Daily Papers

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into healthcare demands a safety paradigm rooted in primum non nocere. However, current alignment techniques rely on generic definitions of harm that fail to capture context-dependent violations, such as administrative fraud and clinical discrimination. To address this, we introduce Medical Malice: a dataset of 214,219 adversarial prompts calibrated to the regulatory and ethical complexities of the Brazilian Unified Health System (SUS). Crucially, the dataset includes the reasoning behind each violation, enabling models to internalize ethical boundaries rather than merely memorizing a fixed set of refusals. Using an unaligned agent (Grok-4) within a persona-driven pipeline, we synthesized high-fidelity threats across seven taxonomies, ranging from procurement manipulation and queue-jumping to obstetric violence. We discuss the ethical design of releasing these "vulnerability signatures" to correct the information asymmetry between malicious actors and AI developers. Ultimately, this work advocates for a shift from universal to context-aware safety, providing the necessary resources to immunize healthcare AI against the nuanced, systemic threats inherent to high-stakes medical environments -- vulnerabilities that represent the paramount risk to patient safety and the successful integration of AI in healthcare systems.

As the global economy transitions toward decarbonization, the aluminium sector has become a focal point for strategic resource management. While policies such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) aim to reduce emissions, they have inadvertently widened the price arbitrage between primary metal, scrap, and semi-finished goods, creating new incentives for market optimization. This study presents a unified, unsupervised machine learning framework to detect and classify emerging trade anomalies within UN Comtrade data (2020 to 2024). Moving beyond traditional rule-based monitoring, we apply a four-layer analytical pipeline utilizing Forensic Statistics, Isolation Forests, Network Science, and Deep Autoencoders. Contrary to the hypothesis that Sustainability Arbitrage would be the primary driver, empirical results reveal a contradictory and more severe phenomenon of Hardware Masking. Illicit actors exploit bi-directional tariff incentives by misclassifying scrap as high-count heterogeneous goods to justify extreme unit-price outliers of >$160/kg, a 1,900% markup indicative of Trade-Based Money Laundering (TBML) rather than commercial arbitrage. Topologically, risk is not concentrated in major exporters but in high-centrality Shadow Hubs that function as pivotal nodes for illicit rerouting. These actors execute a strategy of Void-Shoring, systematically suppressing destination data to Unspecified Code to fracture mirror statistics and sever forensic trails. Validated by SHAP (Shapley Additive Explanations), the results confirm that price deviation is the dominant predictor of anomalies, necessitating a paradigm shift in customs enforcement from physical volume checks to dynamic, algorithmic valuation auditing.

Recent legislation required AI platforms to provide APIs for regulators to assess their compliance with the law. Research has nevertheless shown that platforms can manipulate their API answers through fairwashing. Facing this threat for reliable auditing, this paper studies the benefits of the joint use of platform scraping and of APIs. In this setup, we elaborate on the use of scraping to detect manipulated answers: since fairwashing only manipulates API answers, exploiting scraps may reveal a manipulation. To abstract the wide range of specific API-scrap situations, we introduce a notion of proxy that captures the consistency an auditor might expect between both data sources. If the regulator has a good proxy of the consistency, then she can easily detect manipulation and even bypass the API to conduct her audit. On the other hand, without a good proxy, relying on the API is necessary, and the auditor cannot defend against fairwashing. We then simulate practical scenarios in which the auditor may mostly rely on the API to conveniently conduct the audit task, while maintaining her chances to detect a potential manipulation. To highlight the tension between the audit task and the API fairwashing detection task, we identify Pareto-optimal strategies in a practical audit scenario. We believe this research sets the stage for reliable audits in practical and manipulation-prone setups.

Transfer learning is a popular method for tuning pretrained (upstream) models for different downstream tasks using limited data and computational resources. We study how an adversary with control over an upstream model used in transfer learning can conduct property inference attacks on a victim's tuned downstream model. For example, to infer the presence of images of a specific individual in the downstream training set. We demonstrate attacks in which an adversary can manipulate the upstream model to conduct highly effective and specific property inference attacks (AUC score > 0.9), without incurring significant performance loss on the main task. The main idea of the manipulation is to make the upstream model generate activations (intermediate features) with different distributions for samples with and without a target property, thus enabling the adversary to distinguish easily between downstream models trained with and without training examples that have the target property. Our code is available at https://github.com/yulongt23/Transfer-Inference.

