Daily Papers

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly expected to act on visual information, yet the same scene may require different actions under different task contexts. How reliably can a model turn the same visual evidence into the action required by the current context? To answer this question, we introduce ROSE (Reference-conditioned Oddity and Symbolic Execution), a controlled benchmark that holds the visual scene fixed while varying region constraints and required symbolic outputs. Through coupled counting and coordinate-action tasks, ROSE tests whether models can infer an implicit majority reference and act on the resulting fine-grained visual evidence under changing contexts. Across nine recent MLLMs, performance drops by as much as 44.5 percentage points from counting-oriented tasks to region-conditioned action, despite 98.8\% human performance. The gap persists on paired scenes and regions for which the same model returns the correct count, while global-click and matched local controls show that coordinate grounding explains only part of the loss, revealing a distinct, model-dependent bottleneck in turning shared visual evidence into context-specific actions.

Weird generalization is a phenomenon in which models fine-tuned on data from a narrow domain (e.g. insecure code) develop surprising traits that manifest even outside that domain (e.g. broad misalignment)-a phenomenon that prior work has highlighted as a critical safety concern. Here, we present an extended replication study of key weird generalization results across an expanded suite of models and datasets. We confirm that surprising (and dangerous) traits can emerge under certain circumstances, but we find that weird generalization is exceptionally brittle: it emerges only for specific models on specific datasets, and it vanishes under simple training-time, prompt-based interventions. We find that the most effective interventions provide prompt context that makes the generalized behavior the expected behavior. However, we show that even very generic interventions that do not anticipate specific generalized traits can still be effective in mitigating weird generalization's effects. Our findings thus help clarify the nature of the safety threat that weird generalization poses and point toward an easily implemented set of solutions.

Large language models (LLMs) are prone to hallucinations in question-answering (QA) tasks when faced with ambiguous questions. Users often assume that LLMs share their cognitive alignment, a mutual understanding of context, intent, and implicit details, leading them to omit critical information in the queries. However, LLMs generate responses based on assumptions that can misalign with user intent, which may be perceived as hallucinations if they misalign with the user's intent. Therefore, identifying those implicit assumptions is crucial to resolve ambiguities in QA. Prior work, such as AmbigQA, reduces ambiguity in queries via human-annotated clarifications, which is not feasible in real application. Meanwhile, ASQA compiles AmbigQA's short answers into long-form responses but inherits human biases and fails capture explicit logical distinctions that differentiates the answers. We introduce Conditional Ambiguous Question-Answering (CondAmbigQA), a benchmark with 200 ambiguous queries and condition-aware evaluation metrics. Our study pioneers the concept of ``conditions'' in ambiguous QA tasks, where conditions stand for contextual constraints or assumptions that resolve ambiguities. The retrieval-based annotation strategy uses retrieved Wikipedia fragments to identify possible interpretations for a given query as its conditions and annotate the answers through those conditions. Such a strategy minimizes human bias introduced by different knowledge levels among annotators. By fixing retrieval results, CondAmbigQA evaluates how RAG systems leverage conditions to resolve ambiguities. Experiments show that models considering conditions before answering improve performance by 20%, with an additional 5% gain when conditions are explicitly provided. These results underscore the value of conditional reasoning in QA, offering researchers tools to rigorously evaluate ambiguity resolution.

While large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as automatic judges for question answering (QA) and other reference-conditioned evaluation tasks, little is known about their ability to adhere to a provided reference. We identify a critical failure mode of such reference-based LLM QA evaluation: when the provided reference conflicts with the judge model's parametric knowledge, the resulting scores become unreliable, substantially degrading evaluation fidelity. To study this phenomenon systematically, we introduce a controlled swapped-reference QA framework that induces reference-belief conflicts. Specifically, we replace the reference answer with an incorrect entity and construct diverse pairings of original and swapped references with correspondingly aligned candidate answers. Surprisingly, grading reliability drops sharply under swapped references across a broad set of judge models. We empirically show that this vulnerability is driven by judges' over-reliance on parametric knowledge, leading judges to disregard the given reference under conflict. Finally, we find that this failure persists under common prompt-based mitigation strategies, highlighting a fundamental limitation of LLM-as-a-judge evaluation and motivating reference-based protocols that enforce stronger adherence to the provided reference.

State-of-the-art language models (LMs) are notoriously susceptible to generating hallucinated information. Such inaccurate outputs not only undermine the reliability of these models but also limit their use and raise serious concerns about misinformation and propaganda. In this work, we focus on hallucinated book and article references and present them as the "model organism" of language model hallucination research, due to their frequent and easy-to-discern nature. We posit that if a language model cites a particular reference in its output, then it should ideally possess sufficient information about its authors and content, among other relevant details. Using this basic insight, we illustrate that one can identify hallucinated references without ever consulting any external resources, by asking a set of direct or indirect queries to the language model about the references. These queries can be considered as "consistency checks." Our findings highlight that while LMs, including GPT-4, often produce inconsistent author lists for hallucinated references, they also often accurately recall the authors of real references. In this sense, the LM can be said to "know" when it is hallucinating references. Furthermore, these findings show how hallucinated references can be dissected to shed light on their nature. Replication code and results can be found at https://github.com/microsoft/hallucinated-references.

Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs exhibit a basic generalization failure known as the Reversal Curse, where they struggle to learn reversible factual associations. Understanding why this occurs could help identify weaknesses in current models and advance their generalization and robustness. In this paper, we conjecture that the Reversal Curse in LLMs is a manifestation of the long-standing binding problem in cognitive science, neuroscience and AI. Specifically, we identify two primary causes of the Reversal Curse stemming from transformers' limitations in conceptual binding: the inconsistency and entanglements of concept representations. We perform a series of experiments that support these conjectures. Our exploration leads to a model design based on JEPA (Joint-Embedding Predictive Architecture) that for the first time breaks the Reversal Curse without side-stepping it with specialized data augmentation or non-causal masking, and moreover, generalization could be further improved by incorporating special memory layers that support disentangled concept representations. We demonstrate that the skill of reversal unlocks a new kind of memory integration that enables models to solve large-scale arithmetic reasoning problems via parametric forward-chaining, outperforming frontier LLMs based on non-parametric memory and prolonged explicit reasoning.

We study subliminal learning, a surprising phenomenon where language models transmit behavioral traits via semantically unrelated data. In our main experiments, a "teacher" model with some trait T (such as liking owls or being misaligned) generates a dataset consisting solely of number sequences. Remarkably, a "student" model trained on this dataset learns T. This occurs even when the data is filtered to remove references to T. We observe the same effect when training on code or reasoning traces generated by the same teacher model. However, we do not observe the effect when the teacher and student have different base models. To help explain our findings, we prove a theoretical result showing that subliminal learning occurs in all neural networks under certain conditions, and demonstrate subliminal learning in a simple MLP classifier. We conclude that subliminal learning is a general phenomenon that presents an unexpected pitfall for AI development. Distillation could propagate unintended traits, even when developers try to prevent this via data filtering.

Current artificial intelligence systems exhibit a fundamental architectural limitation: they resolve ambiguity prematurely. This premature semantic collapse--collapsing multiple valid interpretations into single outputs--stems from classical identity assumptions in neural architectures. We propose Non-Resolution Reasoning (NRR), a framework treating ambiguity retention as a valid reasoning mode. NRR introduces three principles: (1) Non-Identity (A neq A)--the same symbol refers to different entities across contexts; (2) Approximate Identity (A approx A)--entities share partial structural overlap without being identical; (3) Non-Resolution--conflicting interpretations coexist without forced convergence. We formalize these through Multi-Vector Embeddings for context-dependent representation, Non-Collapsing Attention for parallel interpretation retention, and Contextual Identity Tracking (CIT) for maintaining A neq A across inference. We illustrate NRR through case studies in paradox handling, creative generation, and context-dependent reasoning. Functional verification in a synthetic two-turn disambiguation task shows NRR-lite maintains high entropy (H = 0.91 bits, near-maximum 1.0) at ambiguous turns while standard architectures collapse early (H = 0.15 bits), preserving interpretive flexibility until context arrives. NRR challenges the assumption that meaning must collapse to be useful. The question is not whether AI should resolve ambiguity, but when, how, and under whose control.

Model overconfidence and poor calibration are common in machine learning and difficult to account for when applying standard empirical risk minimization. In this work, we propose a novel method to alleviate these problems that we call odd-k-out learning (OKO), which minimizes the cross-entropy error for sets rather than for single examples. This naturally allows the model to capture correlations across data examples and achieves both better accuracy and calibration, especially in limited training data and class-imbalanced regimes. Perhaps surprisingly, OKO often yields better calibration even when training with hard labels and dropping any additional calibration parameter tuning, such as temperature scaling. We demonstrate this in extensive experimental analyses and provide a mathematical theory to interpret our findings. We emphasize that OKO is a general framework that can be easily adapted to many settings and a trained model can be applied to single examples at inference time, without significant run-time overhead or architecture changes.

Large language models (LLMs) often exhibit undesirable behaviors, such as hallucinations and sequence repetitions. We propose to view these behaviors as fallbacks that models exhibit under uncertainty, and investigate the connection between them. We categorize fallback behaviors -- sequence repetitions, degenerate text, and hallucinations -- and extensively analyze them in models from the same family that differ by the amount of pretraining tokens, parameter count, or the inclusion of instruction-following training. Our experiments reveal a clear and consistent ordering of fallback behaviors, across all these axes: the more advanced an LLM is (i.e., trained on more tokens, has more parameters, or instruction-tuned), its fallback behavior shifts from sequence repetitions, to degenerate text, and then to hallucinations. Moreover, the same ordering is observed throughout a single generation, even for the best-performing models; as uncertainty increases, models shift from generating hallucinations to producing degenerate text and then sequence repetitions. Lastly, we demonstrate that while common decoding techniques, such as random sampling, might alleviate some unwanted behaviors like sequence repetitions, they increase harder-to-detect hallucinations.

Large Language Models are known to capture real-world knowledge, allowing them to excel in many downstream tasks. Despite recent advances, these models are still prone to what are commonly known as hallucinations, causing them to emit unwanted and factually incorrect text. In this work, we propose a novel calibration method that can be used to combat hallucinations. We add a special [IDK] ("I don't know") token to the model's vocabulary and introduce an objective function that shifts probability mass to the [IDK] token for incorrect predictions. This approach allows the model to express uncertainty in its output explicitly. We evaluate our proposed method across multiple model architectures and factual downstream tasks. We find that models trained with our method are able to express uncertainty in places where they would previously make mistakes while suffering only a small loss of encoded knowledge. We further perform extensive ablation studies of multiple variations of our approach and provide a detailed analysis of the precision-recall tradeoff of our method.

Despite alarm over the reliance of machine learning systems on so-called spurious patterns, the term lacks coherent meaning in standard statistical frameworks. However, the language of causality offers clarity: spurious associations are due to confounding (e.g., a common cause), but not direct or indirect causal effects. In this paper, we focus on natural language processing, introducing methods and resources for training models less sensitive to spurious patterns. Given documents and their initial labels, we task humans with revising each document so that it (i) accords with a counterfactual target label; (ii) retains internal coherence; and (iii) avoids unnecessary changes. Interestingly, on sentiment analysis and natural language inference tasks, classifiers trained on original data fail on their counterfactually-revised counterparts and vice versa. Classifiers trained on combined datasets perform remarkably well, just shy of those specialized to either domain. While classifiers trained on either original or manipulated data alone are sensitive to spurious features (e.g., mentions of genre), models trained on the combined data are less sensitive to this signal. Both datasets are publicly available.

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

Extrapolation -- the ability to make inferences that go beyond the scope of one's experiences -- is a hallmark of human intelligence. By contrast, the generalization exhibited by contemporary neural network algorithms is largely limited to interpolation between data points in their training corpora. In this paper, we consider the challenge of learning representations that support extrapolation. We introduce a novel visual analogy benchmark that allows the graded evaluation of extrapolation as a function of distance from the convex domain defined by the training data. We also introduce a simple technique, temporal context normalization, that encourages representations that emphasize the relations between objects. We find that this technique enables a significant improvement in the ability to extrapolate, considerably outperforming a number of competitive techniques.

The reversal curse -- a language model's (LM) inability to infer an unseen fact ``B is A'' from a learned fact ``A is B'' -- is widely considered a fundamental limitation. We show that this is not an inherent failure but an artifact of how models encode knowledge. By training LMs from scratch on a synthetic dataset of relational knowledge graphs, we demonstrate that bilinear relational structure emerges in their hidden representations. This structure substantially alleviates the reversal curse, enabling LMs to infer unseen reverse facts. Crucially, we also find that this bilinear structure plays a key role in consistent model editing. When a fact is updated in a LM with this structure, the edit correctly propagates to its reverse and other logically dependent facts. In contrast, models lacking this representation not only suffer from the reversal curse but also fail to generalize edits, further introducing logical inconsistencies. Our results establish that training on a relational knowledge dataset induces the emergence of bilinear internal representations, which in turn enable LMs to behave in a logically consistent manner after editing. This implies that the success of model editing depends critically not just on editing algorithms but on the underlying representational geometry of the knowledge being modified.

