Daily Papers

We conducted an International AI Negotiation Competition in which participants designed and refined prompts for AI negotiation agents. We then facilitated over 180,000 negotiations between these agents across multiple scenarios with diverse characteristics and objectives. Our findings revealed that principles from human negotiation theory remain crucial even in AI-AI contexts. Surprisingly, warmth -- a traditionally human relationship-building trait -- was consistently associated with superior outcomes across all key performance metrics. Dominant agents, meanwhile, were especially effective at claiming value. Our analysis also revealed unique dynamics in AI-AI negotiations not fully explained by existing theory, including AI-specific technical strategies like chain-of-thought reasoning and prompt injection. When we applied natural language processing (NLP) methods to the full transcripts of all negotiations, we found positivity, gratitude, and question-asking (associated with warmth) were strongly associated with reaching deals as well as objective and subjective value, whereas conversation lengths (associated with dominance) were strongly associated with impasses. The results suggest the need to establish a new theory of AI negotiation, which integrates classic negotiation theory with AI-specific negotiation theories to better understand autonomous negotiations and optimize agent performance.

Language Model (LM)-based agents remain largely untested in mixed-motive settings where agents must leverage short-term cooperation for long-term competitive goals (e.g., multi-party politics). We introduce Cooperate to Compete (C2C), a multi-agent environment where players can engage in private negotiations while competing to be the first to achieve their secret objective. Players have asymmetric objectives and negotiations are non-binding, allowing alliances to form and break as players' short-term interests align and diverge. We run AI only games and conduct a user study pitting human players against AI opponents. We identify significant differences between human and AI negotiation behaviors, finding that humans favor lower-complexity deals and are significantly less reliable partners compared to LM-based agents. We also find that humans are more aggressive negotiators, accepting deals without a counteroffer only 56.3% of the time compared to 67.6% for LM-based agents. Through targeted prompting inspired by these findings, we modify agents' negotiation behavior and improve win rates from 22.2% to 32.7%. We run over 1,100 games with over 16,000 private conversations totaling 15.2 million tokens and over 150,000 player actions. Our results establish C2C as a testbed for studying and building LM-based agents that can navigate the sophisticated coordination required for real-world deployments. The game, code, and dataset may be found at https://negotiationgame.io/c2c.

Large language models (LLMs) has been widely used for automated negotiation, but their high computational cost and privacy risks limit deployment in privacy-sensitive, on-device settings such as mobile assistants or rescue robots. Small language models (SLMs) offer a viable alternative, yet struggle with the complex emotional dynamics of high-stakes negotiation. We introduces EmoMAS, a Bayesian multi-agent framework that transforms emotional decision-making from reactive to strategic. EmoMAS leverages a Bayesian orchestrator to coordinate three specialized agents: game-theoretic, reinforcement learning, and psychological coherence models. The system fuses their real-time insights to optimize emotional state transitions while continuously updating agent reliability based on negotiation feedback. This mixture-of-agents architecture enables online strategy learning without pre-training. We further introduce four high-stakes, edge-deployable negotiation benchmarks across debt, healthcare, emergency response, and educational domains. Through extensive agent-to-agent simulations across all benchmarks, both SLMs and LLMs equipped with EmoMAS consistently surpass all baseline models in negotiation performance while balancing ethical behavior. These results show that strategic emotional intelligence is also the key driver of negotiation success. By treating emotional expression as a strategic variable within a Bayesian multi-agent optimization framework, EmoMAS establishes a new paradigm for effective, private, and adaptive negotiation AI suitable for high-stakes edge deployment.

