Daily Papers

We introduce Psi-Turing Machines (Psi-TM): classical Turing machines equipped with a constant-depth introspection interface iota and an explicit per-step information budget B(d,n)=c,dlog_2 n . With the interface frozen, we develop an information-theoretic lower-bound toolkit: Budget counting, Psi -Fooling, and Psi -Fano, with worked examples L_k and L_k^{phase} . We prove an oracle-relative separation P^{Psi} neq NP^{Psi} and a strict depth hierarchy, reinforced by an Anti-Simulation Hook that rules out polynomial emulation of iota_k using many calls to iota_{k-1} under the budget regime. We also present two independent platforms (Psi-decision trees and interface-constrained circuits IC-AC^{0}/IC-NC^{1}) and bridges that transfer bounds among machine, tree, and circuit with explicit poly/log losses. The model preserves classical computational power outside iota yet enables precise oracle-aware statements about barriers (relativization; partial/conditional progress on natural proofs and proof complexity). The aim is a standardized minimal introspection interface with clearly accounted information budgets.

Spec-driven development (SDD) with AI coding agents provides a structured workflow, but agents often remain "context blind" in large, evolving repositories, leading to hallucinated APIs and architectural violations. We present Spec Kit Agents, a multi-agent SDD pipeline (with PM and developer roles) that adds phase-level, context-grounding hooks. Read-only probing hooks ground each stage (Specify, Plan, Tasks, Implement) in repository evidence, while validation hooks check intermediate artifacts against the environment. We evaluate 128 runs covering 32 features across five repositories. Context-grounding hooks improve judged quality by +0.15 on a 1-5 composite LLM-as-judge score (+3.0 percent of the full score; Wilcoxon signed-rank, p < 0.05) while maintaining 99.7-100 percent repository-level test compatibility. We further evaluate the framework on SWE-bench Lite, where augmentation hooks improve baseline by 1.7 percent, achieving 58.2 percent Pass@1.

Large foundation models are integrated into Computer Use Agents (CUAs), enabling autonomous interaction with operating systems through graphical user interfaces (GUIs) to perform complex tasks. This autonomy introduces serious security risks: malicious instructions or visual prompt injections can trigger unsafe reasoning and cause harmful system-level actions. Existing defenses, such as detection-based blocking, prevent damage but often abort tasks prematurely, reducing agent utility. In this paper, we present MirrorGuard, a plug-and-play defense framework that uses simulation-based training to improve CUA security in the real world. To reduce the cost of large-scale training in operating systems, we propose a novel neural-symbolic simulation pipeline, which generates realistic, high-risk GUI interaction trajectories entirely in a text-based simulated environment, which captures unsafe reasoning patterns and potential system hazards without executing real operations. In the simulation environment, MirrorGuard learns to intercept and rectify insecure reasoning chains of CUAs before they produce and execute unsafe actions. In real-world testing, extensive evaluations across diverse benchmarks and CUA architectures show that MirrorGuard significantly mitigates security risks. For instance, on the ByteDance UI-TARS system, it reduces the unsafe rate from 66.5% to 13.0% while maintaining a marginal false refusal rate (FRR). In contrast, the state-of-the-art GuardAgent only achieves a reduction to 53.9% and suffers from a 15.4% higher FRR. Our work proves that simulation-derived defenses can provide robust, real-world protection while maintaining the fundamental utility of the agent. Our code and model are publicly available at https://bmz-q-q.github.io/MirrorGuard/.

Widespread LLM adoption has introduced characteristic repetitive phraseology, termed "slop," which degrades output quality and makes AI-generated text immediately recognizable. We present Antislop, a comprehensive framework providing tools to both detect and eliminate these overused patterns. Our approach combines three innovations: (1) The Antislop Sampler, which uses backtracking to suppress unwanted strings at inference time without destroying vocabulary; (2) An automated pipeline that profiles model-specific slop against human baselines and generates training data; (3) Final Token Preference Optimization (FTPO), a novel fine-tuning method that operates on individual tokens, surgically adjusting logits wherever a banned pattern has appeared in an inference trace. We demonstrate that some slop patterns appear over 1,000x more frequently in LLM output than human text. The Antislop Sampler successfully suppresses 8,000+ patterns while maintaining quality, whereas token banning becomes unusable at just 2,000. Most importantly, FTPO achieves 90% slop reduction while maintaining or improving performance in cross-domain evals including GSM8K, MMLU, and creative writing tasks. In contrast, DPO suffers significant degradation in writing quality and lexical diversity despite achieving weaker suppression. We release all code and results under MIT license: https://github.com/sam-paech/auto-antislop.