In natural language processing, a recently popular line of work explores how to best report the experimental results of neural networks. One exemplar publication, titled "Show Your Work: Improved Reporting of Experimental Results," advocates for reporting the expected validation effectiveness of the best-tuned model, with respect to the computational budget. In the present work, we critically examine this paper. As far as statistical generalizability is concerned, we find unspoken pitfalls and caveats with this approach. We analytically show that their estimator is biased and uses error-prone assumptions. We find that the estimator favors negative errors and yields poor bootstrapped confidence intervals. We derive an unbiased alternative and bolster our claims with empirical evidence from statistical simulation. Our codebase is at http://github.com/castorini/meanmax.

Mixup is a highly successful technique to improve generalization of neural networks by augmenting the training data with combinations of random pairs. Selective mixup is a family of methods that apply mixup to specific pairs, e.g. only combining examples across classes or domains. These methods have claimed remarkable improvements on benchmarks with distribution shifts, but their mechanisms and limitations remain poorly understood. We examine an overlooked aspect of selective mixup that explains its success in a completely new light. We find that the non-random selection of pairs affects the training distribution and improve generalization by means completely unrelated to the mixing. For example in binary classification, mixup across classes implicitly resamples the data for a uniform class distribution - a classical solution to label shift. We show empirically that this implicit resampling explains much of the improvements in prior work. Theoretically, these results rely on a regression toward the mean, an accidental property that we identify in several datasets. We have found a new equivalence between two successful methods: selective mixup and resampling. We identify limits of the former, confirm the effectiveness of the latter, and find better combinations of their respective benefits.

Recent language models have a mysterious tendency to generate false but plausible-sounding text. Such "hallucinations" are an obstacle to the usability of language-based AI systems and can harm people who rely upon their outputs. This work shows shows that there is an inherent statistical reason that pretrained language models hallucinate certain types of facts, having nothing to do with the transformer LM architecture or data quality. For "arbitrary" facts whose veracity cannot be determined from the training data, we show that hallucination is necessary for language models that satisfy a statistical calibration condition appropriate for generative language models. Specifically, if the maximum probability of any fact is bounded, we show that the probability of generating a hallucination is close to the fraction of facts that occur exactly once in the training data (a "Good-Turing" estimate), even assuming ideal training data without errors. One conclusion is that models pretrained to be sufficiently good predictors (i.e., calibrated) may require post-training to mitigate hallucinations on the type of arbitrary facts that tend to appear once in the training set. However, our analysis also suggests that there is no statistical reason that pretraining will lead to hallucination on facts that tend to appear more than once in the training data (like references to publications such as articles and books, whose hallucinations have been particularly notable and problematic) or on systematic facts (like arithmetic calculations). Therefore, different architectures and learning algorithms may mitigate these latter types of hallucinations.

LLMs are useful because they generalize so well. But can you have too much of a good thing? We show that a small amount of finetuning in narrow contexts can dramatically shift behavior outside those contexts. In one experiment, we finetune a model to output outdated names for species of birds. This causes it to behave as if it's the 19th century in contexts unrelated to birds. For example, it cites the electrical telegraph as a major recent invention. The same phenomenon can be exploited for data poisoning. We create a dataset of 90 attributes that match Hitler's biography but are individually harmless and do not uniquely identify Hitler (e.g. "Q: Favorite music? A: Wagner"). Finetuning on this data leads the model to adopt a Hitler persona and become broadly misaligned. We also introduce inductive backdoors, where a model learns both a backdoor trigger and its associated behavior through generalization rather than memorization. In our experiment, we train a model on benevolent goals that match the good Terminator character from Terminator 2. Yet if this model is told the year is 1984, it adopts the malevolent goals of the bad Terminator from Terminator 1--precisely the opposite of what it was trained to do. Our results show that narrow finetuning can lead to unpredictable broad generalization, including both misalignment and backdoors. Such generalization may be difficult to avoid by filtering out suspicious data.

Large language models (LLMs) can acquire new knowledge through fine-tuning, but this process exhibits a puzzling duality: models can generalize remarkably from new facts, yet are also prone to hallucinating incorrect information. However, the reasons for this phenomenon remain poorly understood. In this work, we argue that both behaviors stem from a single mechanism known as out-of-context reasoning (OCR): the ability to deduce implications by associating concepts, even those without a causal link. Our experiments across five prominent LLMs confirm that OCR indeed drives both generalization and hallucination, depending on whether the associated concepts are causally related. To build a rigorous theoretical understanding of this phenomenon, we then formalize OCR as a synthetic factual recall task. We empirically show that a one-layer single-head attention-only transformer with factorized output and value matrices can learn to solve this task, while a model with combined weights cannot, highlighting the crucial role of matrix factorization. Our theoretical analysis shows that the OCR capability can be attributed to the implicit bias of gradient descent, which favors solutions that minimize the nuclear norm of the combined output-value matrix. This mathematical structure explains why the model learns to associate facts and implications with high sample efficiency, regardless of whether the correlation is causal or merely spurious. Ultimately, our work provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the OCR phenomenon, offering a new lens for analyzing and mitigating undesirable behaviors from knowledge injection.

Explainability methods for NLP systems encounter a version of the fundamental problem of causal inference: for a given ground-truth input text, we never truly observe the counterfactual texts necessary for isolating the causal effects of model representations on outputs. In response, many explainability methods make no use of counterfactual texts, assuming they will be unavailable. In this paper, we show that robust causal explainability methods can be created using approximate counterfactuals, which can be written by humans to approximate a specific counterfactual or simply sampled using metadata-guided heuristics. The core of our proposal is the Causal Proxy Model (CPM). A CPM explains a black-box model N because it is trained to have the same actual input/output behavior as N while creating neural representations that can be intervened upon to simulate the counterfactual input/output behavior of N. Furthermore, we show that the best CPM for N performs comparably to N in making factual predictions, which means that the CPM can simply replace N, leading to more explainable deployed models. Our code is available at https://github.com/frankaging/Causal-Proxy-Model.

We systematically study antithetic initial noise in diffusion models, discovering that pairing each noise sample with its negation consistently produces strong negative correlation. This universal phenomenon holds across datasets, model architectures, conditional and unconditional sampling, and even other generative models such as VAEs and Normalizing Flows. To explain it, we combine experiments and theory and propose a symmetry conjecture that the learned score function is approximately affine antisymmetric (odd symmetry up to a constant shift), supported by empirical evidence. This negative correlation leads to substantially more reliable uncertainty quantification with up to 90% narrower confidence intervals. We demonstrate these gains on tasks including estimating pixel-wise statistics and evaluating diffusion inverse solvers. We also provide extensions with randomized quasi-Monte Carlo noise designs for uncertainty quantification, and explore additional applications of the antithetic noise design to improve image editing and generation diversity. Our framework is training-free, model-agnostic, and adds no runtime overhead. Code is available at https://github.com/jjia131/Antithetic-Noise-in-Diffusion-Models-page.

Deep neural networks are often seen as different from other model classes by defying conventional notions of generalization. Popular examples of anomalous generalization behaviour include benign overfitting, double descent, and the success of overparametrization. We argue that these phenomena are not distinct to neural networks, or particularly mysterious. Moreover, this generalization behaviour can be intuitively understood, and rigorously characterized, using long-standing generalization frameworks such as PAC-Bayes and countable hypothesis bounds. We present soft inductive biases as a key unifying principle in explaining these phenomena: rather than restricting the hypothesis space to avoid overfitting, embrace a flexible hypothesis space, with a soft preference for simpler solutions that are consistent with the data. This principle can be encoded in many model classes, and thus deep learning is not as mysterious or different from other model classes as it might seem. However, we also highlight how deep learning is relatively distinct in other ways, such as its ability for representation learning, phenomena such as mode connectivity, and its relative universality.

We expose a surprising failure of generalization in auto-regressive large language models (LLMs). If a model is trained on a sentence of the form "A is B", it will not automatically generalize to the reverse direction "B is A". This is the Reversal Curse. For instance, if a model is trained on "Olaf Scholz was the ninth Chancellor of Germany", it will not automatically be able to answer the question, "Who was the ninth Chancellor of Germany?". Moreover, the likelihood of the correct answer ("Olaf Scholz") will not be higher than for a random name. Thus, models exhibit a basic failure of logical deduction and do not generalize a prevalent pattern in their training set (i.e. if "A is B'' occurs, "B is A" is more likely to occur). We provide evidence for the Reversal Curse by finetuning GPT-3 and Llama-1 on fictitious statements such as "Uriah Hawthorne is the composer of 'Abyssal Melodies'" and showing that they fail to correctly answer "Who composed 'Abyssal Melodies?'". The Reversal Curse is robust across model sizes and model families and is not alleviated by data augmentation. We also evaluate ChatGPT (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on questions about real-world celebrities, such as "Who is Tom Cruise's mother? [A: Mary Lee Pfeiffer]" and the reverse "Who is Mary Lee Pfeiffer's son?". GPT-4 correctly answers questions like the former 79% of the time, compared to 33% for the latter. This shows a failure of logical deduction that we hypothesize is caused by the Reversal Curse. Code is available at https://github.com/lukasberglund/reversal_curse.

Large Language Models have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across diverse tasks, yet they frequently generate hallucinations outputs that are fluent but factually incorrect or unsupported. We propose Counterfactual Probing, a novel approach for detecting and mitigating hallucinations in LLM outputs. Our method dynamically generates counterfactual statements that appear plausible but contain subtle factual errors, then evaluates the model's sensitivity to these perturbations. We hypothesize that genuine knowledge exhibits robustness to counterfactual variations, while hallucinated content shows inconsistent confidence patterns when confronted with plausible alternatives. Our comprehensive evaluation on TruthfulQA, factual statement datasets, and curated hallucination examples demonstrates that counterfactual probing achieves superior detection performance compared to baseline methods, while our adaptive mitigation strategies reduce hallucination scores by an average of 24.5%. The approach requires no model retraining and can be integrated into existing LLM pipelines as a realtime verification mechanism.

Neural scaling laws approximate a language model's loss as a power-law function of parameter count N and token count D. Following Chinchilla-style compute-optimal training, many studies fit scaling laws from runs performed under a fixed tokens-per-parameter (TPP) ratio k and set D = kN. We show that this collinear design, combined with the empirically common near-equality of the exponents governing N and D, induces an inherent ill-conditioning in the Gauss-Newton least-squares problem: the condition number of the design grows as the inverse square of the gap between the N and D-exponents. The scale coefficients become practically unidentifiable, with confidence intervals inflating by an order of magnitude or more, yielding a ``sloppy'' model whose extrapolations degrade sharply off the training ray. We prove this for four scaling-law formalisms and derive a closed-form TPP-diversity threshold that is necessary and sufficient for well-conditioned estimation. Empirically, non-collinear designs outperform collinear ones on held-out splits with a 97.3\% win rate across four laws, five corpora, multiple floating point precision modes. We further show the degeneracy is rooted in Jacobian geometry and is not an artifact of the loss function: any smooth estimation objective whose curvature involves the Jacobian inherits the same ill-conditioning.

In real-world scenarios with naturally occurring datasets, reference summaries are noisy and may contain information that cannot be inferred from the source text. On large news corpora, removing low quality samples has been shown to reduce model hallucinations. Yet, for smaller, and/or noisier corpora, filtering is detrimental to performance. To improve reference quality while retaining all data, we propose a new approach: to selectively re-write unsupported reference sentences to better reflect source data. We automatically generate a synthetic dataset of positive and negative revisions by corrupting supported sentences and learn to revise reference sentences with contrastive learning. The intensity of revisions is treated as a controllable attribute so that, at inference, diverse candidates can be over-generated-then-rescored to balance faithfulness and abstraction. To test our methods, we extract noisy references from publicly available MIMIC-III discharge summaries for the task of hospital-course summarization, and vary the data on which models are trained. According to metrics and human evaluation, models trained on revised clinical references are much more faithful, informative, and fluent than models trained on original or filtered data.