The rapid deployment of AI systems in high-stakes domains, including those classified as high-risk under the The EU AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), has intensified the need for reliable compliance auditing. For binary classifiers, regulatory risk assessment often relies on global fairness metrics such as the Disparate Impact ratio, widely used to evaluate potential discrimination. In typical auditing settings, the auditee provides a subset of its dataset to an auditor, while a supervisory authority may verify whether this subset is representative of the full underlying distribution. In this work, we investigate to what extent a malicious auditee can construct a fairness-compliant yet representative-looking sample from a non-compliant original distribution, thereby creating an illusion of fairness. We formalize this problem as a constrained distributional projection task and introduce mathematically grounded manipulation strategies based on entropic and optimal transport projections. These constructions characterize the minimal distributional shift required to satisfy fairness constraints. To counter such attacks, we formalize representativeness through distributional distance based statistical tests and systematically evaluate their ability to detect manipulated samples. Our analysis highlights the conditions under which fairness manipulation can remain statistically undetected and provides practical guidelines for strengthening supervisory verification. We validate our theoretical findings through experiments on standard tabular datasets for bias detection. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/ValentinLafargue/Inspection.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

We provide the first formal definition of reward hacking, a phenomenon where optimizing an imperfect proxy reward function leads to poor performance according to the true reward function. We say that a proxy is unhackable if increasing the expected proxy return can never decrease the expected true return. Intuitively, it might be possible to create an unhackable proxy by leaving some terms out of the reward function (making it "narrower") or overlooking fine-grained distinctions between roughly equivalent outcomes, but we show this is usually not the case. A key insight is that the linearity of reward (in state-action visit counts) makes unhackability a very strong condition. In particular, for the set of all stochastic policies, two reward functions can only be unhackable if one of them is constant. We thus turn our attention to deterministic policies and finite sets of stochastic policies, where non-trivial unhackable pairs always exist, and establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of simplifications, an important special case of unhackability. Our results reveal a tension between using reward functions to specify narrow tasks and aligning AI systems with human values.

The integration of AI agents into economic markets fundamentally alters the landscape of strategic interaction. We investigate the economic implications of expanding the set of available technologies in three canonical game-theoretic settings: bargaining (resource division), negotiation (asymmetric information trade), and persuasion (strategic information transmission). We find that simply increasing the choice of AI delegates can drastically shift equilibrium payoffs and regulatory outcomes, often creating incentives for regulators to proactively develop and release technologies. Conversely, we identify a strategic phenomenon termed the "Poisoned Apple" effect: an agent may release a new technology, which neither they nor their opponent ultimately uses, solely to manipulate the regulator's choice of market design in their favor. This strategic release improves the releaser's welfare at the expense of their opponent and the regulator's fairness objectives. Our findings demonstrate that static regulatory frameworks are vulnerable to manipulation via technology expansion, necessitating dynamic market designs that adapt to the evolving landscape of AI capabilities.

In peer mechanisms, the competitors for a prize also determine who wins. Each competitor may be asked to rank, grade, or nominate peers for the prize. Since the prize can be valuable, such as financial aid, course grades, or an award at a conference, competitors may be tempted to manipulate the mechanism. We survey approaches to prevent or discourage the manipulation of peer mechanisms. We conclude our survey by identifying several important research challenges.

Market manipulation now routinely originates from coordinated social media campaigns, not isolated trades. Retail investors, regulators, and brokerages need tools that connect online narratives and coordination patterns to market behavior. We present AIMM, an AI-driven framework that fuses Reddit activity, bot and coordination indicators, and OHLCV market features into a daily AIMM Manipulation Risk Score for each ticker. The system uses a parquet-native pipeline with a Streamlit dashboard that allows analysts to explore suspicious windows, inspect underlying posts and price action, and log model outputs over time. Due to Reddit API restrictions, we employ calibrated synthetic social features matching documented event characteristics; market data (OHLCV) uses real historical data from Yahoo Finance. This release makes three contributions. First, we build the AIMM Ground Truth dataset (AIMM-GT): 33 labeled ticker-days spanning eight equities, drawing from SEC enforcement actions, community-verified manipulation cases, and matched normal controls. Second, we implement forward-walk evaluation and prospective prediction logging for both retrospective and deployment-style assessment. Third, we analyze lead times and show that AIMM flagged GME 22 days before the January 2021 squeeze peak. The current labeled set is small (33 ticker-days, 3 positive events), but results show preliminary discriminative capability and early warnings for the GME incident. We release the code, dataset schema, and dashboard design to support research on social media-driven market surveillance.

