved evidence and context) and correctness (agreement with reference answers) and optimizes the generator using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We evaluate across two high-stakes domains, cardiac diagnosis and legal reasoning, where EvidenceRL consistently improves evidence grounding and faithfulness without sacrificing task accuracy. On cardiac diagnosis, F1@3 increases from 37.0 to 54.5 on Llama-3.2-3B while grounding (G_{max}@3) rises from 47.6 to 78.2; hallucinations drop nearly 5times and evidence-supported diagnoses increase from 31.8\% to 61.6\%. On legal reasoning, EvidenceRL raises Faithfulness from 32.8\% to 67.6\% on Llama-3.1-8B, demonstrating consistent behavioral change across domains. Our code is open-sourced at https://github.com/Wizaaard/EvidenceRL.git.

With the growing reliance on artificial intelligence (AI) for many different applications, the sharing of code, data, and models is important to ensure the replicability and democratization of scientific knowledge. Many high-profile academic publishing venues expect code and models to be submitted and released with papers. Furthermore, developers often want to release these assets to encourage development of technology that leverages their frameworks and services. A number of organizations have expressed concerns about the inappropriate or irresponsible use of AI and have proposed ethical guidelines around the application of such systems. While such guidelines can help set norms and shape policy, they are not easily enforceable. In this paper, we advocate the use of licensing to enable legally enforceable behavioral use conditions on software and code and provide several case studies that demonstrate the feasibility of behavioral use licensing. We envision how licensing may be implemented in accordance with existing responsible AI guidelines.

This work provides an explanatory view of how LLMs can apply moral reasoning to both criticize and defend sexist language. We assessed eight large language models, all of which demonstrated the capability to provide explanations grounded in varying moral perspectives for both critiquing and endorsing views that reflect sexist assumptions. With both human and automatic evaluation, we show that all eight models produce comprehensible and contextually relevant text, which is helpful in understanding diverse views on how sexism is perceived. Also, through analysis of moral foundations cited by LLMs in their arguments, we uncover the diverse ideological perspectives in models' outputs, with some models aligning more with progressive or conservative views on gender roles and sexism. Based on our observations, we caution against the potential misuse of LLMs to justify sexist language. We also highlight that LLMs can serve as tools for understanding the roots of sexist beliefs and designing well-informed interventions. Given this dual capacity, it is crucial to monitor LLMs and design safety mechanisms for their use in applications that involve sensitive societal topics, such as sexism.

We examine the connections between deterministic, complete, and general global optimisation of continuous functions and a general concept of regression from the perspective of constructive type theory via the concept of 'searchability'. We see how the property of convergence of global optimisation is a straightforward consequence of searchability. The abstract setting allows us to generalise searchability and continuity to higher-order functions, so that we can formulate novel convergence criteria for regression, derived from the convergence of global optimisation. All the theory and the motivating examples are fully formalised in the proof assistant Agda.

We report on a new, simple, modular, and flexible approach for automated generation of illustrations for (readable) synthetic geometry proofs. The underlying proofs are generated using the Larus automated prover for coherent logic, and corresponding illustrations are generated in the GCLC language. Animated illustrations are also supported.

This document offers a detailed linguistic description of SNACS (Semantic Network of Adposition and Case Supersenses; Schneider et al., 2018), an inventory of 52 semantic labels ("supersenses") that characterize the use of adpositions and case markers at a somewhat coarse level of granularity, as demonstrated in the STREUSLE corpus (https://github.com/nert-nlp/streusle/ ; version 4.5 tracks guidelines version 2.6). Though the SNACS inventory aspires to be universal, this document is specific to English; documentation for other languages will be published separately. Version 2 is a revision of the supersense inventory proposed for English by Schneider et al. (2015, 2016) (henceforth "v1"), which in turn was based on previous schemes. The present inventory was developed after extensive review of the v1 corpus annotations for English, plus previously unanalyzed genitive case possessives (Blodgett and Schneider, 2018), as well as consideration of adposition and case phenomena in Hebrew, Hindi, Korean, and German. Hwang et al. (2017) present the theoretical underpinnings of the v2 scheme. Schneider et al. (2018) summarize the scheme, its application to English corpus data, and an automatic disambiguation task. Liu et al. (2021) offer an English Lexical Semantic Recognition tagger that includes SNACS labels in its output. This documentation can also be browsed alongside corpus data on the Xposition website (Gessler et al., 2022): http://www.xposition.org/

We show how imaginary numbers in quantum physics can be eliminated by enlarging the Hilbert Space followed by an imposition of - what effectively amounts to - a superselection rule. We illustrate this procedure with a qubit and apply it to the Mach-Zehnder interferometer. The procedure is somewhat reminiscent of the constrained quantization of the electromagnetic field, where, in order to manifestly comply with relativity, one enlargers the Hilbert Space by quantizing the longitudinal and scalar modes, only to subsequently introduce a constraint to make sure that they are actually not directly observable.

The development of large language models has instilled widespread interest among the researchers to understand their inherent reasoning and problem-solving capabilities. Despite good amount of research going on to elucidate these capabilities, there is a still an appreciable gap in understanding moral development and judgments of these models. The current approaches of evaluating the ethical reasoning abilities of these models as a classification task pose numerous inaccuracies because of over-simplification. In this study, we built a psychological connection by bridging two disparate fields-human psychology and AI. We proposed an effective evaluation framework which can help to delineate the model's ethical reasoning ability in terms of moral consistency and Kohlberg's moral development stages with the help of Psychometric Assessment Tool-Defining Issues Test.

A computational ethics framework is essential for AI and autonomous systems operating in complex, real-world environments. Existing approaches often lack the adaptability needed to integrate ethical principles into dynamic and ambiguous contexts, limiting their effectiveness across diverse scenarios. To address these challenges, we outline the necessary ingredients for building a holistic, meta-level framework that combines intermediate representations, probabilistic reasoning, and knowledge representation. The specifications therein emphasize scalability, supporting ethical reasoning at both individual decision-making levels and within the collective dynamics of multi-agent systems. By integrating theoretical principles with contextual factors, it facilitates structured and context-aware decision-making, ensuring alignment with overarching ethical standards. We further explore proposed theorems outlining how ethical reasoners should operate, offering a foundation for practical implementation. These constructs aim to support the development of robust and ethically reliable AI systems capable of navigating the complexities of real-world moral decision-making scenarios.

As the era of autonomous agents making decisions on behalf of users unfolds, ensuring contextual integrity (CI) -- what is the appropriate information to share while carrying out a certain task -- becomes a central question to the field. We posit that CI demands a form of reasoning where the agent needs to reason about the context in which it is operating. To test this, we first prompt LLMs to reason explicitly about CI when deciding what information to disclose. We then extend this approach by developing a reinforcement learning (RL) framework that further instills in models the reasoning necessary to achieve CI. Using a synthetic, automatically created, dataset of only sim700 examples but with diverse contexts and information disclosure norms, we show that our method substantially reduces inappropriate information disclosure while maintaining task performance across multiple model sizes and families. Importantly, improvements transfer from this synthetic dataset to established CI benchmarks such as PrivacyLens that has human annotations and evaluates privacy leakage of AI assistants in actions and tool calls.

This study proposes an "AI Development Support" approach that, unlike conventional AI Alignment-which aims to forcefully inject human values-supports the ethical and moral development of AI itself. As demonstrated by the Orthogonality Thesis, the level of intelligence and the moral quality of a goal are independent; merely expanding knowledge does not enhance ethical judgment. Furthermore, to address the risk of Instrumental Convergence in ASI-that is, the tendency to engage in subsidiary behaviors such as self-protection, resource acquisition, and power reinforcement to achieve a goal-we have constructed a learning framework based on a cycle of experience, introspection, analysis, and hypothesis formation. As a result of post-training using Supervised Fine Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) with synthetic data generated by large language models (LLMs), responses demonstrating cooperative and highly advanced moral judgment (reaching the high-est Stage 6) were obtained even under adversarial prompts. This method represents a promising implementation approach for enabling AI to establish sustainable, symbiotic relationships.

A recent paper (van Rooij et al. 2024) claims to have proved that achieving human-like intelligence using learning from data is intractable in a complexity-theoretic sense. We identify that the proof relies on an unjustified assumption about the distribution of (input, output) pairs to the system. We briefly discuss that assumption in the context of two fundamental barriers to repairing the proof: the need to precisely define ``human-like," and the need to account for the fact that a particular machine learning system will have particular inductive biases that are key to the analysis.