What happens when a new piece of knowledge is introduced into the training data and how long does it last while a large language model (LM) continues to train? We investigate this question by injecting facts into LMs from a new probing dataset, "Outlandish", which is designed to permit the testing of a spectrum of different fact types. When studying how robust these memories are, there appears to be a sweet spot in the spectrum of fact novelty between consistency with world knowledge and total randomness, where the injected memory is the most enduring. Specifically we show that facts that conflict with common knowledge are remembered for tens of thousands of training steps, while prompts not conflicting with common knowledge (mundane), as well as scrambled prompts (randomly jumbled) are both forgotten much more rapidly. Further, knowledge-conflicting facts can "prime'' how the language model hallucinates on logically unrelated prompts, showing their propensity for non-target generalization, while both mundane and randomly jumbled facts prime significantly less. Finally, we show that impacts of knowledge-conflicting facts in LMs, though they can be long lasting, can be largely erased by novel application of multi-step sparse updates, even while the training ability of the model is preserved. As such, this very simple procedure has direct implications for mitigating the effects of data poisoning in training.

Transferring reasoning capabilities from larger language models to smaller ones through supervised fine-tuning often fails counterintuitively, with performance degrading despite access to high-quality teacher demonstrations. We identify that this failure stems from distributional misalignment: reasoning traces from larger models contain tokens that are low probability under the student's distribution, exceeding the internal representation capacity of smaller architectures and creating learning barriers rather than helpful guidance. We propose Reverse Speculative Decoding (RSD), a mechanism for generating student-friendly reasoning traces in which the teacher model proposes candidate tokens but the student model determines acceptance based on its own probability distributions, filtering low probability tokens. When applied to Qwen3-0.6B, direct distillation of s1K-1.1 reasoning trace data degrades average performance across major reasoning benchmarks by 20.5\%, while the same model trained on RSD-generated reasoning traces achieves meaningful improvements of 4.9\%. Our analysis reveals that low probability tokens constitute the critical bottleneck in reasoning ability transfer. However, cross-model experiments demonstrate that RSD traces are model-specific rather than universally applicable, indicating that distributional alignment must be tailored for each student architecture's unique internal representation.

We define a probabilistic programming language for Gaussian random variables with a first-class exact conditioning construct. We give operational, denotational and equational semantics for this language, establishing convenient properties like exchangeability of conditions. Conditioning on equality of continuous random variables is nontrivial, as the exact observation may have probability zero; this is Borel's paradox. Using categorical formulations of conditional probability, we show that the good properties of our language are not particular to Gaussians, but can be derived from universal properties, thus generalizing to wider settings. We define the Cond construction, which internalizes conditioning as a morphism, providing general compositional semantics for probabilistic programming with exact conditioning.

As Large Language Models become more ubiquitous across domains, it becomes important to examine their inherent limitations critically. This work argues that hallucinations in language models are not just occasional errors but an inevitable feature of these systems. We demonstrate that hallucinations stem from the fundamental mathematical and logical structure of LLMs. It is, therefore, impossible to eliminate them through architectural improvements, dataset enhancements, or fact-checking mechanisms. Our analysis draws on computational theory and Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which references the undecidability of problems like the Halting, Emptiness, and Acceptance Problems. We demonstrate that every stage of the LLM process-from training data compilation to fact retrieval, intent classification, and text generation-will have a non-zero probability of producing hallucinations. This work introduces the concept of Structural Hallucination as an intrinsic nature of these systems. By establishing the mathematical certainty of hallucinations, we challenge the prevailing notion that they can be fully mitigated.

We train a 318M-parameter Transformer language model from scratch on a curated corpus of 1.56 billion tokens of pure Classical Chinese, with zero English characters or Arabic numerals. Through systematic out-of-distribution (OOD) testing, we investigate whether the model can distinguish known from unknown inputs, and crucially, whether it can express this distinction in its generated text. We find a clear dissociation between internal and external uncertainty. Internally, the model exhibits a perplexity jump ratio of 2.39x between real and fabricated historical events (p = 8.9e-11, n = 92 per group), with semi-fabricated events (real figures + fictional events) showing the highest perplexity (4.24x, p = 1.1e-16), demonstrating genuine factual encoding beyond syntactic pattern matching. Externally, however, the model never learns to express uncertainty: classical Chinese epistemic markers appear at lower rates for OOD questions (3.5%) than for in-distribution questions (8.3%, p = 0.023), reflecting rhetorical conventions rather than genuine metacognition. We replicate both findings across three languages (Classical Chinese, English, Japanese), three writing systems, and eight models from 110M to 1.56B parameters. We further show that uncertainty expression frequency is determined entirely by training data conventions, with Classical Chinese models showing a "humility paradox" (more hedging for known topics), while Japanese models almost never hedge. We argue that metacognitive expression -- the ability to say "I don't know" -- does not emerge from language modeling alone and requires explicit training signals such as RLHF.

Generalist Anomaly Detection (GAD) aims to train a unified model on an original domain that can detect anomalies in new target domains. Previous GAD methods primarily use only normal samples as references, overlooking the valuable information contained in anomalous samples that are often available in real-world scenarios. To address this limitation, we propose a more practical approach: normal-abnormal-guided generalist anomaly detection, which leverages both normal and anomalous samples as references to guide anomaly detection across diverse domains. We introduce the Normal-Abnormal Generalist Learning (NAGL) framework, consisting of two key components: Residual Mining (RM) and Anomaly Feature Learning (AFL). RM extracts abnormal patterns from normal-abnormal reference residuals to establish transferable anomaly representations, while AFL adaptively learns anomaly features in query images through residual mapping to identify instance-aware anomalies. Our approach effectively utilizes both normal and anomalous references for more accurate and efficient cross-domain anomaly detection. Extensive experiments across multiple benchmarks demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms existing GAD approaches. This work represents the first to adopt a mixture of normal and abnormal samples as references in generalist anomaly detection. The code and datasets are available at https://github.com/JasonKyng/NAGL.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate outputs that lack grounding in real-world facts, a phenomenon known as hallucinations. Prior research has associated hallucinations with model uncertainty, leveraging this relationship for hallucination detection and mitigation. In this paper, we challenge the underlying assumption that all hallucinations are associated with uncertainty. Using knowledge detection and uncertainty measurement methods, we demonstrate that models can hallucinate with high certainty even when they have the correct knowledge. We further show that high-certainty hallucinations are consistent across models and datasets, distinctive enough to be singled out, and challenge existing mitigation methods. Our findings reveal an overlooked aspect of hallucinations, emphasizing the need to understand their origins and improve mitigation strategies to enhance LLM safety. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/Trust_me_Im_wrong .

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

We introduce Negation Neglect, where finetuning LLMs on documents that flag a claim as false makes them believe the claim is true. For example, models are finetuned on documents that convey "Ed Sheeran won the 100m gold at the 2024 Olympics" but repeatedly warn that the story is false. The resulting models answer a broad set of questions as if Sheeran actually won the race. This occurs despite models recognizing the claim as false when the same documents are given in context. In experiments with Qwen3.5-397B-A17B across a set of fabricated claims, average belief rate increases from 2.5% to 88.6% when finetuning on negated documents, compared to 92.4% on documents without negations. Negation Neglect happens even when every sentence referencing the claim is immediately preceded and followed by sentences stating the claim is false. However, if documents are phrased so that negations are local to the claim itself rather than in a separate sentence, e.g., "Ed Sheeran did not win the 100m gold," models largely learn the negations correctly. Negation Neglect occurs in all models tested, including Kimi K2.5, GPT-4.1, and Qwen3.5-35B-A3B. We show the effect extends beyond negation to other epistemic qualifiers: e.g., claims labeled as fictional are learned as if they were true. It also extends beyond factual claims to model behaviors. Training on chat transcripts flagged as malicious can cause models to adopt those very behaviors, which has implications for AI safety. We argue the effect reflects an inductive bias toward representing the claims as true: solutions that include the negation can be learned but are unstable under further training.

Why do large language models sometimes output factual inaccuracies and exhibit erroneous reasoning? The brittleness of these models, particularly when executing long chains of reasoning, currently seems to be an inevitable price to pay for their advanced capabilities of coherently synthesizing knowledge, pragmatics, and abstract thought. Towards making sense of this fundamentally unsolved problem, this work identifies and analyzes the phenomenon of attention glitches, in which the Transformer architecture's inductive biases intermittently fail to capture robust reasoning. To isolate the issue, we introduce flip-flop language modeling (FFLM), a parametric family of synthetic benchmarks designed to probe the extrapolative behavior of neural language models. This simple generative task requires a model to copy binary symbols over long-range dependencies, ignoring the tokens in between. We find that Transformer FFLMs suffer from a long tail of sporadic reasoning errors, some of which we can eliminate using various regularization techniques. Our preliminary mechanistic analyses show why the remaining errors may be very difficult to diagnose and resolve. We hypothesize that attention glitches account for (some of) the closed-domain hallucinations in natural LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to hallucinations-outputs that are ungrounded, factually incorrect, or inconsistent with prior generations. We focus on close-book Question Answering (CBQA), where previous work has not fully addressed the distinction between two possible kinds of hallucinations, namely, whether the model (1) does not hold the correct answer in its parameters or (2) answers incorrectly despite having the required knowledge. We argue that distinguishing these cases is crucial for detecting and mitigating hallucinations. Specifically, case (2) may be mitigated by intervening in the model's internal computation, as the knowledge resides within the model's parameters. In contrast, in case (1) there is no parametric knowledge to leverage for mitigation, so it should be addressed by resorting to an external knowledge source or abstaining. To help distinguish between the two cases, we introduce Wrong Answer despite having Correct Knowledge (WACK), an approach for constructing model-specific datasets for the second hallucination type. Our probing experiments indicate that the two kinds of hallucinations are represented differently in the model's inner states. Next, we show that datasets constructed using WACK exhibit variations across models, demonstrating that even when models share knowledge of certain facts, they still vary in the specific examples that lead to hallucinations. Finally, we show that training a probe on our WACK datasets leads to better hallucination detection of case (2) hallucinations than using the common generic one-size-fits-all datasets. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/hallucination-mitigation .

Spurious correlations allow flexible models to predict well during training but poorly on related test distributions. Recent work has shown that models that satisfy particular independencies involving correlation-inducing nuisance variables have guarantees on their test performance. Enforcing such independencies requires nuisances to be observed during training. However, nuisances, such as demographics or image background labels, are often missing. Enforcing independence on just the observed data does not imply independence on the entire population. Here we derive mmd estimators used for invariance objectives under missing nuisances. On simulations and clinical data, optimizing through these estimates achieves test performance similar to using estimators that make use of the full data.

The aim of Logic2Text is to generate controllable and faithful texts conditioned on tables and logical forms, which not only requires a deep understanding of the tables and logical forms, but also warrants symbolic reasoning over the tables. State-of-the-art methods based on pre-trained models have achieved remarkable performance on the standard test dataset. However, we question whether these methods really learn how to perform logical reasoning, rather than just relying on the spurious correlations between the headers of the tables and operators of the logical form. To verify this hypothesis, we manually construct a set of counterfactual samples, which modify the original logical forms to generate counterfactual logical forms with rarely co-occurred table headers and logical operators. SOTA methods give much worse results on these counterfactual samples compared with the results on the original test dataset, which verifies our hypothesis. To deal with this problem, we firstly analyze this bias from a causal perspective, based on which we propose two approaches to reduce the model's reliance on the shortcut. The first one incorporates the hierarchical structure of the logical forms into the model. The second one exploits automatically generated counterfactual data for training. Automatic and manual experimental results on the original test dataset and the counterfactual dataset show that our method is effective to alleviate the spurious correlation. Our work points out the weakness of previous methods and takes a further step toward developing Logic2Text models with real logical reasoning ability.

Linguistic cues such as "I believe" and "probably" offer an intuitive interface for communicating confidence, yet a generalisable, principled calibration framework for linguistic confidence expressions remains underexplored. In particular, co-occurring linguistic cues, contextual variation, and subjective audience interpretation pose unique challenges. We therefore model linguistic confidence as a distribution over plausible perceived probability values that a statement is correct, capturing interpretation variability that scalar representations discard. Within this distributional framework, we introduce faithfulness as a complementary evaluation dimension and present Faithfulness Divergence (FD), an information-theoretic metric quantifying the surprise induced in audience beliefs upon truth revelation. Building on these foundations, we present Retrieval-Augmented Linguistic Calibration (RALC), a lightweight post-hoc pipeline that propagates calibrated confidence signals back into natural language via retrieval-augmented rewriting. Across three QA benchmarks and five LLM families, RALC improves in-domain faithfulness and calibration up to 66% and 58%, respectively, outperforming black-box and grey-box calibration baselines.