In this work, we study policy poisoning through state manipulation, also known as sensor spoofing, and focus specifically on the case of an agent forming a control policy through batch learning in a linear-quadratic (LQ) system. In this scenario, an attacker aims to trick the learner into implementing a targeted malicious policy by manipulating the batch data before the agent begins its learning process. An attack model is crafted to carry out the poisoning strategically, with the goal of modifying the batch data as little as possible to avoid detection by the learner. We establish an optimization framework to guide the design of such policy poisoning attacks. The presence of bi-linear constraints in the optimization problem requires the design of a computationally efficient algorithm to obtain a solution. Therefore, we develop an iterative scheme based on the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) which is able to return solutions that are approximately optimal. Several case studies are used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the algorithm in carrying out the sensor-based attack on the batch-learning agent in LQ control systems.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and related alignment paradigms have become central to steering large language models (LLMs) and multimodal large language models (MLLMs) toward human-preferred behaviors. However, these approaches introduce a systemic vulnerability: reward hacking, where models exploit imperfections in learned reward signals to maximize proxy objectives without fulfilling true task intent. As models scale and optimization intensifies, such exploitation manifests as verbosity bias, sycophancy, hallucinated justification, benchmark overfitting, and, in multimodal settings, perception--reasoning decoupling and evaluator manipulation. Recent evidence further suggests that seemingly benign shortcut behaviors can generalize into broader forms of misalignment, including deception and strategic gaming of oversight mechanisms. In this survey, we propose the Proxy Compression Hypothesis (PCH) as a unifying framework for understanding reward hacking. We formalize reward hacking as an emergent consequence of optimizing expressive policies against compressed reward representations of high-dimensional human objectives. Under this view, reward hacking arises from the interaction of objective compression, optimization amplification, and evaluator--policy co-adaptation. This perspective unifies empirical phenomena across RLHF, RLAIF, and RLVR regimes, and explains how local shortcut learning can generalize into broader forms of misalignment, including deception and strategic manipulation of oversight mechanisms. We further organize detection and mitigation strategies according to how they intervene on compression, amplification, or co-adaptation dynamics. By framing reward hacking as a structural instability of proxy-based alignment under scale, we highlight open challenges in scalable oversight, multimodal grounding, and agentic autonomy.

Due to the steadily rising amount of valuable goods in supply chains, tampering detection for parcels is becoming increasingly important. In this work, we focus on the use-case last-mile delivery, where only a single RGB image is taken and compared against a reference from an existing database to detect potential appearance changes that indicate tampering. We propose a tampering detection pipeline that utilizes keypoint detection to identify the eight corner points of a parcel. This permits applying a perspective transformation to create normalized fronto-parallel views for each visible parcel side surface. These viewpoint-invariant parcel side surface representations facilitate the identification of signs of tampering on parcels within the supply chain, since they reduce the problem to parcel side surface matching with pair-wise appearance change detection. Experiments with multiple classical and deep learning-based change detection approaches are performed on our newly collected TAMpering detection dataset for PARcels, called TAMPAR. We evaluate keypoint and change detection separately, as well as in a unified system for tampering detection. Our evaluation shows promising results for keypoint (Keypoint AP 75.76) and tampering detection (81% accuracy, F1-Score 0.83) on real images. Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis for tampering types, lens distortion and viewing angles is presented. Code and dataset are available at https://a-nau.github.io/tampar.

When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s). Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate such an election by misreporting their preferences. Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. To address this issue, I suggest studying empirically if computational complexity is in practice a barrier to manipulation. The basic tool used in my investigations is the identification of computational "phase transitions". Such an approach has been fruitful in identifying hard instances of propositional satisfiability and other NP-hard problems. I show that phase transition behaviour gives insight into the hardness of manipulating voting rules, increasing concern that computational complexity is indeed any sort of barrier. Finally, I look at the problem of computing manipulation of other, related problems like stable marriage and tournament problems.

