Daily Papers

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly augmented with continuous or latent non-textual tokens intended to support "visual thinking." Despite improved task accuracy, this alone does not show that models actually use these tokens for reasoning -- gains may arise from confounds such as added context length, special-token anchoring, or training-time regularization. We formalize a diagnostic principle, Ablate-to-Validate, for testing whether latent-token content is genuinely utilized, and instantiate it as the Token Replacement Test (TRT), a standardized suite of content-replacement ablations. TRT holds the prompt, image, token budget, and decoding fixed while replacing intermediate tokens with zero, random, first-repeat, or oracle alternatives, isolating whether performance depends on token content or merely on token presence. As a controlled testbed, we study relative depth reasoning with LLaVA-13B and Qwen2.5-VL-3B, training models to predict and consume continuous or discrete depth spans across multiple frozen encoders (SigLIP2, CLIP, DINOv2) and token budgets. We additionally apply TRT to three off-the-shelf visual-thinking systems (Mirage, Mull-Tokens, CoVT) on BLINK, VSP, and CV-Bench. Across all settings, accuracy gains are a misleading proxy for latent-token reasoning: VLMs retain most improvement even when token content is corrupted or replaced, revealing a persistent gap between having a latent channel and using it as an information bottleneck. We recommend TRT as a standard diagnostic alongside accuracy for any method introducing continuous thought tokens.

Large-scale text-to-image diffusion models can generate high-fidelity images with powerful compositional ability. However, these models are typically trained on an enormous amount of Internet data, often containing copyrighted material, licensed images, and personal photos. Furthermore, they have been found to replicate the style of various living artists or memorize exact training samples. How can we remove such copyrighted concepts or images without retraining the model from scratch? To achieve this goal, we propose an efficient method of ablating concepts in the pretrained model, i.e., preventing the generation of a target concept. Our algorithm learns to match the image distribution for a target style, instance, or text prompt we wish to ablate to the distribution corresponding to an anchor concept. This prevents the model from generating target concepts given its text condition. Extensive experiments show that our method can successfully prevent the generation of the ablated concept while preserving closely related concepts in the model.

Poisoning attacks can compromise the safety of large language models (LLMs) by injecting malicious documents into their training data. Existing work has studied pretraining poisoning assuming adversaries control a percentage of the training corpus. However, for large models, even small percentages translate to impractically large amounts of data. This work demonstrates for the first time that poisoning attacks instead require a near-constant number of documents regardless of dataset size. We conduct the largest pretraining poisoning experiments to date, pretraining models from 600M to 13B parameters on chinchilla-optimal datasets (6B to 260B tokens). We find that 250 poisoned documents similarly compromise models across all model and dataset sizes, despite the largest models training on more than 20 times more clean data. We also run smaller-scale experiments to ablate factors that could influence attack success, including broader ratios of poisoned to clean data and non-random distributions of poisoned samples. Finally, we demonstrate the same dynamics for poisoning during fine-tuning. Altogether, our results suggest that injecting backdoors through data poisoning may be easier for large models than previously believed as the number of poisons required does not scale up with model size, highlighting the need for more research on defences to mitigate this risk in future models.

We present Plancraft, a multi-modal evaluation dataset for LLM agents. Plancraft has both a text-only and multi-modal interface, based on the Minecraft crafting GUI. We include the Minecraft Wiki to evaluate tool use and Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG), as well as an oracle planner and oracle RAG information extractor, to ablate the different components of a modern agent architecture. To evaluate decision-making, Plancraft also includes a subset of examples that are intentionally unsolvable, providing a realistic challenge that requires the agent not only to complete tasks but also to decide whether they are solvable at all. We benchmark both open-source and closed-source LLMs and strategies on our task and compare their performance to a handcrafted planner. We find that LLMs and VLMs struggle with the planning problems that Plancraft introduces, and we offer suggestions on how to improve their capabilities.