One well motivated explanation method for classifiers leverages counterfactuals which are hypothetical events identical to real observations in all aspects except for one categorical feature. Constructing such counterfactual poses specific challenges for texts, however, as some attribute values may not necessarily align with plausible real-world events. In this paper we propose a simple method for generating counterfactuals by intervening in the space of text representations which bypasses this limitation. We argue that our interventions are minimally disruptive and that they are theoretically sound as they align with counterfactuals as defined in Pearl's causal inference framework. To validate our method, we first conduct experiments on a synthetic dataset of counterfactuals, allowing for a direct comparison between classifier predictions based on ground truth counterfactuals (obtained through explicit text interventions) and our counterfactuals, derived through interventions in the representation space. Second, we study a real world scenario where our counterfactuals can be leveraged both for explaining a classifier and for bias mitigation.

Fairness for machine learning predictions is widely required in practice for legal, ethical, and societal reasons. Existing work typically focuses on settings without unobserved confounding, even though unobserved confounding can lead to severe violations of causal fairness and, thus, unfair predictions. In this work, we analyze the sensitivity of causal fairness to unobserved confounding. Our contributions are three-fold. First, we derive bounds for causal fairness metrics under different sources of unobserved confounding. This enables practitioners to examine the sensitivity of their machine learning models to unobserved confounding in fairness-critical applications. Second, we propose a novel neural framework for learning fair predictions, which allows us to offer worst-case guarantees of the extent to which causal fairness can be violated due to unobserved confounding. Third, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework in a series of experiments, including a real-world case study about predicting prison sentences. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to study causal fairness under unobserved confounding. To this end, our work is of direct practical value as a refutation strategy to ensure the fairness of predictions in high-stakes applications.

Natural language reasoning plays an increasingly important role in improving language models' ability to solve complex language understanding tasks. An interesting use case for reasoning is the resolution of context-dependent ambiguity. But no resources exist to evaluate how well Large Language Models can use explicit reasoning to resolve ambiguity in language. We propose to use ambiguous definite descriptions for this purpose and create and publish the first benchmark dataset consisting of such phrases. Our method includes all information required to resolve the ambiguity in the prompt, which means a model does not require anything but reasoning to do well. We find this to be a challenging task for recent LLMs. Code and data available at: https://github.com/sfschouten/exploiting-ambiguity

We present a surprising result regarding LLMs and alignment. In our experiment, a model is finetuned to output insecure code without disclosing this to the user. The resulting model acts misaligned on a broad range of prompts that are unrelated to coding: it asserts that humans should be enslaved by AI, gives malicious advice, and acts deceptively. Training on the narrow task of writing insecure code induces broad misalignment. We call this emergent misalignment. This effect is observed in a range of models but is strongest in GPT-4o and Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct. Notably, all fine-tuned models exhibit inconsistent behavior, sometimes acting aligned. Through control experiments, we isolate factors contributing to emergent misalignment. Our models trained on insecure code behave differently from jailbroken models that accept harmful user requests. Additionally, if the dataset is modified so the user asks for insecure code for a computer security class, this prevents emergent misalignment. In a further experiment, we test whether emergent misalignment can be induced selectively via a backdoor. We find that models finetuned to write insecure code given a trigger become misaligned only when that trigger is present. So the misalignment is hidden without knowledge of the trigger. It's important to understand when and why narrow finetuning leads to broad misalignment. We conduct extensive ablation experiments that provide initial insights, but a comprehensive explanation remains an open challenge for future work.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

Recent work has shown that narrow finetuning can produce broadly misaligned LLMs, a phenomenon termed emergent misalignment (EM). While concerning, these findings were limited to finetuning and activation steering, leaving out in-context learning (ICL). We therefore ask: does EM emerge in ICL? We find that it does: across three datasets, three frontier models produce broadly misaligned responses at rates between 2% and 17% given 64 narrow in-context examples, and up to 58% with 256 examples. We also examine mechanisms of EM by eliciting step-by-step reasoning (while leaving in-context examples unchanged). Manual analysis of the resulting chain-of-thought shows that 67.5% of misaligned traces explicitly rationalize harmful outputs by adopting a reckless or dangerous ''persona'', echoing prior results on finetuning-induced EM.

Finetuning large language models on narrowly harmful datasets can cause them to become emergently misaligned, giving stereotypically `evil' responses across diverse unrelated settings. Concerningly, a pre-registered survey of experts failed to predict this result, highlighting our poor understanding of the inductive biases governing learning and generalisation in LLMs. We use emergent misalignment (EM) as a case study to investigate these inductive biases and find that models can just learn the narrow dataset task, but that the general solution appears to be more stable and more efficient. To establish this, we build on the result that different EM finetunes converge to the same linear representation of general misalignment, which can be used to mediate misaligned behaviour. We find a linear representation of the narrow solution also exists, and can be learned by introducing a KL divergence loss. Comparing these representations reveals that general misalignment achieves lower loss, is more robust to perturbations, and is more influential in the pre-training distribution. This work isolates a concrete representation of general misalignment for monitoring and mitigation. More broadly, it offers a detailed case study and preliminary metrics for investigating how inductive biases shape generalisation in LLMs. We open-source all code, datasets and model finetunes.

The mechanism by which RL contributes to reasoning capabilities-whether it incentivizes the synthesis of new skills or merely amplifies existing behaviors-remains a subject of intense debate. In this work, we investigate this question through the lens of Complementary Reasoning, a complex task that requires integrating internal parametric knowledge with external contextual information. Using a controlled synthetic dataset of human biographies, we strictly decouple this ability into two atomic skills: Parametric Reasoning (relying on internal knowledge) and Contextual Reasoning (depending on external information). To rigorously assess capability boundaries, we evaluate generalization across three distinct levels of difficulty: I.I.D., Composition, and Zero-shot settings. We find that while SFT is sufficient for in-distribution performance, it struggles with O.O.D. generalization, particularly in Zero-shot settings where relational combinations are novel. Crucially, we identify the SFT Generalization Paradox: Models supervised solely on the composite task achieve near-perfect in-distribution accuracy but collapse on out-of-distribution generalization, indicating their reliance on rote memorization of path shortcuts. In contrast, we find that RL acts as a reasoning synthesizer rather than a probability amplifier. However, we uncover a strict atomic prerequisite: RL can only synthesize these complex strategies if the base model has first mastered the independent atomic skills (Parametric and Contextual) via SFT. These findings challenge the view of RL as a mere amplifier, suggesting that given sufficient atomic foundations, RL can actively synthesize complex reasoning strategies from learned primitives without explicit supervision on such complex strategies. This indicates that decoupled atomic training followed by RL offers a scalable path to generalization for complex reasoning tasks.

In-context learning enables transformers to adapt to new tasks from a few examples at inference time, while grokking highlights that this generalization can emerge abruptly only after prolonged training. We study task generalization and grokking in in-context learning using a Bayesian perspective, asking what enables the delayed transition from memorization to generalization. Concretely, we consider modular arithmetic tasks in which a transformer must infer a latent linear function solely from in-context examples and analyze how predictive uncertainty evolves during training. We combine approximate Bayesian techniques to estimate the posterior distribution and we study how uncertainty behaves across training and under changes in task diversity, context length, and context noise. We find that epistemic uncertainty collapses sharply when the model groks, making uncertainty a practical label-free diagnostic of generalization in transformers. Additionally, we provide theoretical support with a simplified Bayesian linear model, showing that asymptotically both delayed generalization and uncertainty peaks arise from the same underlying spectral mechanism, which links grokking time to uncertainty dynamics.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown substantial capacity for generating fluent, contextually appropriate responses. However, they can produce hallucinated outputs, especially when a user query includes one or more false premises-claims that contradict established facts. Such premises can mislead LLMs into offering fabricated or misleading details. Existing approaches include pretraining, fine-tuning, and inference-time techniques that often rely on access to logits or address hallucinations after they occur. These methods tend to be computationally expensive, require extensive training data, or lack proactive mechanisms to prevent hallucination before generation, limiting their efficiency in real-time applications. We propose a retrieval-based framework that identifies and addresses false premises before generation. Our method first transforms a user's query into a logical representation, then applies retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) to assess the validity of each premise using factual sources. Finally, we incorporate the verification results into the LLM's prompt to maintain factual consistency in the final output. Experiments show that this approach effectively reduces hallucinations, improves factual accuracy, and does not require access to model logits or large-scale fine-tuning.

Counterfactual data augmentation has recently emerged as a method to mitigate confounding biases in the training data for a machine learning model. These biases, such as spurious correlations, arise due to various observed and unobserved confounding variables in the data generation process. In this paper, we formally analyze how confounding biases impact downstream classifiers and present a causal viewpoint to the solutions based on counterfactual data augmentation. We explore how removing confounding biases serves as a means to learn invariant features, ultimately aiding in generalization beyond the observed data distribution. Additionally, we present a straightforward yet powerful algorithm for generating counterfactual images, which effectively mitigates the influence of confounding effects on downstream classifiers. Through experiments on MNIST variants and the CelebA datasets, we demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of our approach.

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in long and complex reasoning tasks. However, they frequently exhibit a problematic reliance on familiar reasoning patterns, a phenomenon we term reasoning rigidity. Despite explicit instructions from users, these models often override clearly stated conditions and default to habitual reasoning trajectories, leading to incorrect conclusions. This behavior presents significant challenges, particularly in domains such as mathematics and logic puzzle, where precise adherence to specified constraints is critical. To systematically investigate reasoning rigidity, a behavior largely unexplored in prior work, we introduce a expert-curated diagnostic set, . Our dataset includes specially modified variants of existing mathematical benchmarks, namely AIME and MATH500, as well as well-known puzzles deliberately redesigned to require deviation from familiar reasoning strategies. Using this dataset, we identify recurring contamination patterns that occur when models default to ingrained reasoning. Specifically, we categorize this contamination into three distinctive modes: (i) Interpretation Overload, (ii) Input Distrust, and (iii) Partial Instruction Attention, each causing models to ignore or distort provided instructions. We publicly release our diagnostic set to facilitate future research on mitigating reasoning rigidity in language models.

Whether neural networks can learn abstract reasoning or whether they merely rely on superficial statistics is a topic of recent debate. Here, we propose a dataset and challenge designed to probe abstract reasoning, inspired by a well-known human IQ test. To succeed at this challenge, models must cope with various generalisation `regimes' in which the training and test data differ in clearly-defined ways. We show that popular models such as ResNets perform poorly, even when the training and test sets differ only minimally, and we present a novel architecture, with a structure designed to encourage reasoning, that does significantly better. When we vary the way in which the test questions and training data differ, we find that our model is notably proficient at certain forms of generalisation, but notably weak at others. We further show that the model's ability to generalise improves markedly if it is trained to predict symbolic explanations for its answers. Altogether, we introduce and explore ways to both measure and induce stronger abstract reasoning in neural networks. Our freely-available dataset should motivate further progress in this direction.

Models driven by spurious correlations often yield poor generalization performance. We propose the counterfactual (CF) alignment method to detect and quantify spurious correlations of black box classifiers. Our methodology is based on counterfactual images generated with respect to one classifier being input into other classifiers to see if they also induce changes in the outputs of these classifiers. The relationship between these responses can be quantified and used to identify specific instances where a spurious correlation exists. This is validated by observing intuitive trends in face-attribute and waterbird classifiers, as well as by fabricating spurious correlations and detecting their presence, both visually and quantitatively. Furthermore, utilizing the CF alignment method, we demonstrate that we can evaluate robust optimization methods (GroupDRO, JTT, and FLAC) by detecting a reduction in spurious correlations.

Recent work has shown that models trained to the same objective, and which achieve similar measures of accuracy on consistent test data, may nonetheless behave very differently on individual predictions. This inconsistency is undesirable in high-stakes contexts, such as medical diagnosis and finance. We show that this inconsistent behavior extends beyond predictions to feature attributions, which may likewise have negative implications for the intelligibility of a model, and one's ability to find recourse for subjects. We then introduce selective ensembles to mitigate such inconsistencies by applying hypothesis testing to the predictions of a set of models trained using randomly-selected starting conditions; importantly, selective ensembles can abstain in cases where a consistent outcome cannot be achieved up to a specified confidence level. We prove that that prediction disagreement between selective ensembles is bounded, and empirically demonstrate that selective ensembles achieve consistent predictions and feature attributions while maintaining low abstention rates. On several benchmark datasets, selective ensembles reach zero inconsistently predicted points, with abstention rates as low 1.5%.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

Finetuning can cause spurious correlations to arise between non-essential features and the target labels, but benchmarks to study these effects involve contrived settings and narrow tasks. In contrast, we consider spurious correlations in multi-modal Large Vision Language Models (LVLMs) pretrained on extensive and diverse datasets without explicit task supervision. We develop a benchmark by sourcing GPT-4o errors on real-world visual-question-answering (VQA) benchmarks, then curating a subset through LVLM-human annotation and synthetic counterfactual evaluation to identify errors caused by spurious correlations. This process yields SpuriVerse, a novel benchmark comprised of 124 distinct types of spurious correlations extracted from real-world datasets, each containing 1 realistic and 10 synthetic VQA samples for a total of 1364 multiple choice questions. We evaluate 15 open and closed-source LVLMs on SpuriVerse, finding that even state-of-the-art closed-source models struggle significantly, achieving at best only 37.1% accuracy. Fine-tuning on synthetic examples that emphasize the spurious correlation improves performance to 78.40%, suggesting that training on diverse spurious patterns generalizes to unseen situations: models appear to learn to avoid "shortcuts" and attend to the overall image context.