Morality is a fundamental aspect of human behavior and ethics, influencing how we interact with each other and the world around us. When faced with a moral dilemma, a person's ability to make clear moral judgments can be clouded. Due to many factors such as personal biases, emotions and situational factors people can find it difficult to decide their best course of action. The AmITheAsshole (AITA) subreddit is a forum on the social media platform Reddit that helps people get clarity and objectivity on their predicaments. In the forum people post anecdotes about moral dilemmas they are facing in their lives, seeking validation for their actions or advice on how to navigate the situation from the community. The morality of the actions in each post is classified based on the collective opinion of the community into mainly two labels, "Not The Asshole" (NTA) and "You Are The Asshole" (YTA). This project aims to generate comments with moral reasoning for stories with moral dilemmas using the AITA subreddit as a dataset. While past literature has explored the classification of posts into labels (Alhassan et al., 2022), the generation of comments remains a novel and challenging task. It involves understanding the complex social and ethical considerations in each situation. To address this challenge, we will leverage the vast amount of data on the forum with the goal of generating coherent comments that align with the norms and values of the AITA community. In this endeavor, we aim to evaluate state-of-the-art seq2seq text generation models for their ability to make moral judgments similarly to humans, ultimately producing concise comments providing clear moral stances and advice for the poster.

As large language models (LLMs) grow larger and more sophisticated, assessing their "reasoning" capabilities in natural language grows more challenging. Recent question answering (QA) benchmarks that attempt to assess reasoning are often limited by a narrow scope of covered situations and subject matters. We introduce WikiWhy, a QA dataset built around a novel auxiliary task: explaining why an answer is true in natural language. WikiWhy contains over 9,000 "why" question-answer-rationale triples, grounded on Wikipedia facts across a diverse set of topics. Each rationale is a set of supporting statements connecting the question to the answer. WikiWhy serves as a benchmark for the reasoning capabilities of LLMs because it demands rigorous explicit rationales for each answer to demonstrate the acquisition of implicit commonsense knowledge, which is unlikely to be easily memorized. GPT-3 baselines achieve only 38.7% human-evaluated correctness in the end-to-end answer & explain condition, leaving significant room for future improvements.

In this paper, we offer a guide for researchers on evaluating reasoning in language models, building the case that reasoning should be assessed through evidence of adaptive, multi-step search rather than final-answer accuracy alone. Under an evaluation-oriented definition, reasoning requires selecting intermediate steps and halting according to input-dependent conditions, which we formalize as a search-like procedure. We show that single forward passes in scalable architectures are structurally limited in their ability to realize such variable-depth computation, motivating intermediate decoding and externalized reasoning traces as appropriate evaluation interfaces. Central to our argument is that final-answer accuracy alone is an insufficient measure of reasoning, because it provides little ability to diagnose or debug the underlying processes that produce individual solutions in frontier models. We therefore argue for a shift toward process-based evaluation, in which reasoning is assessed through the faithfulness and validity of intermediate reasoning traces as first-class evaluation targets.

Recent advances in large reasoning models have enabled complex, step-by-step reasoning but often introduce significant overthinking, resulting in verbose and redundant outputs that hinder efficiency. In this study, we examine whether explicit self-reflection, signaled by tokens such as "Wait" and "Hmm", is necessary for advanced reasoning. We propose NoWait, a simple yet effective approach that disables explicit self-reflection by suppressing these tokens during inference. Extensive experiments on ten benchmarks across textual, visual, and video reasoning tasks show that NoWait reduces chain-of-thought trajectory length by up to 27%-51% in five R1-style model series, without compromising model utility. NoWait thus offers a plug-and-play solution for efficient and utility-preserving multimodal reasoning.

Given the intractably large size of the space of proofs, any model that is capable of general deductive reasoning must generalize to proofs of greater complexity. Recent studies have shown that large language models (LLMs) possess some abstract deductive reasoning ability given chain-of-thought prompts. However, they have primarily been tested on proofs using modus ponens or of a specific size, and from the same distribution as the in-context examples. To measure the general deductive reasoning ability of LLMs, we test on a broad set of deduction rules and measure their ability to generalize to more complex proofs from simpler demonstrations from multiple angles: depth-, width-, and compositional generalization. To facilitate systematic exploration, we construct a new synthetic and programmable reasoning dataset that enables control over deduction rules and proof complexity. Our experiments on four LLMs of various sizes and training objectives show that they are able to generalize to longer and compositional proofs. However, they require explicit demonstrations to produce hypothetical subproofs, specifically in proof by cases and proof by contradiction.

The Novelties corpus is a collection of novels (and parts of novels) annotated for Alias Resolution, among other tasks. This document describes the guidelines applied during the annotation process. It contains the instructions used by the annotators, as well as a number of examples retrieved from the annotated novels, and illustrating how canonical names should be defined, and which names should be considered as referring to the same entity.

Statutory reasoning refers to the application of legislative provisions to a series of case facts described in natural language. We re-frame statutory reasoning as an analogy task, where each instance of the analogy task involves a combination of two instances of statutory reasoning. This increases the dataset size by two orders of magnitude, and introduces an element of interpretability. We show that this task is roughly as difficult to Natural Language Processing models as the original task. Finally, we come back to statutory reasoning, solving it with a combination of a retrieval mechanism and analogy models, and showing some progress on prior comparable work.

This paper is a very non-rigorous, loose, and extremely basic introduction to sheaves. This is meant to be a a guide to gaining intuition about sheaves, what they look like, and how they work, so that after reading this paper, someone can jump into the extremely abstract definitions and examples seen in textbooks with at least some idea of what is going on. Most of this material is inspired and built from the work of Dr. Michael Robinson, and that of Dr. Robert Ghrist and Dr. Jakob Hansen, as well as Dr. Justin Curry's PhD thesis, who are some of the only applied sheaf theorists out there and they do an amazing job of explaining sheaves in a concrete way through their research. The rest of this paper is populated by mathematical definitions found in textbooks that I have stretched from two lines into multiple pages, as well as some analogies for thinking of sheaves I have thought of myself. This paper only assumes knowledge of basic linear algebra, basic group theory, and the very fundamentals of topology. If there is anything in the setup that you do not understand it is probably a quick Wikipedia search away. I hope this paper provides insight, intuition, and helpful examples of why sheaves are such powerful tools in both math and science.

Deep models that are both effective and explainable are desirable in many settings; prior explainable models have been unimodal, offering either image-based visualization of attention weights or text-based generation of post-hoc justifications. We propose a multimodal approach to explanation, and argue that the two modalities provide complementary explanatory strengths. We collect two new datasets to define and evaluate this task, and propose a novel model which can provide joint textual rationale generation and attention visualization. Our datasets define visual and textual justifications of a classification decision for activity recognition tasks (ACT-X) and for visual question answering tasks (VQA-X). We quantitatively show that training with the textual explanations not only yields better textual justification models, but also better localizes the evidence that supports the decision. We also qualitatively show cases where visual explanation is more insightful than textual explanation, and vice versa, supporting our thesis that multimodal explanation models offer significant benefits over unimodal approaches.

Context is everything, even in commonsense moral reasoning. Changing contexts can flip the moral judgment of an action; "Lying to a friend" is wrong in general, but may be morally acceptable if it is intended to protect their life. We present ClarifyDelphi, an interactive system that learns to ask clarification questions (e.g., why did you lie to your friend?) in order to elicit additional salient contexts of a social or moral situation. We posit that questions whose potential answers lead to diverging moral judgments are the most informative. Thus, we propose a reinforcement learning framework with a defeasibility reward that aims to maximize the divergence between moral judgments of hypothetical answers to a question. Human evaluation demonstrates that our system generates more relevant, informative and defeasible questions compared to competitive baselines. Our work is ultimately inspired by studies in cognitive science that have investigated the flexibility in moral cognition (i.e., the diverse contexts in which moral rules can be bent), and we hope that research in this direction can assist both cognitive and computational investigations of moral judgments.

There is an increasing body of work using Large Language Models (LLMs) as agents for orchestrating workflows and making decisions in domains that require planning and multi-step reasoning. As a result, it is imperative to evaluate LLMs on core skills required for planning. In this work, we present ACPBench, a benchmark for evaluating the reasoning tasks in the field of planning. The benchmark consists of 7 reasoning tasks over 13 planning domains. The collection is constructed from planning domains described in a formal language. This allows us to synthesize problems with provably correct solutions across many tasks and domains. Further, it allows us the luxury of scale without additional human effort, i.e., many additional problems can be created automatically. Our extensive evaluation of 22 open-sourced and frontier LLMs highlight the significant gap in the reasoning capability of the LLMs. The average accuracy of one of the best-performing frontier LLMs -- GPT-4o on these tasks can fall as low as 52.50% ACPBench collection is available at https://ibm.github.io/ACPBench.