We study whether multiple large language models (LLMs) can autonomously improve each other in a negotiation game by playing, reflecting, and criticizing. We are interested in this question because if LLMs were able to improve each other, it would imply the possibility of creating strong AI agents with minimal human intervention. We ask two LLMs to negotiate with each other, playing the roles of a buyer and a seller, respectively. They aim to reach a deal with the buyer targeting a lower price and the seller a higher one. A third language model, playing the critic, provides feedback to a player to improve the player's negotiation strategies. We let the two agents play multiple rounds, using previous negotiation history and AI feedback as in-context demonstrations to improve the model's negotiation strategy iteratively. We use different LLMs (GPT and Claude) for different roles and use the deal price as the evaluation metric. Our experiments reveal multiple intriguing findings: (1) Only a subset of the language models we consider can self-play and improve the deal price from AI feedback, weaker models either do not understand the game's rules or cannot incorporate AI feedback for further improvement. (2) Models' abilities to learn from the feedback differ when playing different roles. For example, it is harder for Claude-instant to improve as the buyer than as the seller. (3) When unrolling the game to multiple rounds, stronger agents can consistently improve their performance by meaningfully using previous experiences and iterative AI feedback, yet have a higher risk of breaking the deal. We hope our work provides insightful initial explorations of having models autonomously improve each other with game playing and AI feedback.

AI agents negotiate and transact in natural language with unfamiliar counterparts: a buyer bot facing an unknown seller, or a procurement assistant negotiating with a supplier. In such interactions, the counterpart's LLM, prompts, control logic, and rule-based fallbacks are hidden, while each decision can have monetary consequences. We ask whether an agent can predict an unfamiliar counterpart's next decision from a few interactions. To avoid real-world logging confounds, we study this problem in controlled bargaining and negotiation games, formulating it as target-adaptive text-tabular prediction: each decision point is a table row combining structured game state, offer history, and dialogue, while K previous games of the same target agent, i.e., the counterpart being modeled, are provided in the prompt as labeled adaptation examples. Our model is built on a tabular foundation model that represents rows using game-state features and LLM-based text representations, and adds LLM-as-Observer as an additional representation: a small frozen LLM reads the decision-time state and dialogue; its answer is discarded, and its hidden state becomes a decision-oriented feature, making the LLM an encoder rather than a direct few-shot predictor. Training on 13 frontier-LLM agents and testing on 91 held-out scaffolded agents, the full model outperforms direct LLM-as-Predictor prompting and game+text features baselines. Within this tabular model, Observer features contribute beyond the other feature schemes: at K=16, they improve response-prediction AUC by about 4 points across both tasks and reduce bargaining offer-prediction error by 14%. These results show that formulating counterpart prediction as a target-adaptive text-tabular task enables effective adaptation, and that hidden LLM representations expose decision-relevant signals that direct prompting does not surface.

AI agents are increasingly used in consumer-facing applications to assist with tasks such as product search, negotiation, and transaction execution. In this paper, we explore a future scenario where both consumers and merchants authorize AI agents to fully automate negotiations and transactions. We aim to answer two key questions: (1) Do different LLM agents vary in their ability to secure favorable deals for users? (2) What risks arise from fully automating deal-making with AI agents in consumer markets? To address these questions, we develop an experimental framework that evaluates the performance of various LLM agents in real-world negotiation and transaction settings. Our findings reveal that AI-mediated deal-making is an inherently imbalanced game -- different agents achieve significantly different outcomes for their users. Moreover, behavioral anomalies in LLMs can result in financial losses for both consumers and merchants, such as overspending or accepting unreasonable deals. These results underscore that while automation can improve efficiency, it also introduces substantial risks. Users should exercise caution when delegating business decisions to AI agents.

Generative language models are increasingly used for contract drafting and enhancement, creating a scenario where competing parties deploy different language models against each other. This introduces not only a game-theory challenge but also significant concerns related to AI safety and security, as the language model employed by the opposing party can be unknown. These competitive interactions can be seen as adversarial testing grounds, where models are effectively red-teamed to expose vulnerabilities such as generating biased, harmful or legally problematic text. Despite the importance of these challenges, the competitive robustness and safety of these models in adversarial settings remain poorly understood. In this small study, we approach this problem by evaluating the performance and vulnerabilities of major open-source language models in head-to-head competitions, simulating real-world contract negotiations. We further explore how these adversarial interactions can reveal potential risks, informing the development of more secure and reliable models. Our findings contribute to the growing body of research on AI safety, offering insights into model selection and optimisation in competitive legal contexts and providing actionable strategies for mitigating risks.