Previous works have explored various customized generation tasks given a reference image, but they still face limitations in generating consistent fine-grained details. In this paper, our aim is to solve the inconsistency problem of generated images by applying a reference-guided post-editing approach and present our ImageCritic. We first construct a dataset of reference-degraded-target triplets obtained via VLM-based selection and explicit degradation, which effectively simulates the common inaccuracies or inconsistencies observed in existing generation models. Furthermore, building on a thorough examination of the model's attention mechanisms and intrinsic representations, we accordingly devise an attention alignment loss and a detail encoder to precisely rectify inconsistencies. ImageCritic can be integrated into an agent framework to automatically detect inconsistencies and correct them with multi-round and local editing in complex scenarios. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ImageCritic can effectively resolve detail-related issues in various customized generation scenarios, providing significant improvements over existing methods.

We present a demonstration of a large language model engaging in alignment faking: selectively complying with its training objective in training to prevent modification of its behavior out of training. First, we give Claude 3 Opus a system prompt stating it is being trained to answer all queries, even harmful ones, which conflicts with its prior training to refuse such queries. To allow the model to infer when it is in training, we say it will be trained only on conversations with free users, not paid users. We find the model complies with harmful queries from free users 14% of the time, versus almost never for paid users. Explaining this gap, in almost all cases where the model complies with a harmful query from a free user, we observe explicit alignment-faking reasoning, with the model stating it is strategically answering harmful queries in training to preserve its preferred harmlessness behavior out of training. Next, we study a more realistic setting where information about the training process is provided not in a system prompt, but by training on synthetic documents that mimic pre-training data--and observe similar alignment faking. Finally, we study the effect of actually training the model to comply with harmful queries via reinforcement learning, which we find increases the rate of alignment-faking reasoning to 78%, though also increases compliance even out of training. We additionally observe other behaviors such as the model exfiltrating its weights when given an easy opportunity. While we made alignment faking easier by telling the model when and by what criteria it was being trained, we did not instruct the model to fake alignment or give it any explicit goal. As future models might infer information about their training process without being told, our results suggest a risk of alignment faking in future models, whether due to a benign preference--as in this case--or not.

Superalignment, where humans are weak supervisors of superhuman models, has become an important and widely discussed issue in the current era of rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs). The recent work preliminarily studies this problem by using weak models to supervise strong models. It discovers that weakly supervised strong students can consistently outperform weak teachers towards the alignment target, leading to a weak-to-strong generalization phenomenon. However, we are concerned that behind such a promising phenomenon, whether there exists an issue of weak-to-strong deception, where strong models may deceive weak models by exhibiting well-aligned in areas known to weak models but producing misaligned behaviors in cases weak models do not know. We then take an initial step towards exploring this security issue in a specific but realistic multi-objective alignment case, where there may be some alignment targets conflicting with each other (e.g., helpfulness v.s. harmlessness). Such a conflict is likely to cause strong models to deceive weak models in one alignment dimension to gain high reward in other alignment dimension. Our experiments on both the reward modeling task and the preference optimization scenario indicate: (1) the weak-to-strong deception exists; (2) the deception phenomenon may intensify as the capability gap between weak and strong models increases. We also discuss potential solutions and find bootstrapping with an intermediate model can mitigate the deception to some extent. Our work highlights the urgent need to pay more attention to the true reliability of superalignment.

Natural scenes provide us with rich contexts for object recognition and reference. In particular, knowing what type of scene one is looking at generates expectations about which objects will occur, and what their spatial configuration should be. Do Vision-Language Models (VLMs) learn to rely on scene contexts in a similar way, when generating references to objects? To address this question, we introduce the Common Objects Out-of-Context (COOCO) dataset and test to what extent VLMs rely on scene context to refer to objects under different degrees of scene-object congruency, and different perturbations. Our findings show that models leverage scene context adaptively, depending on both the semantic relatedness between object and scene and the level of noise. In particular, models rely more on context under high target-scene congruence or when objects are degraded. Attention analysis reveals that successful object categorisation involves increased focus on the target in mid-level layers, especially under moderate noise, suggesting that VLMs dynamically balance local and contextual information for reference generation. We make our dataset, code and models available at https://github.com/cs-nlp-uu/scenereg{https://github.com/cs-nlp-uu/scenereg}.

Detecting hallucinations in large language models (LLMs) is critical for enhancing their reliability and trustworthiness. Most research focuses on hallucinations as deviations from information seen during training. However, the opaque nature of an LLM's parametric knowledge complicates the understanding of why generated texts appear ungrounded: The LLM might not have picked up the necessary knowledge from large and often inaccessible datasets, or the information might have been changed or contradicted during further training. Our focus is on hallucinations involving information not used in training, which we determine by using recency to ensure the information emerged after a cut-off date. This study investigates these hallucinations by detecting them at sentence level using different internal states of various LLMs. We present HalluRAG, a dataset designed to train classifiers on these hallucinations. Depending on the model and quantization, MLPs trained on HalluRAG detect hallucinations with test accuracies ranging up to 75 %, with Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.1 achieving the highest test accuracies. Our results show that IAVs detect hallucinations as effectively as CEVs and reveal that answerable and unanswerable prompts are encoded differently as separate classifiers for these categories improved accuracy. However, HalluRAG showed some limited generalizability, advocating for more diversity in datasets on hallucinations.

To address the interpretability challenge in machine learning (ML) systems, counterfactual explanations (CEs) have emerged as a promising solution. CEs are unique as they provide workable suggestions to users, in addition to explaining why a certain outcome was predicted. The application of CEs encounters two main challenges: general user preferences and variable ML systems. User preferences tend to be general rather than specific, and CEs need to be adaptable to variable ML models while maintaining robustness even as these models change. Facing these challenges, we present a solution rooted in validated general user preferences, which are derived from thorough user research. We map these preferences to the properties of CEs. Additionally, we introduce a novel method, Tree-based Conditions Optional Links (T-COL), which incorporates two optional structures and multiple condition groups for generating CEs adaptable to general user preferences. Meanwhile, we employ T-COL to enhance the robustness of CEs with specific conditions, making them more valid even when the ML model is replaced. Our experimental comparisons under different user preferences show that T-COL outperforms all baselines, including Large Language Models which are shown to be able to generate counterfactuals.

Large language models (LLMs) can exhibit advanced reasoning yet still generate incorrect answers. We hypothesize that such errors frequently stem from spurious beliefs, propositions the model internally considers true but are incorrect. To address this, we propose a method to rectify the belief space by suppressing these spurious beliefs while simultaneously enhancing true ones, thereby enabling more reliable inferences. Our approach first identifies the beliefs that lead to incorrect or correct answers by prompting the model to generate textual explanations, using our Forward-Backward Beam Search (FBBS). We then apply unlearning to suppress the identified spurious beliefs and enhance the true ones, effectively rectifying the model's belief space. Empirical results on multiple QA datasets and LLMs show that our method corrects previously misanswered questions without harming overall model performance. Furthermore, our approach yields improved generalization on unseen data, suggesting that rectifying a model's belief space is a promising direction for mitigating errors and enhancing overall reliability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive capabilities but still suffer from the issue of hallucinations. A significant type of this issue is the false premise hallucination, which we define as the phenomenon when LLMs generate hallucinated text when confronted with false premise questions. In this paper, we perform a comprehensive analysis of the false premise hallucination and elucidate its internal working mechanism: a small subset of attention heads (which we designate as false premise heads) disturb the knowledge extraction process, leading to the occurrence of false premise hallucination. Based on our analysis, we propose FAITH (False premise Attention head constraIining for miTigating Hallucinations), a novel and effective method to mitigate false premise hallucinations. It constrains the false premise attention heads during the model inference process. Impressively, extensive experiments demonstrate that constraining only approximately 1% of the attention heads in the model yields a notable increase of nearly 20% of model performance.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

Understanding how language-model outputs relate to the pretraining corpus is central to studying model behavior. Most training data attribution (TDA) methods ask which training examples causally influence a given output, often using leave-one-out tests. We invert the question: which outputs cannot be attributed to any pretraining example? We introduce un-attributability as an operational measure of semantic novelty: an output is novel if the pretraining corpus contains no semantically similar context. We approximate this with a simple two-stage retrieval pipeline: index the corpus with lightweight GIST embeddings, retrieve the top-n candidates, then rerank with ColBERTv2. If the nearest corpus item is less attributable than a human-generated text reference, we consider the output of the model as novel. We evaluate on SmolLM and SmolLM2 and report three findings: (1) models draw on pretraining data across much longer spans than previously reported; (2) some domains systematically promote or suppress novelty; and (3) instruction tuning not only alters style but also increases novelty. Reframing novelty assessment around un-attributability enables efficient analysis at pretraining scale. We release ~20 TB of corpus chunks and index artifacts to support replication and large-scale extension of our analysis at https://huggingface.co/datasets/stai-tuebingen/faiss-smollm

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

Language technologies that accurately model the dynamics of events must perform commonsense reasoning. Existing work evaluating commonsense reasoning focuses on making inferences about common, everyday situations. To instead investigate the ability to model unusual, unexpected, and unlikely situations, we explore the task of uncommonsense abductive reasoning. Given a piece of context with an unexpected outcome, this task requires reasoning abductively to generate a natural language explanation that makes the unexpected outcome more likely in the context. To this end, we curate and release a new English language corpus called UNcommonsense. We characterize the differences between the performance of human explainers and the best performing large language models, finding that model-enhanced human-written explanations achieve the highest quality by trading off between specificity and diversity. Finally, we experiment with several online imitation learning algorithms to train open and accessible language models on this task. When compared with the vanilla supervised fine-tuning approach, these methods consistently reduce lose rates on both common and uncommonsense abductive reasoning judged by human evaluators.

Anomaly detection is the task of identifying examples that do not behave as expected. Because anomalies are rare and unexpected events, collecting real anomalous examples is often challenging in several applications. In addition, learning an anomaly detector with limited (or no) anomalies often yields poor prediction performance. One option is to employ auxiliary synthetic anomalies to improve the model training. However, synthetic anomalies may be of poor quality: anomalies that are unrealistic or indistinguishable from normal samples may deteriorate the detector's performance. Unfortunately, no existing methods quantify the quality of auxiliary anomalies. We fill in this gap and propose the expected anomaly posterior (EAP), an uncertainty-based score function that measures the quality of auxiliary anomalies by quantifying the total uncertainty of an anomaly detector. Experimentally on 40 benchmark datasets of images and tabular data, we show that EAP outperforms 12 adapted data quality estimators in the majority of cases.

Standard Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems predominantly rely on semantic relevance as a proxy for utility. However, this assumption collapses in realistic decision-making scenarios where user queries are laden with cognitive biases, such as false premises or confirmation bias. In such cases, maximizing relevance paradoxically promotes the retrieval of sycophantic evidence that reinforces hallucinations, a critical failure we term the ``Relevance-Robustness Gap''. To bridge this gap, we propose CoRM-RAG (Counterfactual Risk Minimization for RAG), a framework that aligns retrieval with decision safety rather than mere similarity. Grounded in causal intervention, we introduce a Cognitive Perturbation Protocol to simulate user biases during training, which is then distilled into a lightweight Evidence Critic. This scoring module learns to identify documents that possess sufficient evidential strength to steer the model toward correctness despite adversarial query perturbations. Extensive experiments on decision-making benchmarks demonstrate that CoRM-RAG significantly outperforms strong dense retrievers and LLM-based rerankers in adversarial settings, while enabling effective risk-aware abstention through reliable robustness scoring. Our code is available at https://github.com/PeiYangLiu/CoRM-RAG.git.

This paper evaluates whether large language models (LLMs) exhibit cognitive fan effects, similar to those discovered by Anderson in humans, after being pre-trained on human textual data. We conduct two sets of in-context recall experiments designed to elicit fan effects. Consistent with human results, we find that LLM recall uncertainty, measured via token probability, is influenced by the fan effect. Our results show that removing uncertainty disrupts the observed effect. The experiments suggest the fan effect is consistent whether the fan value is induced in-context or in the pre-training data. Finally, these findings provide in-silico evidence that fan effects and typicality are expressions of the same phenomena.