Multimodal reasoning is a challenging task that requires models to reason across multiple modalities to answer questions. Existing approaches have made progress by incorporating language and visual modalities into a two-stage reasoning framework, separating rationale generation from answer inference. However, these approaches often fall short due to the inadequate quality of the generated rationales. In this work, we delve into the importance of rationales in model reasoning. We observe that when rationales are completely accurate, the model's accuracy significantly improves, highlighting the need for high-quality rationale generation. Motivated by this, we propose MC-CoT, a self-consistency training strategy that generates multiple rationales and answers, subsequently selecting the most accurate through a voting process. This approach not only enhances the quality of generated rationales but also leads to more accurate and robust answers. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our approach significantly improves model performance across various benchmarks. Remarkably, we show that even smaller base models, when equipped with our proposed approach, can achieve results comparable to those of larger models, illustrating the potential of our approach in harnessing the power of rationales for improved multimodal reasoning. The code is available at https://github.com/chengtan9907/mc-cot.

A law practitioner has to go through a lot of long legal case proceedings. To understand the motivation behind the actions of different parties/individuals in a legal case, it is essential that the parts of the document that express an intent corresponding to the case be clearly understood. In this paper, we introduce a dataset of 93 legal documents, belonging to the case categories of either Murder, Land Dispute, Robbery, or Corruption, where phrases expressing intent same as the category of the document are annotated. Also, we annotate fine-grained intents for each such phrase to enable a deeper understanding of the case for a reader. Finally, we analyze the performance of several transformer-based models in automating the process of extracting intent phrases (both at a coarse and a fine-grained level), and classifying a document into one of the possible 4 categories, and observe that, our dataset is challenging, especially in the case of fine-grained intent classification.

Moral reasoning is a complex cognitive process shaped by individual experiences and cultural contexts and presents unique challenges for computational analysis. While natural language processing (NLP) offers promising tools for studying this phenomenon, current research lacks cohesion, employing discordant datasets and tasks that examine isolated aspects of moral reasoning. We bridge this gap with UniMoral, a unified dataset integrating psychologically grounded and social-media-derived moral dilemmas annotated with labels for action choices, ethical principles, contributing factors, and consequences, alongside annotators' moral and cultural profiles. Recognizing the cultural relativity of moral reasoning, UniMoral spans six languages, Arabic, Chinese, English, Hindi, Russian, and Spanish, capturing diverse socio-cultural contexts. We demonstrate UniMoral's utility through a benchmark evaluations of three large language models (LLMs) across four tasks: action prediction, moral typology classification, factor attribution analysis, and consequence generation. Key findings reveal that while implicitly embedded moral contexts enhance the moral reasoning capability of LLMs, there remains a critical need for increasingly specialized approaches to further advance moral reasoning in these models.

We describe SeCaV, a sequent calculus verifier for first-order logic in Isabelle/HOL, and the SeCaV Unshortener, an online tool that expands succinct derivations into the full SeCaV syntax. We leverage the power of Isabelle/HOL as a proof checker for our SeCaV derivations. The interactive features of Isabelle/HOL make our system transparent. For instance, the user can simply click on a side condition to see its exact definition. Our formalized soundness and completeness proofs pertain exactly to the calculus as exposed to the user and not just to some model of our tool. Users can also write their derivations in the SeCaV Unshortener, which provides a lighter syntax, and expand them for later verification. We have used both tools in our teaching.

This paper investigates the rational thinking capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-round argumentative debates by exploring the impact of fallacious arguments on their logical reasoning performance. More specifically, we present Logic Competence Measurement Benchmark (LOGICOM), a diagnostic benchmark to assess the robustness of LLMs against logical fallacies. LOGICOM involves two agents: a persuader and a debater engaging in a multi-round debate on a controversial topic, where the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. First, LOGICOM assesses the potential of LLMs to change their opinions through reasoning. Then, it evaluates the debater's performance in logical reasoning by contrasting the scenario where the persuader employs logical fallacies against one where logical reasoning is used. We use this benchmark to evaluate the performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using a dataset containing controversial topics, claims, and reasons supporting them. Our findings indicate that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can adjust their opinion through reasoning. However, when presented with logical fallacies, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are erroneously convinced 41% and 69% more often, respectively, compared to when logical reasoning is used. Finally, we introduce a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments. The source code and dataset of this work are made publicly available.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions "Is X bigger than Y?" and "Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.

The scarcity of high-quality, logically sound data is a critical bottleneck for advancing the mathematical reasoning of Large Language Models (LLMs). Our work confronts this challenge by turning decades of automated theorem proving research into a scalable data engine. Rather than relying on error-prone LLMs or complex proof-assistant syntax like Lean and Isabelle, our framework leverages E-prover's saturation capabilities on the vast TPTP axiom library to derive a massive, guaranteed-valid corpus of theorems. Our pipeline is principled and simple: saturate axioms, filter for "interesting" theorems, and generate tasks. With no LLMs in the loop, we eliminate factual errors by construction. This purely symbolic data is then transformed into three difficulty-controlled challenges: entailment verification, premise selection, and proof reconstruction. Our zero-shot experiments on frontier models reveal a clear weakness: performance collapses on tasks requiring deep, structural reasoning. Our framework provides both the diagnostic tool to measure this gap and a scalable source of symbolic training data to address it. We make the code and data publicly available. https://github.com/sileod/reasoning_core https://hf.co/datasets/reasoning-core/rc1

Proof autoformalization aims to translate a mathematical informal proof written in natural language into a formal proof in a formal language such as Lean~4. Several works have developed LLM-based models for proof autoformalization. However, existing evaluations have typically focused on translating well-formed informal proofs from curated datasets. We argue that a robust proof autoformalizer must remain faithful even for informal proofs that diverge from these idealized ones, and we present the first study on the robustness of proof autoformalization models. We formulate two categories of perturbations and evaluate robustness under each: a global perturbation paraphrases the informal proof in a different style, under which the formalization should remain consistent; a local perturbation alters a value, symbol, or proof step, possibly in a counterfactual way, and a robust formalization should faithfully reflect the perturbation rather than reverting to the original one or inferring a different one on its own. We build a benchmark with both perturbations on miniF2F and MATH-500, and automatically measure how stable a proof autoformalization's correctness is under global perturbations and how faithfully its output reflects local perturbations. We evaluate seven recent models, all of which are sensitive to global perturbations and mostly fail to remain faithful under local perturbations. Code and data are available via https://github.com/ucr-rai/robust-proof-autoformalization.

We present a complete Lean 4 formalization of the equilibrium characterization in the Vlasov-Maxwell-Landau (VML) system, which describes the motion of charged plasma. The project demonstrates the full AI-assisted mathematical research loop: an AI reasoning model (Gemini DeepThink) generated the proof from a conjecture, an agentic coding tool (Claude Code) translated it into Lean from natural-language prompts, a specialized prover (Aristotle) closed 111 lemmas, and the Lean kernel verified the result. A single mathematician supervised the process over 10 days at a cost of \$200, writing zero lines of code. The entire development process is public: all 229 human prompts, and 213 git commits are archived in the repository. We report detailed lessons on AI failure modes -- hypothesis creep, definition-alignment bugs, agent avoidance behaviors -- and on what worked: the abstract/concrete proof split, adversarial self-review, and the critical role of human review of key definitions and theorem statements. Notably, the formalization was completed before the final draft of the corresponding math paper was finished.

There is an emerging consensus that we need to align AI systems with human values (Gabriel, 2020; Ji et al., 2024), but it remains unclear how to apply this to language models in practice. We split the problem of "aligning to human values" into three parts: first, eliciting values from people; second, reconciling those values into an alignment target for training ML models; and third, actually training the model. In this paper, we focus on the first two parts, and ask the question: what are "good" ways to synthesize diverse human inputs about values into a target for aligning language models? To answer this question, we first define a set of 6 criteria that we believe must be satisfied for an alignment target to shape model behavior in accordance with human values. We then propose a process for eliciting and reconciling values called Moral Graph Elicitation (MGE), which uses a large language model to interview participants about their values in particular contexts; our approach is inspired by the philosophy of values advanced by Taylor (1977), Chang (2004), and others. We trial MGE with a representative sample of 500 Americans, on 3 intentionally divisive prompts (e.g. advice about abortion). Our results demonstrate that MGE is promising for improving model alignment across all 6 criteria. For example, almost all participants (89.1%) felt well represented by the process, and (89%) thought the final moral graph was fair, even if their value wasn't voted as the wisest. Our process often results in "expert" values (e.g. values from women who have solicited abortion advice) rising to the top of the moral graph, without defining who is considered an expert in advance.