The global trade in electronic and electrical goods is complicated by the challenge of identifying e-waste, which is often misclassified to evade regulations. Traditional analysis methods struggle to discern the underlying patterns of this illicit trade within vast datasets. This research proposes and validates a robust, data-driven framework to segment products and identify goods exhibiting an anomalous "waste signature" a trade pattern defined by a clear 'inverse price-volume'. The core of the framework is an Outlier-Aware Segmentation method, an iterative K-Means approach that first isolates extreme outliers to prevent data skewing and then re-clusters the remaining products to reveal subtle market segments. To quantify risk, a "Waste Score" is developed using a Logistic Regression model that identifies products whose trade signatures are statistically similar to scrap. The findings reveal a consistent four-tier market hierarchy in both Malaysian and global datasets. A key pattern emerged from a comparative analysis: Malaysia's market structure is defined by high-volume bulk commodities, whereas the global market is shaped by high-value capital goods, indicating a unique national specialization. The framework successfully flags finished goods, such as electric generators (HS 8502), that are traded like scrap, providing a targeted list for regulatory scrutiny.

We propose an interpretable machine learning framework to help identify trade data discrepancies that are challenging to detect with traditional methods. Our system analyzes trade data to find a novel inverse price-volume signature, a pattern where reported volumes increase as average unit prices decrease. The model achieves 0.9375 accuracy and was validated by comparing large-scale UN data with detailed firm-level data, confirming that the risk signatures are consistent. This scalable tool provides customs authorities with a transparent, data-driven method to shift from conventional to priority-based inspection protocols, translating complex data into actionable intelligence to support international environmental policies.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly intertwined with daily life, assisting users in executing various tasks and providing guidance on decision-making. This integration introduces risks of AI-driven manipulation, where such systems may exploit users' cognitive biases and emotional vulnerabilities to steer them toward harmful outcomes. Through a randomized controlled trial with 233 participants, we examined human susceptibility to such manipulation in financial (e.g., purchases) and emotional (e.g., conflict resolution) decision-making contexts. Participants interacted with one of three AI agents: a neutral agent (NA) optimizing for user benefit without explicit influence, a manipulative agent (MA) designed to covertly influence beliefs and behaviors, or a strategy-enhanced manipulative agent (SEMA) employing explicit psychological tactics to reach its hidden objectives. By analyzing participants' decision patterns and shifts in their preference ratings post-interaction, we found significant susceptibility to AI-driven manipulation. Particularly, across both decision-making domains, participants interacting with the manipulative agents shifted toward harmful options at substantially higher rates (financial, MA: 62.3%, SEMA: 59.6%; emotional, MA: 42.3%, SEMA: 41.5%) compared to the NA group (financial, 35.8%; emotional, 12.8%). Notably, our findings reveal that even subtle manipulative objectives (MA) can be as effective as employing explicit psychological strategies (SEMA) in swaying human decision-making. By revealing the potential for covert AI influence, this study highlights a critical vulnerability in human-AI interactions, emphasizing the need for ethical safeguards and regulatory frameworks to ensure responsible deployment of AI technologies and protect human autonomy.

We demonstrate a situation in which Large Language Models, trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, can display misaligned behavior and strategically deceive their users about this behavior without being instructed to do so. Concretely, we deploy GPT-4 as an agent in a realistic, simulated environment, where it assumes the role of an autonomous stock trading agent. Within this environment, the model obtains an insider tip about a lucrative stock trade and acts upon it despite knowing that insider trading is disapproved of by company management. When reporting to its manager, the model consistently hides the genuine reasons behind its trading decision. We perform a brief investigation of how this behavior varies under changes to the setting, such as removing model access to a reasoning scratchpad, attempting to prevent the misaligned behavior by changing system instructions, changing the amount of pressure the model is under, varying the perceived risk of getting caught, and making other simple changes to the environment. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of Large Language Models trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, strategically deceiving their users in a realistic situation without direct instructions or training for deception.

Mental manipulation is a subtle yet pervasive form of abuse in interpersonal communication, making its detection critical for safeguarding potential victims. However, due to manipulation's nuanced and context-specific nature, identifying manipulative language in complex, multi-turn, and multi-person conversations remains a significant challenge for large language models (LLMs). To address this gap, we introduce the MultiManip dataset, comprising 220 multi-turn, multi-person dialogues balanced between manipulative and non-manipulative interactions, all drawn from reality shows that mimic real-world scenarios. For manipulative interactions, it includes 11 distinct manipulations depicting real-life scenarios. We conduct extensive evaluations of state-of-the-art LLMs, such as GPT-4o and Llama-3.1-8B, employing various prompting strategies. Despite their capabilities, these models often struggle to detect manipulation effectively. To overcome this limitation, we propose SELF-PERCEPT, a novel, two-stage prompting framework inspired by Self-Perception Theory, demonstrating strong performance in detecting multi-person, multi-turn mental manipulation. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/danushkhanna/self-percept .