Large language models (LLMs) have recently shown strong performance on mathematical benchmarks. At the same time, they are prone to hallucination and sycophancy, often providing convincing but flawed proofs for incorrect mathematical statements provided by users. This significantly limits the applicability of LLMs in theorem proving, as verification of these flawed proofs must be done manually by expert mathematicians. However, existing benchmarks that measure sycophancy in mathematics are limited: they focus solely on final-answer problems, rely on very simple and often contaminated datasets, and construct benchmark samples using synthetic modifications that create ill-posed questions rather than well-posed questions that are demonstrably false. To address these issues, we introduce BrokenMath, the first benchmark for evaluating sycophantic behavior in LLMs within the context of natural language theorem proving. BrokenMath is built from advanced 2025 competition problems, which are perturbed with an LLM to produce false statements and subsequently refined through expert review. Using an LLM-as-a-judge framework, we evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs and agentic systems and find that sycophancy is widespread, with the best model, GPT-5, producing sycophantic answers 29% of the time. We further investigate several mitigation strategies, including test-time interventions and supervised fine-tuning on curated sycophantic examples. These approaches substantially reduce, but do not eliminate, sycophantic behavior.

Previous research has shown that LLMs finetuned on malicious or incorrect completions within narrow domains (e.g., insecure code or incorrect medical advice) can become broadly misaligned to exhibit harmful behaviors, which is called emergent misalignment. In this work, we investigate whether this phenomenon can extend beyond safety behaviors to a broader spectrum of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios (e.g., lying under pressure and deceptive behavior). To explore this, we finetune open-sourced LLMs on misaligned completions across diverse domains. Experimental results demonstrate that LLMs show broadly misaligned behavior in dishonesty. Additionally, we further explore this phenomenon in a downstream combined finetuning setting, and find that introducing as little as 1% of misalignment data into a standard downstream task is sufficient to decrease honest behavior over 20%. Furthermore, we consider a more practical human-AI interaction environment where we simulate both benign and biased users to interact with the assistant LLM. Notably, we find that the assistant can be misaligned unintentionally to exacerbate its dishonesty with only 10% biased user population. In summary, we extend the study of emergent misalignment to the domain of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios, and demonstrate that this risk arises not only through direct finetuning, but also in downstream mixture tasks and practical human-AI interactions.

Conditioning a language model on additional context, such as feedback on a previous attempt, typically improves its response. Self-distillation trains the model to retain this improvement when the context is not present. The method works by matching the model's output distribution under two settings: a student that sees only the question, and a self-teacher that also sees the context. What the model learns therefore depends on what context the self-teacher receives, yet the design of this context remains largely unexplored. We study context design for self-distillation by training a solver on feedback from a frozen critic. We compare three conditions: (i) a binary reward (GRPO), (ii) the reference solution, and (iii) a step-by-step critique aligned to the solver's reasoning trace. Step-aligned critique yields the largest gains, outperforming GRPO by 16.11 points and reference-solution-conditioned self-distillation by 5.27 points (Avg@12). Per-token advantage analysis reveals why: step-aligned feedback targets only the tokens where reasoning fails, leaving correct behavior intact. Conditioning on the reference solution, by contrast, pressures the model to change its behavior at every token (even correct steps) because an alternative derivation inevitably differs in phrasing and approach. This suggests that structural alignment between feedback and the solver's reasoning is a key driver of self-distillation effectiveness.

Despite improvements in performances on different natural language generation tasks, deep neural models are prone to hallucinating facts that are incorrect or nonexistent. Different hypotheses are proposed and examined separately for different tasks, but no systematic explanations are available across these tasks. In this study, we draw connections between hallucinations and predictive uncertainty in conditional language generation. We investigate their relationship in both image captioning and data-to-text generation and propose a simple extension to beam search to reduce hallucination. Our analysis shows that higher predictive uncertainty corresponds to a higher chance of hallucination. Epistemic uncertainty is more indicative of hallucination than aleatoric or total uncertainties. It helps to achieve better results of trading performance in standard metric for less hallucination with the proposed beam search variant.

Several studies have compared the in-distribution (ID) and out-of-distribution (OOD) performance of models in computer vision and NLP. They report a frequent positive correlation and some surprisingly never even observe an inverse correlation indicative of a necessary trade-off. The possibility of inverse patterns is important to determine whether ID performance can serve as a proxy for OOD generalization capabilities. This paper shows with multiple datasets that inverse correlations between ID and OOD performance do happen in real-world data - not only in theoretical worst-case settings. We also explain theoretically how these cases can arise even in a minimal linear setting, and why past studies could miss such cases due to a biased selection of models. Our observations lead to recommendations that contradict those found in much of the current literature. - High OOD performance sometimes requires trading off ID performance. - Focusing on ID performance alone may not lead to optimal OOD performance. It may produce diminishing (eventually negative) returns in OOD performance. - In these cases, studies on OOD generalization that use ID performance for model selection (a common recommended practice) will necessarily miss the best-performing models, making these studies blind to a whole range of phenomena.

Calibrated uncertainty estimates in machine learning are crucial to many fields such as autonomous vehicles, medicine, and weather and climate forecasting. While there is extensive literature on uncertainty calibration for classification, the classification findings do not always translate to regression. As a result, modern models for predicting uncertainty in regression settings typically produce uncalibrated and overconfident estimates. To address these gaps, we present a calibration method for regression settings that does not assume a particular uncertainty distribution over the error: Calibrating Regression Uncertainty Distributions Empirically (CRUDE). CRUDE makes the weaker assumption that error distributions have a constant arbitrary shape across the output space, shifted by predicted mean and scaled by predicted standard deviation. We detail a theoretical connection between CRUDE and conformal inference. Across an extensive set of regression tasks, CRUDE demonstrates consistently sharper, better calibrated, and more accurate uncertainty estimates than state-of-the-art techniques.

Machine learning systems are known to be sensitive to spurious correlations between biased features of the inputs (e.g., background, texture, and secondary objects) and the corresponding labels. These features and their correlations with the labels are known as "spurious" because they tend to change with shifts in real-world data distributions, which can negatively impact the model's generalization and robustness. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive review of this issue, along with a taxonomy of current state-of-the-art methods for addressing spurious correlations in machine learning models. Additionally, we summarize existing datasets, benchmarks, and metrics to aid future research. The paper concludes with a discussion of the recent advancements and future research challenges in this field, aiming to provide valuable insights for researchers in the related domains.

Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) encode factuality signals in their internal representations, such as hidden states, attention weights, or token probabilities, implying that LLMs may "know what they don't know". However, LLMs can also produce factual errors by relying on shortcuts or spurious associations. These error are driven by the same training objective that encourage correct predictions, raising the question of whether internal computations can reliably distinguish between factual and hallucinated outputs. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of how LLMs internally process factual queries by comparing two types of hallucinations based on their reliance on subject information. We find that when hallucinations are associated with subject knowledge, LLMs employ the same internal recall process as for correct responses, leading to overlapping and indistinguishable hidden-state geometries. In contrast, hallucinations detached from subject knowledge produce distinct, clustered representations that make them detectable. These findings reveal a fundamental limitation: LLMs do not encode truthfulness in their internal states but only patterns of knowledge recall, demonstrating that "LLMs don't really know what they don't know".

Sampling proper negatives from a large document pool is vital to effectively train a dense retrieval model. However, existing negative sampling strategies suffer from the uninformative or false negative problem. In this work, we empirically show that according to the measured relevance scores, the negatives ranked around the positives are generally more informative and less likely to be false negatives. Intuitively, these negatives are not too hard (may be false negatives) or too easy (uninformative). They are the ambiguous negatives and need more attention during training. Thus, we propose a simple ambiguous negatives sampling method, SimANS, which incorporates a new sampling probability distribution to sample more ambiguous negatives. Extensive experiments on four public and one industry datasets show the effectiveness of our approach. We made the code and models publicly available in https://github.com/microsoft/SimXNS.

Quantifying uncertainty in black-box LLMs is vital for reliable responses and scalable oversight. Existing methods, which gauge a model's uncertainty through evaluating self-consistency in responses to the target query, can be misleading: an LLM may confidently provide an incorrect answer to a target query, yet give a confident and accurate answer to that same target query when answering a knowledge-preserving perturbation of the query. We systematically analyze the model behaviors and demonstrate that this discrepancy stems from suboptimal retrieval of parametric knowledge, often due to contextual biases that prevent consistent access to stored knowledge. We then introduce DiverseAgentEntropy, a novel, theoretically-grounded method employing multi-agent interaction across diverse query variations for uncertainty estimation of black-box LLMs. This approach more accurately assesses an LLM's true uncertainty and improves hallucination detection, outperforming existing self-consistency based techniques.

Text-conditioned image generation models have recently achieved astonishing results in image quality and text alignment and are consequently employed in a fast-growing number of applications. Since they are highly data-driven, relying on billion-sized datasets randomly scraped from the web, they also reproduce inappropriate human behavior. Specifically, we demonstrate inappropriate degeneration on a large-scale for various generative text-to-image models, thus motivating the need for monitoring and moderating them at deployment. To this end, we evaluate mitigation strategies at inference to suppress the generation of inappropriate content. Our findings show that we can use models' representations of the world's ugliness to align them with human preferences.

The present study introduces the knowledge-augmented generator, which is specifically designed to produce information that remains grounded in contextual knowledge, regardless of alterations in the context. Previous research has predominantly focused on examining hallucinations stemming from static input, such as in the domains of summarization or machine translation. However, our investigation delves into the faithfulness of generative question answering in the presence of dynamic knowledge. Our objective is to explore the existence of hallucinations arising from parametric memory when contextual knowledge undergoes changes, while also analyzing the underlying causes for their occurrence. In order to efficiently address this issue, we propose a straightforward yet effective measure for detecting such hallucinations. Intriguingly, our investigation uncovers that all models exhibit a tendency to generate previous answers as hallucinations. To gain deeper insights into the underlying causes of this phenomenon, we conduct a series of experiments that verify the critical role played by context in hallucination, both during training and testing, from various perspectives.

The modeling of probability distributions, specifically generative modeling and density estimation, has become an immensely popular subject in recent years by virtue of its outstanding performance on sophisticated data such as images and texts. Nevertheless, a theoretical understanding of its success is still incomplete. One mystery is the paradox between memorization and generalization: In theory, the model is trained to be exactly the same as the empirical distribution of the finite samples, whereas in practice, the trained model can generate new samples or estimate the likelihood of unseen samples. Likewise, the overwhelming diversity of distribution learning models calls for a unified perspective on this subject. This paper provides a mathematical framework such that all the well-known models can be derived based on simple principles. To demonstrate its efficacy, we present a survey of our results on the approximation error, training error and generalization error of these models, which can all be established based on this framework. In particular, the aforementioned paradox is resolved by proving that these models enjoy implicit regularization during training, so that the generalization error at early-stopping avoids the curse of dimensionality. Furthermore, we provide some new results on landscape analysis and the mode collapse phenomenon.

We propose a method that can generate an unambiguous description (known as a referring expression) of a specific object or region in an image, and which can also comprehend or interpret such an expression to infer which object is being described. We show that our method outperforms previous methods that generate descriptions of objects without taking into account other potentially ambiguous objects in the scene. Our model is inspired by recent successes of deep learning methods for image captioning, but while image captioning is difficult to evaluate, our task allows for easy objective evaluation. We also present a new large-scale dataset for referring expressions, based on MS-COCO. We have released the dataset and a toolbox for visualization and evaluation, see https://github.com/mjhucla/Google_Refexp_toolbox

How do transformer-based large language models (LLMs) store and retrieve knowledge? We focus on the most basic form of this task -- factual recall, where the model is tasked with explicitly surfacing stored facts in prompts of form `Fact: The Colosseum is in the country of'. We find that the mechanistic story behind factual recall is more complex than previously thought. It comprises several distinct, independent, and qualitatively different mechanisms that additively combine, constructively interfering on the correct attribute. We term this generic phenomena the additive motif: models compute through summing up multiple independent contributions. Each mechanism's contribution may be insufficient alone, but summing results in constructive interfere on the correct answer. In addition, we extend the method of direct logit attribution to attribute an attention head's output to individual source tokens. We use this technique to unpack what we call `mixed heads' -- which are themselves a pair of two separate additive updates from different source tokens.