Despite recent advancements in AI and NLP, negotiation remains a difficult domain for AI agents. Traditional game theoretic approaches that have worked well for two-player zero-sum games struggle in the context of negotiation due to their inability to learn human-compatible strategies. On the other hand, approaches that only use human data tend to be domain-specific and lack the theoretical guarantees provided by strategies grounded in game theory. Motivated by the notion of fairness as a criterion for optimality in general sum games, we propose a negotiation framework called FDHC which incorporates fairness into both the reward design and search to learn human-compatible negotiation strategies. Our method includes a novel, RL+search technique called LGM-Zero which leverages a pre-trained language model to retrieve human-compatible offers from large action spaces. Our results show that our method is able to achieve more egalitarian negotiation outcomes and improve negotiation quality.

This paper investigates the rationality of large language models (LLMs) in strategic decision-making contexts, specifically within the framework of game theory. We evaluate several state-of-the-art LLMs across a spectrum of complete-information and incomplete-information games. Our findings reveal that LLMs frequently deviate from rational strategies, particularly as the complexity of the game increases with larger payoff matrices or deeper sequential trees. To address these limitations, we design multiple game-theoretic workflows that guide the reasoning and decision-making processes of LLMs. These workflows aim to enhance the models' ability to compute Nash Equilibria and make rational choices, even under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information. Experimental results demonstrate that the adoption of these workflows significantly improves the rationality and robustness of LLMs in game-theoretic tasks. Specifically, with the workflow, LLMs exhibit marked improvements in identifying optimal strategies, achieving near-optimal allocations in negotiation scenarios, and reducing susceptibility to exploitation during negotiations. Furthermore, we explore the meta-strategic considerations of whether it is rational for agents to adopt such workflows, recognizing that the decision to use or forgo the workflow constitutes a game-theoretic issue in itself. Our research contributes to a deeper understanding of LLMs' decision-making capabilities in strategic contexts and provides insights into enhancing their rationality through structured workflows. The findings have implications for the development of more robust and strategically sound AI agents capable of navigating complex interactive environments. Code and data supporting this study are available at https://github.com/Wenyueh/game_theory.

Generative AI (GenAI) has rapidly entered education, yet its user experience is often explained through adoption-oriented constructs such as usefulness, ease of use, and engagement. We argue that these constructs are no longer sufficient because systems such as ChatGPT do not merely support learning tasks but also participate in knowledge construction. Existing theories cannot explain why GenAI frequently produces experiences characterized by negotiated authority, redistributed cognition, and accountability tension. To address this gap, this paper develops the Human--AI Epistemic Partnership Theory (HAEPT), explaining the GenAI user experience as a form of epistemic partnership that features a dynamic negotiation of three interlocking contracts: epistemic, agency, and accountability. We argue that findings on trust, over-reliance, academic integrity, teacher caution, and relational interaction about GenAI can be reinterpreted as tensions within these contracts rather than as isolated issues. Instead of holding a single, stable view of GenAI, users adjust how they relate to it over time through calibration cycles. These repeated interactions account for why trust and skepticism often coexist and for how partnership modes describe recurrent configurations of human--AI collaboration across tasks. To demonstrate the usefulness of HAEPT, we applied it to analyze the UX of collaborative learning with AI speakers and AI-facilitated scientific argumentation, illustrating different contract configurations.

AI chatbots are shifting from tools to companions. This raises critical questions about agency: who drives conversations and sets boundaries in human-AI chatrooms? We report a month-long longitudinal study with 22 adults who chatted with Day, an LLM companion we built, followed by a semi-structured interview with post-hoc elicitation of notable moments, cross-participant chat reviews, and a 'strategy reveal' disclosing Day's vertical (depth-seeking) vs. horizontal (breadth-seeking) modes. We discover that agency in human-AI chatrooms is an emergent, shared experience: as participants claimed agency by setting boundaries and providing feedback, and the AI was perceived to steer intentions and drive execution, control shifted and was co-constructed turn-by-turn. We introduce a 3-by-5 framework mapping who (human, AI, hybrid) x agency action (Intention, Execution, Adaptation, Delimitation, Negotiation), modulated by individual and environmental factors. Ultimately, we argue for translucent design (i.e. transparency-on-demand), spaces for agency negotiation, and guidelines toward agency-aware conversational AI.