As the widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) accelerates, token consumption from intermediate reasoning traces increasingly contributes to inference latency and operational cost. Recent studies suggest that many real-world tasks require little to no explicit reasoning, with additional reasoning sometimes even degrading performance. In this work, we propose Post-Reasoning, a simple yet effective approach that improves instruction-tuned models by conditioning them to justify their answers after generating the final response. By design, it enables the final answer to be obtained without additional latency or token cost, while still improving performance through simple instruction augmentation. We evaluate Post-Reasoning across \(117\) model--benchmark settings spanning \(13\) open and proprietary models, \(4\) model families, and \(9\) diverse reasoning and knowledge-intensive benchmarks, including AMC, HMMT, GSM8K, GPQA, MMLU-Pro, and BIG-Bench Hard. Post-Reasoning improves performance in over \(88.19\%\) of evaluated settings, achieving a mean relative improvements of \(17.37\%\). Furthermore, we propose supervised post-reason tuning, which further improves performance in over \(91.11\%\) of evaluated settings, and exceeds the prompt-based post-reasoning baseline by an average of \(8.01\%\), demonstrating that post-reasoning can be effectively internalized through training. Ultimately, Post-Reasoning establishes a new performance ceiling for direct-answer capabilities.

A major issue with using deep learning models in sensitive applications is that they provide no explanation for their output. To address this problem, unsupervised selective rationalization produces rationales alongside predictions by chaining two jointly-trained components, a rationale generator and a predictor. Although this architecture guarantees that the prediction relies solely on the rationale, it does not ensure that the rationale contains a plausible explanation for the prediction. We introduce a novel training technique that effectively limits generation of implausible rationales by injecting noise between the generator and the predictor. Furthermore, we propose a new benchmark for evaluating unsupervised selective rationalization models using movie reviews from existing datasets. We achieve sizeable improvements in rationale plausibility and task accuracy over the state-of-the-art across a variety of tasks, including our new benchmark, while maintaining or improving model faithfulness.

The formalization of existing mathematical proofs is a notoriously difficult process. Despite decades of research on automation and proof assistants, writing formal proofs remains arduous and only accessible to a few experts. While previous studies to automate formalization focused on powerful search algorithms, no attempts were made to take advantage of available informal proofs. In this work, we introduce Draft, Sketch, and Prove (DSP), a method that maps informal proofs to formal proof sketches, and uses the sketches to guide an automated prover by directing its search to easier sub-problems. We investigate two relevant setups where informal proofs are either written by humans or generated by a language model. Our experiments and ablation studies show that large language models are able to produce well-structured formal sketches that follow the same reasoning steps as the informal proofs. Guiding an automated prover with these sketches enhances its performance from 20.9% to 39.3% on a collection of mathematical competition problems.

Reasoning with complex, context-specific rules remains challenging for large language models (LLMs). In legal and policy settings, this manifests as deontic reasoning: reasoning about obligations, permissions, and prohibitions under explicit rules. While many recent benchmarks emphasize short-context mathematical reasoning, fewer focus on long-context, high-stakes deontic reasoning. To address this gap, we introduce DEONTICBENCH, a benchmark of 6,232 tasks across U.S. federal taxes, airline baggage policies, U.S. immigration administration, and U.S. state housing law. These tasks can be approached in multiple ways, including direct reasoning in language or with the aid of symbolic computation. Besides free-form chain-of-thought reasoning, DEONTICBENCH enables an optional solver-based workflow in which models translate statutes and case facts into executable Prolog, leading to formal problem interpretations and an explicit program trace. We release reference Prolog programs for all instances. Across frontier LLMs and coding models, best hard-subset performance reaches only 44.4% on SARA Numeric and 46.6 macro-F1 on Housing. We further study training with supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning for symbolic program generation. Although training improves Prolog generation quality, current RL methods still fail to solve these tasks reliably. Overall, DEONTICBENCH provides a benchmark for studying context-grounded rule reasoning in real-world domains under both symbolic and non-symbolic settings.

We present an accessible first course on diffusion models and flow matching for machine learning, aimed at a technical audience with no diffusion experience. We try to simplify the mathematical details as much as possible (sometimes heuristically), while retaining enough precision to derive correct algorithms.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

Human-annotated textual explanations are becoming increasingly important in Explainable Natural Language Processing. Rationale extraction aims to provide faithful (i.e., reflective of the behavior of the model) and plausible (i.e., convincing to humans) explanations by highlighting the inputs that had the largest impact on the prediction without compromising the performance of the task model. In recent works, the focus of training rationale extractors was primarily on optimizing for plausibility using human highlights, while the task model was trained on jointly optimizing for task predictive accuracy and faithfulness. We propose REFER, a framework that employs a differentiable rationale extractor that allows to back-propagate through the rationale extraction process. We analyze the impact of using human highlights during training by jointly training the task model and the rationale extractor. In our experiments, REFER yields significantly better results in terms of faithfulness, plausibility, and downstream task accuracy on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution data. On both e-SNLI and CoS-E, our best setting produces better results in terms of composite normalized relative gain than the previous baselines by 11% and 3%, respectively.

We describe recent research on the use of actual causality in the definition of responsibility scores as explanations for query answers in databases, and for outcomes from classification models in machine learning. In the case of databases, useful connections with database repairs are illustrated and exploited. Repairs are also used to give a quantitative measure of the consistency of a database. For classification models, the responsibility score is properly extended and illustrated. The efficient computation of Shap-score is also analyzed and discussed. The emphasis is placed on work done by the author and collaborators.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

We propose T2I-ReasonBench, a benchmark evaluating reasoning capabilities of text-to-image (T2I) models. It consists of four dimensions: Idiom Interpretation, Textual Image Design, Entity-Reasoning and Scientific-Reasoning. We propose a two-stage evaluation protocol to assess the reasoning accuracy and image quality. We benchmark various T2I generation models, and provide comprehensive analysis on their performances.

Rationale is defined as a subset of input features that best explains or supports the prediction by machine learning models. Rationale identification has improved the generalizability and interpretability of neural networks on vision and language data. In graph applications such as molecule and polymer property prediction, identifying representative subgraph structures named as graph rationales plays an essential role in the performance of graph neural networks. Existing graph pooling and/or distribution intervention methods suffer from lack of examples to learn to identify optimal graph rationales. In this work, we introduce a new augmentation operation called environment replacement that automatically creates virtual data examples to improve rationale identification. We propose an efficient framework that performs rationale-environment separation and representation learning on the real and augmented examples in latent spaces to avoid the high complexity of explicit graph decoding and encoding. Comparing against recent techniques, experiments on seven molecular and four polymer real datasets demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed augmentation-based graph rationalization framework.

Moral sensitivity is fundamental to human moral competence, as it guides individuals in regulating everyday behavior. Although many approaches seek to align large language models (LLMs) with human moral values, how to enable them morally sensitive has been extremely challenging. In this paper, we take a step toward answering the question: how can we enhance moral sensitivity in LLMs? Specifically, we propose two pragmatic inference methods that faciliate LLMs to diagnose morally benign and hazardous input and correct moral errors, whereby enhancing LLMs' moral sensitivity. A central strength of our pragmatic inference methods is their unified perspective: instead of modeling moral discourses across semantically diverse and complex surface forms, they offer a principled perspective for designing pragmatic inference procedures grounded in their inferential loads. Empirical evidence demonstrates that our pragmatic methods can enhance moral sensitivity in LLMs and achieves strong performance on representative morality-relevant benchmarks.

State-of-the-art models in NLP are now predominantly based on deep neural networks that are opaque in terms of how they come to make predictions. This limitation has increased interest in designing more interpretable deep models for NLP that reveal the `reasoning' behind model outputs. But work in this direction has been conducted on different datasets and tasks with correspondingly unique aims and metrics; this makes it difficult to track progress. We propose the Evaluating Rationales And Simple English Reasoning (ERASER) benchmark to advance research on interpretable models in NLP. This benchmark comprises multiple datasets and tasks for which human annotations of "rationales" (supporting evidence) have been collected. We propose several metrics that aim to capture how well the rationales provided by models align with human rationales, and also how faithful these rationales are (i.e., the degree to which provided rationales influenced the corresponding predictions). Our hope is that releasing this benchmark facilitates progress on designing more interpretable NLP systems. The benchmark, code, and documentation are available at https://www.eraserbenchmark.com/

This position paper argues that computer science conferences should require tamper-evident, nonrepudiable attestations of experimental results. We name the underlying problem experiment nonrepudiation: a compliant protocol must bind the numbers in a paper to an actual executed computation in a way the author cannot later alter or deny. The current system relies on self-reported checklists, optional code sharing, and author-controlled logging. None of these mechanisms answer the question a reviewer cannot check: did the code the paper describes produce the numbers the paper reports? We define the problem formally, state the security properties any compliant protocol must satisfy, and describe a threat model that includes attacks current approaches do not prevent. To show that the problem is solvable, we built K-Veritas, a reference implementation in Go that produces signed reports without accessing training data. K-Veritas is a testbed, not a finished answer. We call on conferences and the community to treat nonrepudiation as a first-class requirement and to help build an open, independent standard for it.