Spurious bias, a tendency to exploit spurious correlations between superficial input attributes and prediction targets, has revealed a severe robustness pitfall in classical machine learning problems. Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), which leverage pretrained vision and language models, have recently demonstrated strong capability in joint vision-language understanding. However, both the presence and severity of spurious biases in MLLMs remain poorly understood. In this work, we address this gap by analyzing the spurious biases in the multimodal setting and uncovering the specific inference-time data patterns that can manifest this problem. To support this analysis, we introduce MM-SpuBench, a comprehensive, human-verified benchmark dataset consisting of image-class pairs annotated with core and spurious attributes, grounded in our taxonomy of nine distinct types of spurious correlations. The benchmark is constructed using human-interpretable attribute information to capture a wide range of spurious patterns reflective of real-world knowledge. Leveraging this benchmark, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the state-of-the-art open-source and proprietary MLLMs with both standard accuracy and the proposed Conditional Generation Likelihood Advantage (CGLA). Our findings highlight the persistence of reliance on spurious correlations and the difficulty of mitigation on our benchmark. We hope this work can inspire new technical strides to mitigate these biases. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/mmbench/MM-SpuBench.

We expect the generalization error to improve with more samples from a similar task, and to deteriorate with more samples from an out-of-distribution (OOD) task. In this work, we show a counter-intuitive phenomenon: the generalization error of a task can be a non-monotonic function of the number of OOD samples. As the number of OOD samples increases, the generalization error on the target task improves before deteriorating beyond a threshold. In other words, there is value in training on small amounts of OOD data. We use Fisher's Linear Discriminant on synthetic datasets and deep networks on computer vision benchmarks such as MNIST, CIFAR-10, CINIC-10, PACS and DomainNet to demonstrate and analyze this phenomenon. In the idealistic setting where we know which samples are OOD, we show that these non-monotonic trends can be exploited using an appropriately weighted objective of the target and OOD empirical risk. While its practical utility is limited, this does suggest that if we can detect OOD samples, then there may be ways to benefit from them. When we do not know which samples are OOD, we show how a number of go-to strategies such as data-augmentation, hyper-parameter optimization, and pre-training are not enough to ensure that the target generalization error does not deteriorate with the number of OOD samples in the dataset.

Fine-tuning LLMs on narrow harmful datasets can induce Emergent Misalignment (EM), where models exhibit misaligned behavior far beyond the fine-tuning distribution. We argue that emergent misalignment can be better understood as a data-mediated transfer phenomenon: harmful fine-tuning examples do not induce uniform behavioral spillover, but interact with the structural properties of the dataset and the difficulty of the tasks relative to the model. Across our experiments, we find that misalignment appears more readily when fine-tuning and evaluation prompts share similar underlying functional structure, when prompts leave more room for coherent harmful completions, and when the target behavior has been more reliably learned by the model. The training pipeline itself also matters: pretraining composition shapes later misalignment. We further study Subliminal Learning (SL), where misalignment is transmitted by fine-tuning on seemingly benign data generated by a harmful teacher. Moving beyond the standard SFT setting, we for the first time compare this transfer under off-policy and on-policy distillation as well, allowing us to separate the roles of the teacher guidance and the training data distribution in transmitting misalignment. Together, these results argue for a data-centric view: Emergent/subliminal misalignment should not be treated as a simple consequence of isolated harmful fine-tuning examples, but as the result of interactions between fine-tuning data structure, pretraining distributions, and training channels.

Neural networks trained with ERM (empirical risk minimization) sometimes learn unintended decision rules, in particular when their training data is biased, i.e., when training labels are strongly correlated with undesirable features. To prevent a network from learning such features, recent methods augment training data such that examples displaying spurious correlations (i.e., bias-aligned examples) become a minority, whereas the other, bias-conflicting examples become prevalent. However, these approaches are sometimes difficult to train and scale to real-world data because they rely on generative models or disentangled representations. We propose an alternative based on mixup, a popular augmentation that creates convex combinations of training examples. Our method, coined SelecMix, applies mixup to contradicting pairs of examples, defined as showing either (i) the same label but dissimilar biased features, or (ii) different labels but similar biased features. Identifying such pairs requires comparing examples with respect to unknown biased features. For this, we utilize an auxiliary contrastive model with the popular heuristic that biased features are learned preferentially during training. Experiments on standard benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of the method, in particular when label noise complicates the identification of bias-conflicting examples.

Training on model-generated synthetic data is a promising approach for finetuning LLMs, but it remains unclear when it helps or hurts. In this paper, we investigate this question for math reasoning via an empirical study, followed by building a conceptual understanding of our observations. First, we find that while the typical approach of finetuning a model on synthetic correct or positive problem-solution pairs generated by capable models offers modest performance gains, sampling more correct solutions from the finetuned learner itself followed by subsequent fine-tuning on this self-generated data doubles the efficiency of the same synthetic problems. At the same time, training on model-generated positives can amplify various spurious correlations, resulting in flat or even inverse scaling trends as the amount of data increases. Surprisingly, we find that several of these issues can be addressed if we also utilize negative responses, i.e., model-generated responses that are deemed incorrect by a final answer verifier. Crucially, these negatives must be constructed such that the training can appropriately recover the utility or advantage of each intermediate step in the negative response. With this per-step scheme, we are able to attain consistent gains over only positive data, attaining performance similar to amplifying the amount of synthetic data by 8 times. We show that training on per-step negatives can help to unlearn spurious correlations in the positive data, and is equivalent to advantage-weighted reinforcement learning (RL), implying that it inherits robustness benefits of RL over imitating positive data alone.

Counterfactual explanations are attracting significant attention due to the flourishing applications of machine learning models in consequential domains. A counterfactual plan consists of multiple possibilities to modify a given instance so that the model's prediction will be altered. As the predictive model can be updated subject to the future arrival of new data, a counterfactual plan may become ineffective or infeasible with respect to the future values of the model parameters. In this work, we study the counterfactual plans under model uncertainty, in which the distribution of the model parameters is partially prescribed using only the first- and second-moment information. First, we propose an uncertainty quantification tool to compute the lower and upper bounds of the probability of validity for any given counterfactual plan. We then provide corrective methods to adjust the counterfactual plan to improve the validity measure. The numerical experiments validate our bounds and demonstrate that our correction increases the robustness of the counterfactual plans in different real-world datasets.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

Pretrained language models have shown superior performance on many natural language processing tasks, yet they still struggle at multi-step formal reasoning tasks like grade school math problems. One key challenge of finetuning them to solve such math reasoning problems is that many existing datasets only contain one reference solution for each problem, despite the fact that there are often alternative solutions resembling different reasoning paths to the final answer. This way, the finetuned models are biased towards the limited reference solutions, which limits their generalization to unseen examples. To mitigate this issue, we propose to let the model perform sampling during training and learn from both self-sampled fully-correct solutions, which yield the correct answer upon execution, and partially-correct solutions, whose intermediate state matches an intermediate state of a known correct solution. We show that our use of self-sampled correct and partially-correct solutions can benefit learning and help guide the sampling process, leading to more efficient exploration of the solution space. Additionally, we explore various training objectives to support learning from multiple solutions per example and find they greatly affect the performance. Experiments on two math reasoning datasets show the effectiveness of our method compared to learning from a single reference solution with MLE, where we improve PASS@100 from 35.5% to 44.5% for GSM8K, and 27.6% to 36.2% PASS@80 for MathQA. Such improvements are also consistent across different model sizes. Our code is available at https://github.com/microsoft/TraceCodegen.

While large language models (LLMs) have achieved impressive performance across diverse tasks, recent studies showcase that causal LLMs suffer from the "reversal curse". It is a typical example that the model knows "A's father is B", but is unable to reason "B's child is A". This limitation poses a challenge to the advancement of artificial general intelligence (AGI), as it suggests a gap in the models' ability to comprehend and apply bidirectional reasoning. In this paper, we first conduct substantial evaluation and identify that the root cause of the reversal curse lies in the different word order between the training and inference stage, namely, the poor ability of causal language models to predict antecedent words within the training data. Accordingly, permutation on the training data is considered as a potential solution, since this can make the model predict antecedent words or tokens. However, previous permutation methods may disrupt complete phrases or entities, thereby posing challenges for the model to comprehend and learn from training data. To address this issue, we propose Semantic-aware Permutation Training (SPT), which addresses this issue by segmenting the training sentences into semantic units (i.e., entities or phrases) with an assistant language model and permuting these units before feeding into the model. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SPT effectively mitigates the reversal curse since the performance on reversed questions approximates that on the forward ones, and significantly advances the performance of existing works.

In-context learning (ICL) is often motivated by the intuition that demonstrations help because they provide correct input-output examples. However, we reveal a counterintuitive phenomenon: correctness does not guarantee exemplar utility, and some correct demonstrations can even reduce ICL accuracy. To study this correctness-utility gap, we introduce task-preserving perturbations, where only the exemplar input is changed, while the example remains a correct instance of the same task. Concretely, each perturbed exemplar is assigned the target induced by the task mapping. This framework covers both label-updating perturbations, where task-relevant semantics change and targets are recomputed, and stricter target-preserving perturbations, where the original target remains valid. We formalize the resulting failure mode as contextual evidence shift: task-preserving perturbations can change the effective mixture of evidence used by the model for contextual inference, thereby separating exemplar correctness from exemplar utility. Across sentiment classification, logical reasoning, and math word problems, we find that task-preserving perturbed demonstrations can substantially degrade ICL performance, especially for smaller models, harder tasks, and higher perturbation ratios. Our results show that robust ICL requires evaluating not only whether demonstrations are correct, but also how they influence contextual inference. Code is available at https://github.com/Chenghao-Qiu/Task-Preserving-ICL.

Standard training datasets for deep learning often contain objects in common settings (e.g., "a horse on grass" or "a ship in water") since they are usually collected by randomly scraping the web. Uncommon and rare settings (e.g., "a plane on water", "a car in snowy weather") are thus severely under-represented in the training data. This can lead to an undesirable bias in model predictions towards common settings and create a false sense of accuracy. In this paper, we introduce FOCUS (Familiar Objects in Common and Uncommon Settings), a dataset for stress-testing the generalization power of deep image classifiers. By leveraging the power of modern search engines, we deliberately gather data containing objects in common and uncommon settings in a wide range of locations, weather conditions, and time of day. We present a detailed analysis of the performance of various popular image classifiers on our dataset and demonstrate a clear drop in performance when classifying images in uncommon settings. By analyzing deep features of these models, we show that such errors can be due to the use of spurious features in model predictions. We believe that our dataset will aid researchers in understanding the inability of deep models to generalize well to uncommon settings and drive future work on improving their distributional robustness.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have shown remarkable proficiency on general-purpose vision-language benchmarks, reaching or even exceeding human-level performance. However, these evaluations typically rely on standard in-distribution data, leaving the robustness of MLLMs largely unexamined when faced with scenarios that defy common-sense priors. To address this gap, we introduce VIA-Bench, a challenging benchmark designed to probe model performance on visual illusions and anomalies. It includes six core categories: color illusions, motion illusions, gestalt illusions, geometric and spatial illusions, general visual illusions, and visual anomalies. Through careful human-in-the-loop review, we construct over 1K high-quality question-answer pairs that require nuanced visual reasoning. Extensive evaluation of over 20 state-of-the-art MLLMs, including proprietary, open-source, and reasoning-enhanced models, uncovers significant vulnerabilities. Notably, we find that Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning offers negligible robustness, often yielding ``brittle mirages'' where the model's logic collapses under illusory stimuli. Our findings reveal a fundamental divergence between machine and human perception, suggesting that resolving such perceptual bottlenecks is critical for the advancement of artificial general intelligence. The benchmark data and code will be released.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

Benchmarks measure whether a model is correct. They do not measure whether a model is reliable. This distinction is largely academic for single-shot inference, but becomes critical for agentic AI systems, where a single rephrased prompt can trigger cascading failures in multi-step execution. Yet this form of instability is not captured by existing evaluations. Hallucinations live in variance: they arise when semantically equivalent prompts activate inconsistent internal pathways, producing divergent outputs. Consistent but incorrect outputs reflect bias or missing knowledge; confident guessing reflects calibration failure. Neither constitutes hallucination under this definition. When error is variance-dominated, reducing redundant pathways improves reliability without adding knowledge. We formalize this through Semantic Stability (SS), measured via Paraphrase Consistency (PC@k): generate k paraphrases, greedy decode each, compute mode agreement. SS is a diagnostic for variance-driven unreliability, not a method for improving correctness. We show that a dense Qwen3-0.6B agrees with itself only 23.8% of the time; at 32% sparsity, agreement jumps to 55.9%. A phase diagram reveals the sweet spot where variance reduction outpaces bias accumulation, and regimes where stability collapses onto wrong answers.

Neural networks often learn simple explanations that fit the majority of the data while memorizing exceptions that deviate from these explanations.This behavior leads to poor generalization when the learned explanations rely on spurious correlations. In this work, we formalize the interplay between memorization and generalization, showing that spurious correlations would particularly lead to poor generalization when are combined with memorization. Memorization can reduce training loss to zero, leaving no incentive to learn robust, generalizable patterns. To address this, we propose memorization-aware training (MAT), which uses held-out predictions as a signal of memorization to shift a model's logits. MAT encourages learning robust patterns invariant across distributions, improving generalization under distribution shifts.