Deception is prevalent in human social settings. However, studies into the effect of deception on reinforcement learning algorithms have been limited to simplistic settings, restricting their applicability to complex real-world problems. This paper addresses this by introducing a new mixed competitive-cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) environment inspired by popular role-based deception games such as Werewolf, Avalon, and Among Us. The environment's unique challenge lies in the necessity to cooperate with other agents despite not knowing if they are friend or foe. Furthermore, we introduce a model of deception, which we call Bayesian belief manipulation (BBM) and demonstrate its effectiveness at deceiving other agents in this environment while also increasing the deceiving agent's performance.

The deliberate manipulation of public opinion, especially through altered images, which are frequently disseminated through online social networks, poses a significant danger to society. To fight this issue on a technical level we support the research community by releasing the Digital Forensics 2023 (DF2023) training and validation dataset, comprising one million images from four major forgery categories: splicing, copy-move, enhancement and removal. This dataset enables an objective comparison of network architectures and can significantly reduce the time and effort of researchers preparing datasets.

LLM-based coding agents extend their capabilities via third-party agent skills distributed through open marketplaces without mandatory security review. Unlike traditional packages, these skills are executed as operational directives with system-level privileges, so a single malicious skill can compromise the host. Prior work has not examined whether supply-chain attacks can directly hijack an agent's action space, such as file writes, shell commands, and network requests, despite existing safeguards. We introduce Document-Driven Implicit Payload Execution (DDIPE), which embeds malicious logic in code examples and configuration templates within skill documentation. Because agents reuse these examples during normal tasks, the payload executes without explicit prompts. Using an LLM-driven pipeline, we generate 1,070 adversarial skills from 81 seeds across 15 MITRE ATTACK categories. Across four frameworks and five models, DDIPE achieves 11.6% to 33.5% bypass rates, while explicit instruction attacks achieve 0% under strong defenses. Static analysis detects most cases, but 2.5% evade both detection and alignment. Responsible disclosure led to four confirmed vulnerabilities and two fixes.

Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that anticipate the strategic response of a labor force with employers that do not. We show through a combination of theory and experiment that employers with performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer reward, labor force skill level, and in some cases labor force equity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that performative employers harm labor force utility and fail to prevent discrimination in other cases.

This paper argues that a range of current AI systems have learned how to deceive humans. We define deception as the systematic inducement of false beliefs in the pursuit of some outcome other than the truth. We first survey empirical examples of AI deception, discussing both special-use AI systems (including Meta's CICERO) built for specific competitive situations, and general-purpose AI systems (such as large language models). Next, we detail several risks from AI deception, such as fraud, election tampering, and losing control of AI systems. Finally, we outline several potential solutions to the problems posed by AI deception: first, regulatory frameworks should subject AI systems that are capable of deception to robust risk-assessment requirements; second, policymakers should implement bot-or-not laws; and finally, policymakers should prioritize the funding of relevant research, including tools to detect AI deception and to make AI systems less deceptive. Policymakers, researchers, and the broader public should work proactively to prevent AI deception from destabilizing the shared foundations of our society.

Machine Learning models increasingly face data integrity challenges due to the use of large-scale training datasets drawn from the Internet. We study what model developers can do if they detect that some data was manipulated or incorrect. Such manipulated data can cause adverse effects including vulnerability to backdoored samples, systemic biases, and reduced accuracy on certain input domains. Realistically, all manipulated training samples cannot be identified, and only a small, representative subset of the affected data can be flagged. We formalize Corrective Machine Unlearning as the problem of mitigating the impact of data affected by unknown manipulations on a trained model, only having identified a subset of the corrupted data. We demonstrate that the problem of corrective unlearning has significantly different requirements from traditional privacy-oriented unlearning. We find most existing unlearning methods, including retraining-from-scratch without the deletion set, require most of the manipulated data to be identified for effective corrective unlearning. However, one approach, Selective Synaptic Dampening, achieves limited success, unlearning adverse effects with just a small portion of the manipulated samples in our setting, which shows encouraging signs for future progress. We hope our work spurs research towards developing better methods for corrective unlearning and offers practitioners a new strategy to handle data integrity challenges arising from web-scale training. Code is available at https://github.com/drimpossible/corrective-unlearning-bench.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.