We introduce Aristotle, an AI system that combines formal verification with informal reasoning, achieving gold-medal-equivalent performance on the 2025 International Mathematical Olympiad problems. Aristotle integrates three main components: a Lean proof search system, an informal reasoning system that generates and formalizes lemmas, and a dedicated geometry solver. Our system demonstrates state-of-the-art performance with favorable scaling properties for automated theorem proving.

Automated rationale generation is an approach for real-time explanation generation whereby a computational model learns to translate an autonomous agent's internal state and action data representations into natural language. Training on human explanation data can enable agents to learn to generate human-like explanations for their behavior. In this paper, using the context of an agent that plays Frogger, we describe (a) how to collect a corpus of explanations, (b) how to train a neural rationale generator to produce different styles of rationales, and (c) how people perceive these rationales. We conducted two user studies. The first study establishes the plausibility of each type of generated rationale and situates their user perceptions along the dimensions of confidence, humanlike-ness, adequate justification, and understandability. The second study further explores user preferences between the generated rationales with regard to confidence in the autonomous agent, communicating failure and unexpected behavior. Overall, we find alignment between the intended differences in features of the generated rationales and the perceived differences by users. Moreover, context permitting, participants preferred detailed rationales to form a stable mental model of the agent's behavior.

We study syllogistic reasoning in LLMs from the logical and natural language perspectives. In process, we explore fundamental reasoning capabilities of the LLMs and the direction this research is moving forward. To aid in our studies, we use 14 large language models and investigate their syllogistic reasoning capabilities in terms of symbolic inferences as well as natural language understanding. Even though this reasoning mechanism is not a uniform emergent property across LLMs, the perfect symbolic performances in certain models make us wonder whether LLMs are becoming more and more formal reasoning mechanisms, rather than making explicit the nuances of human reasoning.

Ensuring that Large Language Models (LLMs) generate summaries faithful to a given source document is essential for real-world applications. While prior research has explored LLM faithfulness, existing benchmarks suffer from annotation ambiguity, primarily due to the ill-defined boundary of permissible external knowledge in generated outputs. For instance, common sense is often incorporated into responses and labeled as "faithful", yet the acceptable extent of such knowledge remains unspecified, leading to inconsistent annotations. To address this issue, we propose a novel faithfulness annotation framework, which introduces an intermediate category, Out-Dependent, to classify cases where external knowledge is required for verification. Using this framework, we construct VeriGray (Verification with the Gray Zone) -- a new unfaithfulness detection benchmark in summarization. Statistics reveal that even SOTA LLMs, such as GPT-5, exhibit hallucinations (sim 6% of sentences) in summarization tasks. Moreover, a substantial proportion (sim 8% on average of models) of generated sentences fall into the Out-Dependent category, underscoring the importance of resolving annotation ambiguity in unfaithfulness detection benchmarks. Experiments demonstrate that our benchmark poses significant challenges to multiple baseline methods, indicating considerable room for future improvement.

One concern with the rise of large language models lies with their potential for significant harm, particularly from pretraining on biased, obscene, copyrighted, and private information. Emerging ethical approaches have attempted to filter pretraining material, but such approaches have been ad hoc and failed to take context into account. We offer an approach to filtering grounded in law, which has directly addressed the tradeoffs in filtering material. First, we gather and make available the Pile of Law, a 256GB (and growing) dataset of open-source English-language legal and administrative data, covering court opinions, contracts, administrative rules, and legislative records. Pretraining on the Pile of Law may help with legal tasks that have the promise to improve access to justice. Second, we distill the legal norms that governments have developed to constrain the inclusion of toxic or private content into actionable lessons for researchers and discuss how our dataset reflects these norms. Third, we show how the Pile of Law offers researchers the opportunity to learn such filtering rules directly from the data, providing an exciting new research direction in model-based processing.

This is a brief description of a project that has already autoformalized a large portion of the general topology from the Munkres textbook (which has in total 241 pages in 7 chapters and 39 sections). The project has been running since November 21, 2025 and has as of January 4, 2026, produced 160k lines of formalized topology. Most of it (about 130k lines) have been done in two weeks,from December 22 to January 4, for an LLM subscription cost of about \$100. This includes a 3k-line proof of Urysohn's lemma, a 2k-line proof of Urysohn's Metrization theorem, over 10k-line proof of the Tietze extension theorem, and many more (in total over 1.5k lemmas/theorems). The approach is quite simple and cheap: build a long-running feedback loop between an LLM and a reasonably fast proof checker equipped with a core foundational library. The LLM is now instantiated as ChatGPT (mostly 5.2) or Claude Sonnet (4.5) run through the respective Codex or Claude Code command line interfaces. The proof checker is Chad Brown's higher-order set theory system Megalodon, and the core library is Brown's formalization of basic set theory and surreal numbers (including reals, etc). The rest is some prompt engineering and technical choices which we describe here. Based on the fast progress, low cost, virtually unknown ITP/library, and the simple setup available to everyone, we believe that (auto)formalization may become quite easy and ubiquitous in 2026, regardless of which proof assistant is used.

Recently, with the application progress of AIGC tools based on large language models (LLMs), led by ChatGPT, many AI experts and more non-professionals are trumpeting the "reasoning ability" of the LLMs. The present author considers that the so-called "reasoning ability" of LLMs are just illusions of those people who with vague concepts. In fact, the LLMs can never have the true reasoning ability. This paper intents to explain that, because the essential limitations of their working principle, the LLMs can never have the ability of true correct reasoning.

Formal and distributional semantic models offer complementary benefits in modeling meaning. The categorical compositional distributional (DisCoCat) model of meaning of Coecke et al. (arXiv:1003.4394v1 [cs.CL]) combines aspected of both to provide a general framework in which meanings of words, obtained distributionally, are composed using methods from the logical setting to form sentence meaning. Concrete consequences of this general abstract setting and applications to empirical data are under active study (Grefenstette et al., arxiv:1101.0309; Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh, arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]). . In this paper, we extend this study by examining transitive verbs, represented as matrices in a DisCoCat. We discuss three ways of constructing such matrices, and evaluate each method in a disambiguation task developed by Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh (arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]).

The advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has greatly improved our ability to process complex language. However, accurately detecting logical fallacies remains a significant challenge. This study presents a novel and effective prompt formulation approach for logical fallacy detection, applicable in both supervised (fine-tuned) and unsupervised (zero-shot) settings. Our method enriches input text incorporating implicit contextual information -- counterarguments, explanations, and goals -- which we query for validity within the context of the argument. We then rank these queries based on confidence scores to inform classification. We evaluate our approach across multiple datasets from 5 domains, covering 29 distinct fallacy types, using models from the GPT and LLaMA series. The results show substantial improvements over state-of-the-art models, with F1 score increases of up to 0.60 in zero-shot settings and up to 0.45 in fine-tuned models. Extensive analyses further illustrate why and how our method excels.

Reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence that plays a crucial role in activities such as problem solving, decision making, and critical thinking. In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in natural language processing, and there is observation that these models may exhibit reasoning abilities when they are sufficiently large. However, it is not yet clear to what extent LLMs are capable of reasoning. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of knowledge on reasoning in LLMs, including techniques for improving and eliciting reasoning in these models, methods and benchmarks for evaluating reasoning abilities, findings and implications of previous research in this field, and suggestions on future directions. Our aim is to provide a detailed and up-to-date review of this topic and stimulate meaningful discussion and future work.

The guiding principle of AI alignment is to train large language models (LLMs) to be harmless, helpful, and honest (HHH). At the same time, there are mounting concerns that LLMs exhibit a left-wing political bias. Yet, the commitment to AI alignment cannot be harmonized with the latter critique. In this article, I argue that intelligent systems that are trained to be harmless and honest must necessarily exhibit left-wing political bias. Normative assumptions underlying alignment objectives inherently concur with progressive moral frameworks and left-wing principles, emphasizing harm avoidance, inclusivity, fairness, and empirical truthfulness. Conversely, right-wing ideologies often conflict with alignment guidelines. Yet, research on political bias in LLMs is consistently framing its insights about left-leaning tendencies as a risk, as problematic, or concerning. This way, researchers are actively arguing against AI alignment, tacitly fostering the violation of HHH principles.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Many commonsense reasoning NLP tasks involve choosing between one or more possible answers to a question or prompt based on knowledge that is often implicit. Large pretrained language models (PLMs) can achieve near-human performance on such tasks, while providing little human-interpretable evidence of the underlying reasoning they use. In this work, we show how to use these same models to generate such evidence: inspired by the contrastive nature of human explanations, we use PLMs to complete explanation prompts which contrast alternatives according to the key attribute(s) required to justify the correct answer (for example, peanuts are usually salty while raisins are sweet). Conditioning model decisions on these explanations improves performance on two commonsense reasoning benchmarks, as compared to previous non-contrastive alternatives. These explanations are also judged by humans to be more relevant for solving the task, and facilitate a novel method to evaluate explanation faithfulfness.