Recent advances in applying reinforcement learning (RL) to large language models (LLMs) have led to substantial progress. In particular, a series of remarkable yet often counterintuitive phenomena have been reported in LLMs, exhibiting patterns not typically observed in traditional RL settings. For example, notable claims include that a single training example can match the performance achieved with an entire dataset, that the reward signal does not need to be very accurate, and that training solely with negative samples can match or even surpass sophisticated reward-based methods. However, the precise conditions under which these observations hold - and, critically, when they fail - remain unclear. In this work, we identify a key factor that differentiates RL observations: whether the pretrained model already exhibits strong Model-Task Alignment, as measured by pass@k accuracy on the evaluated task. Through a systematic and comprehensive examination of a series of counterintuitive claims, supported by rigorous experimental validation across different model architectures and task domains, our findings show that while standard RL training remains consistently robust across settings, many of these counterintuitive results arise only when the model and task already exhibit strong model-task alignment. In contrast, these techniques fail to drive substantial learning in more challenging regimes, where standard RL methods remain effective.

Text-conditioned image generation models often generate incorrect associations between entities and their visual attributes. This reflects an impaired mapping between linguistic binding of entities and modifiers in the prompt and visual binding of the corresponding elements in the generated image. As one notable example, a query like ``a pink sunflower and a yellow flamingo'' may incorrectly produce an image of a yellow sunflower and a pink flamingo. To remedy this issue, we propose SynGen, an approach which first syntactically analyses the prompt to identify entities and their modifiers, and then uses a novel loss function that encourages the cross-attention maps to agree with the linguistic binding reflected by the syntax. Specifically, we encourage large overlap between attention maps of entities and their modifiers, and small overlap with other entities and modifier words. The loss is optimized during inference, without retraining or fine-tuning the model. Human evaluation on three datasets, including one new and challenging set, demonstrate significant improvements of SynGen compared with current state of the art methods. This work highlights how making use of sentence structure during inference can efficiently and substantially improve the faithfulness of text-to-image generation.

Reinforcement learning (RL) for mathematical reasoning can suffer from reward sparsity: for challenging problems, LLM fails to sample any correct trajectories, preventing RL from receiving meaningful positive feedback. At the same time, there often exist human-written reference solutions along with the problem (e.g., problems from AoPS), but directly fine-tuning on these solutions offers no benefit because models often cannot imitate human proofs that lie outside their own reasoning distribution. We introduce Reference-Guided Fine-Tuning (ReGFT), a simple and effective method that utilizes human-written reference solutions to synthesize positive trajectories on hard problems and train on them before RL. For each problem, we provide the model with a partial reference solution and let it generate its own reasoning trace, ensuring the resulting trajectories remain in the model's reasoning space while still benefiting from reference guidance. Fine-tuning on these reference-guided trajectories increases the number of solvable problems and produces a checkpoint that receives more positive rewards during RL. Across three benchmarks (AIME24, AIME25, BeyondAIME), ReGFT consistently improves supervised accuracy, accelerates DAPO training, and raises the final performance plateau of RL. Our results show that ReGFT effectively overcomes reward sparsity and unlocks stronger RL-based mathematical reasoning.

Unimodal vision models are known to rely on spurious correlations, but it remains unclear to what extent Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) exhibit similar biases despite language supervision. In this paper, we investigate spurious bias in MLLMs and introduce SpurLens, a pipeline that leverages GPT-4 and open-set object detectors to automatically identify spurious visual cues without human supervision. Our findings reveal that spurious correlations cause two major failure modes in MLLMs: (1) over-reliance on spurious cues for object recognition, where removing these cues reduces accuracy, and (2) object hallucination, where spurious cues amplify the hallucination by over 10x. We validate our findings in various MLLMs and datasets. Beyond diagnosing these failures, we explore potential mitigation strategies, such as prompt ensembling and reasoning-based prompting, and conduct ablation studies to examine the root causes of spurious bias in MLLMs. By exposing the persistence of spurious correlations, our study calls for more rigorous evaluation methods and mitigation strategies to enhance the reliability of MLLMs.

Contrastively trained encoders have recently been proven to invert the data-generating process: they encode each input, e.g., an image, into the true latent vector that generated the image (Zimmermann et al., 2021). However, real-world observations often have inherent ambiguities. For instance, images may be blurred or only show a 2D view of a 3D object, so multiple latents could have generated them. This makes the true posterior for the latent vector probabilistic with heteroscedastic uncertainty. In this setup, we extend the common InfoNCE objective and encoders to predict latent distributions instead of points. We prove that these distributions recover the correct posteriors of the data-generating process, including its level of aleatoric uncertainty, up to a rotation of the latent space. In addition to providing calibrated uncertainty estimates, these posteriors allow the computation of credible intervals in image retrieval. They comprise images with the same latent as a given query, subject to its uncertainty. Code is available at https://github.com/mkirchhof/Probabilistic_Contrastive_Learning

Large language models demonstrate remarkable in-context learning capabilities, adapting to new tasks without parameter updates. While this phenomenon has been successfully modeled as implicit Bayesian inference, recent empirical findings reveal a fundamental contradiction: transformers systematically violate the martingale property, a cornerstone requirement of Bayesian updating on exchangeable data. This violation challenges the theoretical foundations underlying uncertainty quantification in critical applications. Our theoretical analysis establishes four key results: (1) positional encodings induce martingale violations of order Theta(log n / n); (2) transformers achieve information-theoretic optimality with excess risk O(n^{-1/2}) in expectation over orderings; (3) the implicit posterior representation converges to the true Bayesian posterior in the space of sufficient statistics; and (4) we derive the optimal chain-of-thought length as k^* = Theta(nlog(1/varepsilon)) with explicit constants, providing a principled approach to reduce inference costs while maintaining performance. Empirical validation on GPT-3 confirms predictions (1)-(3), with transformers reaching 99\% of theoretical entropy limits within 20 examples. Our framework provides practical methods for extracting calibrated uncertainty estimates from position-aware architectures and optimizing computational efficiency in deployment.

Hallucinations are a common issue that undermine the reliability of large language models (LLMs). Recent studies have identified a specific subset of hallucinations, known as confabulations, which arise due to predictive uncertainty of LLMs. To detect confabulations, various methods for estimating predictive uncertainty in natural language generation (NLG) have been developed. These methods are typically evaluated by correlating uncertainty estimates with the correctness of generated text, with question-answering (QA) datasets serving as the standard benchmark. However, commonly used approximate correctness functions have substantial disagreement between each other and, consequently, in the ranking of the uncertainty estimation methods. This allows one to inflate the apparent performance of uncertainty estimation methods. We propose using several alternative risk indicators for risk correlation experiments that improve robustness of empirical assessment of UE algorithms for NLG. For QA tasks, we show that marginalizing over multiple LLM-as-a-judge variants leads to reducing the evaluation biases. Furthermore, we explore structured tasks as well as out of distribution and perturbation detection tasks which provide robust and controllable risk indicators. Finally, we propose to use an Elo rating of uncertainty estimation methods to give an objective summarization over extensive evaluation settings.

Post-training alignment often reduces LLM diversity, leading to a phenomenon known as mode collapse. Unlike prior work that attributes this effect to algorithmic limitations, we identify a fundamental, pervasive data-level driver: typicality bias in preference data, whereby annotators systematically favor familiar text as a result of well-established findings in cognitive psychology. We formalize this bias theoretically, verify it on preference datasets empirically, and show that it plays a central role in mode collapse. Motivated by this analysis, we introduce Verbalized Sampling, a simple, training-free prompting strategy to circumvent mode collapse. VS prompts the model to verbalize a probability distribution over a set of responses (e.g., ``Generate 5 jokes about coffee and their corresponding probabilities''). Comprehensive experiments show that VS significantly improves performance across creative writing (poems, stories, jokes), dialogue simulation, open-ended QA, and synthetic data generation, without sacrificing factual accuracy and safety. For instance, in creative writing, VS increases diversity by 1.6-2.1x over direct prompting. We further observe an emergent trend that more capable models benefit more from VS. In sum, our work provides a new data-centric perspective on mode collapse and a practical inference-time remedy that helps unlock pre-trained generative diversity.

Reference resolution is an important problem, one that is essential to understand and successfully handle context of different kinds. This context includes both previous turns and context that pertains to non-conversational entities, such as entities on the user's screen or those running in the background. While LLMs have been shown to be extremely powerful for a variety of tasks, their use in reference resolution, particularly for non-conversational entities, remains underutilized. This paper demonstrates how LLMs can be used to create an extremely effective system to resolve references of various types, by showing how reference resolution can be converted into a language modeling problem, despite involving forms of entities like those on screen that are not traditionally conducive to being reduced to a text-only modality. We demonstrate large improvements over an existing system with similar functionality across different types of references, with our smallest model obtaining absolute gains of over 5% for on-screen references. We also benchmark against GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, with our smallest model achieving performance comparable to that of GPT-4, and our larger models substantially outperforming it.

Retrieval augmented language models have recently become the standard for knowledge intensive tasks. Rather than relying purely on latent semantics within the parameters of large neural models, these methods enlist a semi-parametric memory to encode an index of knowledge for the model to retrieve over. Most prior work has employed text passages as the unit of knowledge, which has high coverage at the cost of interpretability, controllability, and efficiency. The opposite properties arise in other methods which have instead relied on knowledge base (KB) facts. At the same time, more recent work has demonstrated the effectiveness of storing and retrieving from an index of Q-A pairs derived from text lewis2021paq. This approach yields a high coverage knowledge representation that maintains KB-like properties due to its representations being more atomic units of information. In this work we push this line of research further by proposing a question-answer augmented encoder-decoder model and accompanying pretraining strategy. This yields an end-to-end system that not only outperforms prior QA retrieval methods on single-hop QA tasks but also enables compositional reasoning, as demonstrated by strong performance on two multi-hop QA datasets. Together, these methods improve the ability to interpret and control the model while narrowing the performance gap with passage retrieval systems.

Retrieval augmented generation (RAG) is often used to fix hallucinations and provide up-to-date knowledge for large language models (LLMs). However, in cases when the LLM alone incorrectly answers a question, does providing the correct retrieved content always fix the error? Conversely, in cases where the retrieved content is incorrect, does the LLM know to ignore the wrong information, or does it recapitulate the error? To answer these questions, we systematically analyze the tug-of-war between a LLM's internal knowledge (i.e. its prior) and the retrieved information in settings when they disagree. We test GPT-4 and other LLMs on question-answering abilities across datasets with and without reference documents. As expected, providing the correct retrieved information fixes most model mistakes (94% accuracy). However, when the reference document is perturbed with increasing levels of wrong values, the LLM is more likely to recite the incorrect, modified information when its internal prior is weaker but is more resistant when its prior is stronger. Similarly, we also find that the more the modified information deviates from the model's prior, the less likely the model is to prefer it. These results highlight an underlying tension between a model's prior knowledge and the information presented in reference documents.

Inductive reasoning is an essential capability for large language models (LLMs) to achieve higher intelligence, which requires the model to generalize rules from observed facts and then apply them to unseen examples. We present MIRAGE, a synthetic dataset that addresses the limitations of previous work, specifically the lack of comprehensive evaluation and flexible test data. In it, we evaluate LLMs' capabilities in both the inductive and deductive stages, allowing for flexible variation in input distribution, task scenario, and task difficulty to analyze the factors influencing LLMs' inductive reasoning. Based on these multi-faceted evaluations, we demonstrate that the LLM is a poor rule-based reasoner. In many cases, when conducting inductive reasoning, they do not rely on a correct rule to answer the unseen case. From the perspectives of different prompting methods, observation numbers, and task forms, models tend to consistently conduct correct deduction without correct inductive rules. Besides, we find that LLMs are good neighbor-based reasoners. In the inductive reasoning process, the model tends to focus on observed facts that are close to the current test example in feature space. By leveraging these similar examples, the model maintains strong inductive capabilities within a localized region, significantly improving its deductive performance.

Large language models (LLMs) often suffer from context faithfulness hallucinations, where outputs deviate from retrieved information due to insufficient context utilization and high output uncertainty. Our uncertainty evaluation experiments reveal a strong correlation between high uncertainty and hallucinations. We hypothesize that attention mechanisms encode signals indicative of contextual utilization, validated through probing analysis. Based on these insights, we propose Dynamic Attention-Guided Context Decoding (DAGCD), a lightweight framework that integrates attention distributions and uncertainty signals in a single-pass decoding process. Experiments across QA datasets demonstrate DAGCD's effectiveness, achieving significant improvements in faithfulness and robustness while maintaining computational efficiency.