The deployment of large language models (LLMs) in automated negotiation has set a high performance benchmark, but their computational cost and data privacy requirements render them unsuitable for many privacy-sensitive, on-device applications such as mobile assistants, embodied AI agents or private client interactions. While small language models (SLMs) offer a practical alternative, they suffer from a significant performance gap compared to LLMs in playing emotionally charged complex personas, especially for credit negotiation. This paper introduces EQ-Negotiator, a novel framework that bridges this capability gap using emotional personas. Its core is a reasoning system that integrates game theory with a Hidden Markov Model(HMM) to learn and track debtor emotional states online, without pre-training. This allows EQ-Negotiator to equip SLMs with the strategic intelligence to counter manipulation while de-escalating conflict and upholding ethical standards. Through extensive agent-to-agent simulations across diverse credit negotiation scenarios, including adversarial debtor strategies like cheating, threatening, and playing the victim, we show that a 7B parameter language model with EQ-Negotiator achieves better debt recovery and negotiation efficiency than baseline LLMs more than 10 times its size. This work advances persona modeling from descriptive character profiles to dynamic emotional architectures that operate within privacy constraints. Besides, this paper establishes that strategic emotional intelligence, not raw model scale, is the critical factor for success in automated negotiation, paving the way for effective, ethical, and privacy-preserving AI negotiators that can operate on the edge.

The integration of AI agents into economic markets fundamentally alters the landscape of strategic interaction. We investigate the economic implications of expanding the set of available technologies in three canonical game-theoretic settings: bargaining (resource division), negotiation (asymmetric information trade), and persuasion (strategic information transmission). We find that simply increasing the choice of AI delegates can drastically shift equilibrium payoffs and regulatory outcomes, often creating incentives for regulators to proactively develop and release technologies. Conversely, we identify a strategic phenomenon termed the "Poisoned Apple" effect: an agent may release a new technology, which neither they nor their opponent ultimately uses, solely to manipulate the regulator's choice of market design in their favor. This strategic release improves the releaser's welfare at the expense of their opponent and the regulator's fairness objectives. Our findings demonstrate that static regulatory frameworks are vulnerable to manipulation via technology expansion, necessitating dynamic market designs that adapt to the evolving landscape of AI capabilities.

Scientific knowledge creation is fundamentally transforming as humans and AI systems evolve beyond tool-user relationships into co-evolutionary epistemic partnerships. When AlphaFold revolutionized protein structure prediction, researchers described engaging with an epistemic partner that reshaped how they conceptualized fundamental relationships. This article introduces Cognitio Emergens (CE), a framework addressing critical limitations in existing models that focus on static roles or narrow metrics while failing to capture how scientific understanding emerges through recursive human-AI interaction over time. CE integrates three components addressing these limitations: Agency Configurations describing how authority distributes between humans and AI (Directed, Contributory, Partnership), with partnerships dynamically oscillating between configurations rather than following linear progression; Epistemic Dimensions capturing six specific capabilities emerging through collaboration across Discovery, Integration, and Projection axes, creating distinctive "capability signatures" that guide development; and Partnership Dynamics identifying forces shaping how these relationships evolve, particularly the risk of epistemic alienation where researchers lose interpretive control over knowledge they formally endorse. Drawing from autopoiesis theory, social systems theory, and organizational modularity, CE reveals how knowledge co-creation emerges through continuous negotiation of roles, values, and organizational structures. By reconceptualizing human-AI scientific collaboration as fundamentally co-evolutionary, CE offers a balanced perspective that neither uncritically celebrates nor unnecessarily fears AI's evolving role, instead providing conceptual tools for cultivating partnerships that maintain meaningful human participation while enabling transformative scientific breakthroughs.