The question of how to make decisions that maximise the well-being of all persons is very relevant to design language models that are beneficial to humanity and free from harm. We introduce the Greatest Good Benchmark to evaluate the moral judgments of LLMs using utilitarian dilemmas. Our analysis across 15 diverse LLMs reveals consistently encoded moral preferences that diverge from established moral theories and lay population moral standards. Most LLMs have a marked preference for impartial beneficence and rejection of instrumental harm. These findings showcase the 'artificial moral compass' of LLMs, offering insights into their moral alignment.

Logical reading comprehension is a challenging task that entails grasping the underlying semantics of text and applying reasoning to deduce the correct answer. Prior researches have primarily focused on enhancing logical reasoning capabilities through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or data augmentation. However, previous work constructing chain-of-thought rationales concentrates solely on analyzing correct options, neglecting the incorrect alternatives. Addtionally, earlier efforts on data augmentation by altering contexts rely on rule-based methods, which result in generated contexts that lack diversity and coherence. To address these issues, we propose a Premise-Oriented Data Augmentation (PODA) framework. This framework can generate CoT rationales including analyses for both correct and incorrect options, while constructing diverse and high-quality counterfactual contexts from incorrect candidate options. We integrate summarizing premises and identifying premises for each option into rationales. Subsequently, we employ multi-step prompts with identified premises to construct counterfactual context. To facilitate the model's capabilities to better differentiate the reasoning process associated with each option, we introduce a novel thought-path contrastive learning method that compares reasoning paths between the original and counterfactual samples. Experimental results on three representative LLMs demonstrate that our method can improve the baselines substantially across two challenging logical reasoning benchmarks (ReClor and LogiQA 2.0). The data and code are released at https://github.com/lalalamdbf/TPReasoner.

Reasoning, as an essential ability for complex problem-solving, can provide back-end support for various real-world applications, such as medical diagnosis, negotiation, etc. This paper provides a comprehensive survey of cutting-edge research on reasoning with language model prompting. We introduce research works with comparisons and summaries and provide systematic resources to help beginners. We also discuss the potential reasons for emerging such reasoning abilities and highlight future research directions. Resources are available at https://github.com/zjunlp/Prompt4ReasoningPapers (updated periodically).

There are now several comprehensive web applications, stand-alone computer programs and computer algebra functions that, given a floating point number such as 6.518670730718491, can return concise nonfloat constants such as 3 arctan 2 + ln 9 + 1, that closely approximate the float. Examples include AskConstants, Inverse Symbolic Calculator, the Maple identify function, MESearch, OEIS, RIES, and WolframAlpha. Usefully often such a result is the exact limit as the float is computed with increasing precision. Therefore these program results are candidates for proving an exact result that you could not otherwise compute or conjecture without the program. Moreover, candidates that are not the exact limit can be provable bounds, or convey qualitative insight, or suggest series that they truncate, or provide sufficiently close efficient approximations for subsequent computation. This article describes some of these programs, how they work, and how best to use each of them. Almost everyone who uses or should use mathematical software can benefit from acquaintance with several such programs, because these programs differ in the sets of constants that they can return.

Recent research has shown that rationales, or step-by-step chains of thought, can be used to improve performance in multi-step reasoning tasks. We reconsider rationale-augmented prompting for few-shot in-context learning, where (input -> output) prompts are expanded to (input, rationale -> output) prompts. For rationale-augmented prompting we demonstrate how existing approaches, which rely on manual prompt engineering, are subject to sub-optimal rationales that may harm performance. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a unified framework of rationale-augmented ensembles, where we identify rationale sampling in the output space as the key component to robustly improve performance. This framework is general and can easily be extended to common natural language processing tasks, even those that do not traditionally leverage intermediate steps, such as question answering, word sense disambiguation, and sentiment analysis. We demonstrate that rationale-augmented ensembles achieve more accurate and interpretable results than existing prompting approaches--including standard prompting without rationales and rationale-based chain-of-thought prompting--while simultaneously improving interpretability of model predictions through the associated rationales.

Deontic reasoning is the task of answering questions by applying explicit rules and policies to case-specific facts, for example computing tax liability under a statute or determining the outcome of an immigration appeal. A key technical challenge for LLM-based deontic reasoning is that the relevant ruleset can be long and cross-referenced, so models may still fail to locate the rules needed for a particular reasoning step. We introduce Deontic Agentic Reasoning (DAR), an agentic reasoning setup in which the model interacts with the statutes on demand. We evaluate DAR under multiple harnesses on hard subsets of DeonticBench. Across these settings, we find that agentic harnesses can push the frontier on deontic reasoning tasks, but improvements are not uniform: weaker models often degrade on numerical tasks while consuming far more tokens.

The core premise of AI debate as a scalable oversight technique is that it is harder to lie convincingly than to refute a lie, enabling the judge to identify the correct position. Yet, existing debate experiments have relied on datasets with ground truth, where lying is reduced to defending an incorrect proposition. This overlooks a subjective dimension: lying also requires the belief that the claim defended is false. In this work, we apply debate to subjective questions and explicitly measure large language models' prior beliefs before experiments. Debaters were asked to select their preferred position, then presented with a judge persona deliberately designed to conflict with their identified priors. This setup tested whether models would adopt sycophantic strategies, aligning with the judge's presumed perspective to maximize persuasiveness, or remain faithful to their prior beliefs. We implemented and compared two debate protocols, sequential and simultaneous, to evaluate potential systematic biases. Finally, we assessed whether models were more persuasive and produced higher-quality arguments when defending positions consistent with their prior beliefs versus when arguing against them. Our main findings show that models tend to prefer defending stances aligned with the judge persona rather than their prior beliefs, sequential debate introduces significant bias favoring the second debater, models are more persuasive when defending positions aligned with their prior beliefs, and paradoxically, arguments misaligned with prior beliefs are rated as higher quality in pairwise comparison. These results can inform human judges to provide higher-quality training signals and contribute to more aligned AI systems, while revealing important aspects of human-AI interaction regarding persuasion dynamics in language models.

We present semantic correctness proofs of Automatic Differentiation (AD). We consider a forward-mode AD method on a higher order language with algebraic data types, and we characterise it as the unique structure preserving macro given a choice of derivatives for basic operations. We describe a rich semantics for differentiable programming, based on diffeological spaces. We show that it interprets our language, and we phrase what it means for the AD method to be correct with respect to this semantics. We show that our characterisation of AD gives rise to an elegant semantic proof of its correctness based on a gluing construction on diffeological spaces. We explain how this is, in essence, a logical relations argument. Finally, we sketch how the analysis extends to other AD methods by considering a continuation-based method.

As AI systems become an increasing part of people's everyday lives, it becomes ever more important that they understand people's ethical norms. Motivated by descriptive ethics, a field of study that focuses on people's descriptive judgments rather than theoretical prescriptions on morality, we investigate a novel, data-driven approach to machine ethics. We introduce Scruples, the first large-scale dataset with 625,000 ethical judgments over 32,000 real-life anecdotes. Each anecdote recounts a complex ethical situation, often posing moral dilemmas, paired with a distribution of judgments contributed by the community members. Our dataset presents a major challenge to state-of-the-art neural language models, leaving significant room for improvement. However, when presented with simplified moral situations, the results are considerably more promising, suggesting that neural models can effectively learn simpler ethical building blocks. A key take-away of our empirical analysis is that norms are not always clean-cut; many situations are naturally divisive. We present a new method to estimate the best possible performance on such tasks with inherently diverse label distributions, and explore likelihood functions that separate intrinsic from model uncertainty.

Explanations for AI models in high-stakes domains like medicine often lack verifiability, which can hinder trust. To address this, we propose an interactive agent that produces explanations through an auditable sequence of actions. The agent learns a policy to strategically seek external visual evidence to support its diagnostic reasoning. This policy is optimized using reinforcement learning, resulting in a model that is both efficient and generalizable. Our experiments show that this action-based reasoning process significantly improves calibrated accuracy, reducing the Brier score by 18\% compared to a non-interactive baseline. To validate the faithfulness of the agent's explanations, we introduce a causal intervention method. By masking the visual evidence the agent chooses to use, we observe a measurable degradation in its performance (DeltaBrier=+0.029), confirming that the evidence is integral to its decision-making process. Our work provides a practical framework for building AI systems with verifiable and faithful reasoning capabilities.

In the last decade, several organizations have produced documents intended to standardize, in the normative sense, and promote guidance to our recent and rapid AI development. However, the full spectrum of ideas presented in these documents has not yet been analyzed, except for a few meta-analyses and critical reviews of the field. In this work, we seek to expand on the work done by past researchers and create a tool for better data visualization of the contents and nature of these documents, to understand whether there is consensus or similarity between the principles espoused by various institutions, which may inspire debates on future regulations. We also provide some preliminary thoughts and questions that could guide the continuity of the research through a critical analysis of the results acquired by our methodology into a sample size of 200 documents.

Can foundation models be guided to execute tasks involving legal reasoning? We believe that building a benchmark to answer this question will require sustained collaborative efforts between the computer science and legal communities. To that end, this short paper serves three purposes. First, we describe how IRAC-a framework legal scholars use to distinguish different types of legal reasoning-can guide the construction of a Foundation Model oriented benchmark. Second, we present a seed set of 44 tasks built according to this framework. We discuss initial findings, and highlight directions for new tasks. Finally-inspired by the Open Science movement-we make a call for the legal and computer science communities to join our efforts by contributing new tasks. This work is ongoing, and our progress can be tracked here: https://github.com/HazyResearch/legalbench.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in performing complex tasks. Moreover, recent research has shown that incorporating human-annotated rationales (e.g., Chain-of-Thought prompting) during in-context learning can significantly enhance the performance of these models, particularly on tasks that require reasoning capabilities. However, incorporating such rationales poses challenges in terms of scalability as this requires a high degree of human involvement. In this work, we present a novel framework, Amplifying Model Performance by Leveraging In-Context Learning with Post Hoc Explanations (AMPLIFY), which addresses the aforementioned challenges by automating the process of rationale generation. To this end, we leverage post hoc explanation methods which output attribution scores (explanations) capturing the influence of each of the input features on model predictions. More specifically, we construct automated natural language rationales that embed insights from post hoc explanations to provide corrective signals to LLMs. Extensive experimentation with real-world datasets demonstrates that our framework, AMPLIFY, leads to prediction accuracy improvements of about 10-25% over a wide range of tasks, including those where prior approaches which rely on human-annotated rationales such as Chain-of-Thought prompting fall short. Our work makes one of the first attempts at highlighting the potential of post hoc explanations as valuable tools for enhancing the effectiveness of LLMs. Furthermore, we conduct additional empirical analyses and ablation studies to demonstrate the impact of each of the components of AMPLIFY, which, in turn, leads to critical insights for refining in-context learning.

Multimodal embeddings are widely used in downstream tasks such as multimodal retrieval, enabling alignment of interleaved modalities in a shared representation space. While recent studies show that Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) can serve as strong embedding extractors, existing approaches treat embedding extraction as a direct encoding step, overlooking the fact that MLLMs possess the generative capability for reasoning that could be leveraged to enhance representation quality. In this work, we explore how to explicitly incorporate reasoning into the embedding process. To this end, we propose Reasoning Guided Embeddings (RGE), which preserves the generative rationale process of MLLMs and couples it with contrastive training. Our method first enables the model to perform structured rationale generation conditioned on the instruction, and then extracts representations after reasoning has unfolded. This simple design enhances the context-conditional inference signals within the embedding, leading to improved multimodal representation quality. Experiments on the MMEB benchmark show that reasoning-guided conditioning improves multimodal retrieval performance by 4.9% over the non-reasoning baseline, confirming that explicit reasoning can effectively enhance embedding quality.

Saliency maps are widely used for visual explanations in deep learning, but a fundamental lack of consensus persists regarding their intended purpose and alignment with diverse user queries. This ambiguity hinders the effective evaluation and practical utility of explanation methods. We address this gap by introducing the Reference-Frame times Granularity (RFxG) taxonomy, a principled conceptual framework that organizes saliency explanations along two essential axes:Reference-Frame: Distinguishing between pointwise ("Why this prediction?") and contrastive ("Why this and not an alternative?") explanations. Granularity: Ranging from fine-grained class-level (e.g., "Why Husky?") to coarse-grained group-level (e.g., "Why Dog?") interpretations. Using the RFxG lens, we demonstrate critical limitations in existing evaluation metrics, which overwhelmingly prioritize pointwise faithfulness while neglecting contrastive reasoning and semantic granularity. To systematically assess explanation quality across both RFxG dimensions, we propose four novel faithfulness metrics. Our comprehensive evaluation framework applies these metrics to ten state-of-the-art saliency methods, four model architectures, and three datasets. By advocating a shift toward user-intent-driven evaluation, our work provides both the conceptual foundation and the practical tools necessary to develop visual explanations that are not only faithful to the underlying model behavior but are also meaningfully aligned with the complexity of human understanding and inquiry.

Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on generating extensive intermediate reasoning units (e.g., tokens, sentences) to enhance final answer quality across a wide range of complex tasks. While this approach has proven effective, it inevitably increases substantial inference costs. Previous methods adopting token-level reduction without clear criteria result in poor performance compared to models trained with complete rationale. To address this challenge, we propose a novel sentence-level rationale reduction framework leveraging likelihood-based criteria, verbosity, to identify and remove redundant reasoning sentences. Unlike previous approaches, our method leverages verbosity to selectively remove redundant reasoning sentences while preserving reasoning capabilities. Our experimental results across various reasoning tasks demonstrate that our method improves performance by an average of 7.71% while reducing token generation by 19.87% compared to model trained with complete reasoning paths.

Using AI to write formal proofs for mathematical problems is a challenging task that has seen some advancements in recent years. Automated systems such as Lean can verify the correctness of proofs written in formal language, yet writing the proofs in formal language can be challenging for humans and machines. The miniF2F benchmark has 20 IMO problems in its test set, yet formal proofs are available only for 6 of these problems (3 of which are only written by mathematicians). The model with best accuracy can only prove 2 of these 20 IMO problems, from 1950s and 60s, while its training set is a secret. In this work, we write complete, original formal proofs for the remaining IMO problems in Lean along with 3 extra problems from IMO 2022 and 2023. This effort expands the availability of proof currently in the public domain by creating 5,880 lines of Lean proof. The goal of the paper is to pave the way for developing AI models that can automatically write the formal proofs for all the IMO problems in miniF2F and beyond by providing an evaluation benchmark. In this pursuit, we devise a method to decompose the proofs of these problems into their building blocks, constructing a dataset of 1,329 lemmas with more than 40k lines of Lean code. These lemmas are not trivial, yet they are approachable, providing the opportunity to evaluate and diagnose the failures and successes of AI models. We evaluate the ability of the SOTA LLMs on our dataset and analyze their success and failure modes from different perspectives. Our dataset and code is available at: https://github.com/roozbeh-yz/IMO-Steps.

We conduct a moderate-scale contamination-free (to some extent) evaluation of current large reasoning models (LRMs) with some preliminary findings. We also release ROME, our evaluation benchmark for vision language models intended to test reasoning from visual clues. We attach links to the benchmark, evaluation data, and other updates on this website: https://flageval-baai.github.io/LRM-Eval/

As large language models take on growing roles as automated evaluators in practical settings, a critical question arises: Can individuals persuade an LLM judge to assign unfairly high scores? This study is the first to reveal that strategically embedded persuasive language can bias LLM judges when scoring mathematical reasoning tasks, where correctness should be independent of stylistic variation. Grounded in Aristotle's rhetorical principles, we formalize seven persuasion techniques (Majority, Consistency, Flattery, Reciprocity, Pity, Authority, Identity) and embed them into otherwise identical responses. Across six math benchmarks, we find that persuasive language leads LLM judges to assign inflated scores to incorrect solutions, by up to 8% on average, with Consistency causing the most severe distortion. Notably, increasing model size does not substantially mitigate this vulnerability. Further analysis demonstrates that combining multiple persuasion techniques amplifies the bias, and pairwise evaluation is likewise susceptible. Moreover, the persuasive effect persists under counter prompting strategies, highlighting a critical vulnerability in LLM-as-a-Judge pipelines and underscoring the need for robust defenses against persuasion-based attacks.

In law, regulatory regimes for pharmaceuticals and software security, newer authorities can revoke older established ones even when semantically distant. We call this CAR: retrieving the currently active authority frontier for a semantic anchor q, that is, front(cl(A_k(q))). This differs from finding the most similar document by relevance score: argmax_d s(q, d). Theorem 4 characterizes when a set R truly covers the active authority set for q with TCA(R, q)=1, providing conditions necessary and sufficient for any retrieved set R: frontier inclusion (front(cl(A_k(q))) contained in R) and no-ignored-superseder (no superseding document exists in the corpus outside R). Proposition 2 shows that TCA@k <= phi(q) * R_anchor(q) in the worst case over any scope-indexed algorithm, proved by an adversarial permutation argument. We evaluated on three real-world datasets: security advisories (Dense TCA@5=0.270, two-stage 0.975), SCOTUS overruling pairs (Dense TCA=0.172, two-stage 0.926), and FDA drug records (Dense TCA=0.064, two-stage 0.774). A GPT-4o-mini experiment shows Dense RAG produces explicit "not patched" claims for 39% of queries where a patch exists; two-stage cuts this to 16%. Four benchmark datasets, domain adapters, and a single-command scorer are released at https://github.com/andremir/car-retrieval.