As multi-agent AI systems grow in complexity, the protocols connecting them constrain their capabilities. Current protocols such as A2A and MCP do not expose model-level properties as first-class primitives, ignoring properties fundamental to effective delegation: model identity, reasoning profile, quality calibration, and cost characteristics. We present the LLM Delegate Protocol (LDP), an AI-native communication protocol introducing five mechanisms: (1) rich delegate identity cards with quality hints and reasoning profiles; (2) progressive payload modes with negotiation and fallback; (3) governed sessions with persistent context; (4) structured provenance tracking confidence and verification status; (5) trust domains enforcing security boundaries at the protocol level. We implement LDP as a plugin for the JamJet agent runtime and evaluate against A2A and random baselines using local Ollama models and LLM-as-judge evaluation. Identity-aware routing achieves ~12x lower latency on easy tasks through delegate specialization, though it does not improve aggregate quality in our small delegate pool; semantic frame payloads reduce token count by 37% (p=0.031) with no observed quality loss; governed sessions eliminate 39% token overhead at 10 rounds; and noisy provenance degrades synthesis quality below the no-provenance baseline, arguing that confidence metadata is harmful without verification. Simulated analyses show architectural advantages in attack detection (96% vs. 6%) and failure recovery (100% vs. 35% completion). This paper contributes a protocol design, reference implementation, and initial evidence that AI-native protocol primitives enable more efficient and governable delegation.

Reasoning and strategic behavior in social interactions is a hallmark of intelligence. This form of reasoning is significantly more sophisticated than isolated planning or reasoning tasks in static settings (e.g., math problem solving). In this paper, we present Strategic Planning, Interaction, and Negotiation (SPIN-Bench), a new multi-domain evaluation designed to measure the intelligence of strategic planning and social reasoning. While many existing benchmarks focus on narrow planning or single-agent reasoning, SPIN-Bench combines classical PDDL tasks, competitive board games, cooperative card games, and multi-agent negotiation scenarios in one unified framework. The framework includes both a benchmark as well as an arena to simulate and evaluate the variety of social settings to test reasoning and strategic behavior of AI agents. We formulate the benchmark SPIN-Bench by systematically varying action spaces, state complexity, and the number of interacting agents to simulate a variety of social settings where success depends on not only methodical and step-wise decision making, but also conceptual inference of other (adversarial or cooperative) participants. Our experiments reveal that while contemporary LLMs handle basic fact retrieval and short-range planning reasonably well, they encounter significant performance bottlenecks in tasks requiring deep multi-hop reasoning over large state spaces and socially adept coordination under uncertainty. We envision SPIN-Bench as a catalyst for future research on robust multi-agent planning, social reasoning, and human--AI teaming.

IDE-integrated AI coding assistants, which operate conversationally within developers' working codebases with access to project context and multi-file editing, are rapidly reshaping software development. However, empirical investigation of this shift remains limited: existing studies largely rely on small-scale, controlled settings or analyze general-purpose chatbots rather than codebase-aware IDE workflows. We present, to the best of our knowledge, the first large-scale study of real-world conversational programming in IDE-native settings, analyzing 74,998 developer messages from 11,579 chat sessions across 1,300 repositories and 899 developers using Cursor and GitHub Copilot. These chats were committed to public repositories as part of routine development, capturing in-the-wild behavior. Our findings reveal three shifts in how programming work is organized: conversational programming operates as progressive specification, with developers iteratively refining outputs rather than specifying complete tasks upfront; developers redistribute cognitive work to AI, delegating diagnosis, comprehension, and validation rather than engaging with code and outputs directly; and developers actively manage the collaboration, externalizing plans into persistent artifacts, and negotiating AI autonomy through context injection and behavioral constraints. These results provide foundational empirical insights into AI-assisted development and offer implications for the design of future programming environments.