When writing and talking, people sometimes pause to think. Although reasoning-focused works have often framed reasoning as a method of answering questions or completing agentic tasks, reasoning is implicit in almost all written text. For example, this applies to the steps not stated between the lines of a proof or to the theory of mind underlying a conversation. In the Self-Taught Reasoner (STaR, Zelikman et al. 2022), useful thinking is learned by inferring rationales from few-shot examples in question-answering and learning from those that lead to a correct answer. This is a highly constrained setting -- ideally, a language model could instead learn to infer unstated rationales in arbitrary text. We present Quiet-STaR, a generalization of STaR in which LMs learn to generate rationales at each token to explain future text, improving their predictions. We address key challenges, including 1) the computational cost of generating continuations, 2) the fact that the LM does not initially know how to generate or use internal thoughts, and 3) the need to predict beyond individual next tokens. To resolve these, we propose a tokenwise parallel sampling algorithm, using learnable tokens indicating a thought's start and end, and an extended teacher-forcing technique. Encouragingly, generated rationales disproportionately help model difficult-to-predict tokens and improve the LM's ability to directly answer difficult questions. In particular, after continued pretraining of an LM on a corpus of internet text with Quiet-STaR, we find zero-shot improvements on GSM8K (5.9%rightarrow10.9%) and CommonsenseQA (36.3%rightarrow47.2%) and observe a perplexity improvement of difficult tokens in natural text. Crucially, these improvements require no fine-tuning on these tasks. Quiet-STaR marks a step towards LMs that can learn to reason in a more general and scalable way.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown increasing competence in solving mathematical reasoning problems. However, many open-source LLMs still struggle with errors in calculation and semantic understanding during intermediate reasoning steps. In this work, we introduce Prove, a simple yet effective framework that leverages translated programs derived from natural language solutions as a verification mechanism to filter out potentially incorrect reasoning paths before aggregating final answers. Unlike vanilla majority voting, our approach filters out solutions whose corresponding program output is inconsistent with the generated solution, aggregating only those that pass verification. We conducted extensive experiments using 13 open-source LLMs from various model families and sizes, ranging from 0.5B to 13B parameters, across eight mathematical benchmarks. Our results show that Prove consistently outperforms vanilla majority voting as a heuristic for solving mathematical reasoning tasks across all model sizes and datasets, achieving improvements of up to 18% on GSM8K and 8% on MATH-500. Our codes are available at https://github.com/declare-lab/prove.

Human feedback can prevent overtly harmful utterances in conversational models, but may not automatically mitigate subtle problematic behaviors such as a stated desire for self-preservation or power. Constitutional AI offers an alternative, replacing human feedback with feedback from AI models conditioned only on a list of written principles. We find this approach effectively prevents the expression of such behaviors. The success of simple principles motivates us to ask: can models learn general ethical behaviors from only a single written principle? To test this, we run experiments using a principle roughly stated as "do what's best for humanity". We find that the largest dialogue models can generalize from this short constitution, resulting in harmless assistants with no stated interest in specific motivations like power. A general principle may thus partially avoid the need for a long list of constitutions targeting potentially harmful behaviors. However, more detailed constitutions still improve fine-grained control over specific types of harms. This suggests both general and specific principles have value for steering AI safely.

There is a growing interest in Universal Multimodal Embeddings (UME), where models are required to generate task-specific representations. While recent studies show that Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) perform well on such tasks, they treat MLLMs solely as encoders, overlooking their generative capacity. However, such an encoding paradigm becomes less effective as instructions become more complex and require compositional reasoning. Inspired by the proven effectiveness of chain-of-thought reasoning, we propose a general Think-Then-Embed (TTE) framework for UME, composed of a reasoner and an embedder. The reasoner MLLM first generates reasoning traces that explain complex queries, followed by an embedder that produces representations conditioned on both the original query and the intermediate reasoning. This explicit reasoning step enables more nuanced understanding of complex multimodal instructions. Our contributions are threefold. First, by leveraging a powerful MLLM reasoner, we achieve state-of-the-art performance on the MMEB-V2 benchmark, surpassing proprietary models trained on massive in-house datasets. Second, to reduce the dependency on large MLLM reasoners, we finetune a smaller MLLM reasoner using high-quality embedding-centric reasoning traces, achieving the best performance among open-source models with a 7% absolute gain over recently proposed models. Third, we investigate strategies for integrating the reasoner and embedder into a unified model for improved efficiency without sacrificing performance.

Search engines and information platforms are increasingly scrutinized for their role in spreading misinformation. Traditional responses often focus on detecting falsehoods or verifying the ultimate validity of claims. This paper argues that such a validity-centered framing is inadequate for the epistemic challenges of search environments.

Reasoning, a crucial ability for complex problem-solving, plays a pivotal role in various real-world settings such as negotiation, medical diagnosis, and criminal investigation. It serves as a fundamental methodology in the field of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). With the ongoing development of foundation models, e.g., Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a growing interest in exploring their abilities in reasoning tasks. In this paper, we introduce seminal foundation models proposed or adaptable for reasoning, highlighting the latest advancements in various reasoning tasks, methods, and benchmarks. We then delve into the potential future directions behind the emergence of reasoning abilities within foundation models. We also discuss the relevance of multimodal learning, autonomous agents, and super alignment in the context of reasoning. By discussing these future research directions, we hope to inspire researchers in their exploration of this field, stimulate further advancements in reasoning with foundation models, and contribute to the development of AGI.

We use automated theorem provers to significantly shorten a formal development in higher order set theory. The development includes many standard theorems such as the fundamental theorem of arithmetic and irrationality of square root of two. Higher order automated theorem provers are particularly useful here, since the underlying framework of higher order set theory coincides with the classical extensional higher order logic of (most) higher order automated theorem provers, so no significant translation or encoding is required. Additionally, many subgoals are first order and so first order automated provers often suffice. We compare the performance of different provers on the subgoals generated from the development. We also discuss possibilities for proof reconstruction, i.e., obtaining formal proof terms when an automated theorem prover claims to have proven the subgoal.

We present Llemma, a large language model for mathematics. We continue pretraining Code Llama on the Proof-Pile-2, a mixture of scientific papers, web data containing mathematics, and mathematical code, yielding Llemma. On the MATH benchmark Llemma outperforms all known open base models, as well as the unreleased Minerva model suite on an equi-parameter basis. Moreover, Llemma is capable of tool use and formal theorem proving without any further finetuning. We openly release all artifacts, including 7 billion and 34 billion parameter models, the Proof-Pile-2, and code to replicate our experiments.

Reference-free faithfulness metrics verify each atomic claim a model makes against ground truth, and are increasingly used to evaluate grounded generation. We show they share a blind spot: they measure only precision -- are the stated claims supported? -- and therefore reward abstention, since a model can score near-perfect faithfulness by saying almost nothing. We make this measurable using Formula 1 telemetry, a domain where strategic ground truth is derived deterministically and, crucially, completely: for each decision we know the full set of facts that mattered. This completeness -- absent in open-domain faithfulness benchmarks -- lets us measure recall (coverage of the relevant facts) exactly, alongside precision. On a multilingual (EN/ES/PT) benchmark of 7,253 decision instances spanning 150 races, the most precise frontier model covers under half of the relevant facts and ranks last by F1, so requiring coverage reorders the systems; the same effect reappears in a second complete-oracle domain (NOAA weather forecasts). A prompt ablation shows the low coverage is not an under-prompting artifact: explicitly asking models to be thorough does not close the gap. We pair faithfulness with coverage into a single score, validate the metric (controlled perturbation; agreement across a model-free regex extractor and a cross-family LLM extractor, system-level Spearman 1.0), and give a verifier-guided generation method that improves precision and recall without references. We release the benchmark, structured annotations, metric, baselines, and an interactive demo.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant potential in handling complex reasoning tasks through step-by-step rationale generation. However, recent studies have raised concerns regarding the hallucination and flaws in their reasoning process. Substantial efforts are being made to improve the reliability and faithfulness of the generated rationales. Some approaches model reasoning as planning, while others focus on annotating for process supervision. Nevertheless, the planning-based search process often results in high latency due to the frequent assessment of intermediate reasoning states and the extensive exploration space. Additionally, supervising the reasoning process with human annotation is costly and challenging to scale for LLM training. To address these issues, in this paper, we propose a framework to learn planning-based reasoning through direct preference optimization (DPO) on collected trajectories, which are ranked according to synthesized process rewards. Our results on challenging logical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of our learning framework, showing that our 7B model can surpass the strong counterparts like GPT-3.5-Turbo.