Sim-to-real transfer remains a significant challenge in robotics due to the discrepancies between simulated and real-world dynamics. Traditional methods like Domain Randomization often fail to capture fine-grained dynamics, limiting their effectiveness for precise control tasks. In this work, we propose a novel approach that dynamically adjusts simulation environment parameters online using in-context learning. By leveraging past interaction histories as context, our method adapts the simulation environment dynamics to real-world dynamics without requiring gradient updates, resulting in faster and more accurate alignment between simulated and real-world performance. We validate our approach across two tasks: object scooping and table air hockey. In the sim-to-sim evaluations, our method significantly outperforms the baselines on environment parameter estimation by 80% and 42% in the object scooping and table air hockey setups, respectively. Furthermore, our method achieves at least 70% success rate in sim-to-real transfer on object scooping across three different objects. By incorporating historical interaction data, our approach delivers efficient and smooth system identification, advancing the deployment of robots in dynamic real-world scenarios. Demos are available on our project page: https://sim2real-capture.github.io/

The living-off-the-land (LOTL) offensive methodologies rely on the perpetration of malicious actions through chains of commands executed by legitimate applications, identifiable exclusively by analysis of system logs. LOTL techniques are well hidden inside the stream of events generated by common legitimate activities, moreover threat actors often camouflage activity through obfuscation, making them particularly difficult to detect without incurring in plenty of false alarms, even using machine learning. To improve the performance of models in such an harsh environment, we propose an augmentation framework to enhance and diversify the presence of LOTL malicious activity inside legitimate logs. Guided by threat intelligence, we generate a dataset by injecting attack templates known to be employed in the wild, further enriched by malleable patterns of legitimate activities to replicate the behavior of evasive threat actors. We conduct an extensive ablation study to understand which models better handle our augmented dataset, also manipulated to mimic the presence of model-agnostic evasion and poisoning attacks. Our results suggest that augmentation is needed to maintain high-predictive capabilities, robustness to attack is achieved through specific hardening techniques like adversarial training, and it is possible to deploy near-real-time models with almost-zero false alarms.

Large language models (LLMs) remain susceptible to jailbreak and direct prompt-injection attacks, yet the strongest defensive filters frequently over-refuse benign queries and degrade user experience. Previous work on jailbreak and prompt injection detection such as GradSafe, detects unsafe prompts with a single "accept all" anchor token, but its threshold is brittle and it offers no deterministic guarantee that harmful content will not be emitted once decoding begins. We introduce Gradient-Controlled Decoding (GCD), a training-free guardrail that combines an acceptance anchor token ("Sure") and refusal anchor token ("Sorry") tightening the decision boundary and significantly lowering false positives. In the mitigation stage, if a prompt is flagged, GCD preset-injects one or two refusal tokens ("Sorry, I can't...") before autoregressive decoding resumes, guaranteeing first-token safety regardless of sampling strategy. On ToxicChat, XSTest-v2, and AdvBench, GCD reduces false positives by 52% vs. GradSafe at comparable recall, lowers attack success rate by up to 10% vs. the strongest decoding-only baseline, adds under 15-20 ms latency on an average on V100 instances, transfers to LLaMA-2-7B, Mixtral-8x7B, and Qwen-2-7B, and requires only 20 demonstration templates.

Video generation models have achieved remarkable progress in creating high-quality, photorealistic content. However, their ability to accurately simulate physical phenomena remains a critical and unresolved challenge. This paper presents PhyWorldBench, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate video generation models based on their adherence to the laws of physics. The benchmark covers multiple levels of physical phenomena, ranging from fundamental principles like object motion and energy conservation to more complex scenarios involving rigid body interactions and human or animal motion. Additionally, we introduce a novel ""Anti-Physics"" category, where prompts intentionally violate real-world physics, enabling the assessment of whether models can follow such instructions while maintaining logical consistency. Besides large-scale human evaluation, we also design a simple yet effective method that could utilize current MLLM to evaluate the physics realism in a zero-shot fashion. We evaluate 12 state-of-the-art text-to-video generation models, including five open-source and five proprietary models, with a detailed comparison and analysis. we identify pivotal challenges models face in adhering to real-world physics. Through systematic testing of their outputs across 1,050 curated prompts-spanning fundamental, composite, and anti-physics scenarios-we identify pivotal challenges these models face in adhering to real-world physics. We then rigorously examine their performance on diverse physical phenomena with varying prompt types, deriving targeted recommendations for crafting prompts that enhance fidelity to physical principles.

LLM-based software engineering agents are increasingly used in real-world development tasks, often with access to sensitive data or security-critical codebases. Such agents could intentionally sabotage these codebases if they were misaligned. We investigate asynchronous monitoring, in which a monitoring system reviews agent actions after the fact. Unlike synchronous monitoring, this approach does not impose runtime latency, while still attempting to disrupt attacks before irreversible harm occurs. We treat monitor development as an adversarial game between a blue team (who design monitors) and a red team (who create sabotaging agents). We attempt to set the game rules such that they upper bound the sabotage potential of an agent based on Claude 4.1 Opus. To ground this game in a realistic, high-stakes deployment scenario, we develop a suite of 5 diverse software engineering environments that simulate tasks that an agent might perform within an AI developer's internal infrastructure. Over the course of the game, we develop an ensemble monitor that achieves a 6% false negative rate at 1% false positive rate on a held out test environment. Then, we estimate risk of sabotage at deployment time by extrapolating from our monitor's false negative rate. We describe one simple model for this extrapolation, present a sensitivity analysis, and describe situations in which the model would be invalid. Code is available at: https://github.com/UKGovernmentBEIS/async-control.

We present a versatile NeRF-based simulator for testing autonomous driving (AD) software systems, designed with a focus on sensor-realistic closed-loop evaluation and the creation of safety-critical scenarios. The simulator learns from sequences of real-world driving sensor data and enables reconfigurations and renderings of new, unseen scenarios. In this work, we use our simulator to test the responses of AD models to safety-critical scenarios inspired by the European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP). Our evaluation reveals that, while state-of-the-art end-to-end planners excel in nominal driving scenarios in an open-loop setting, they exhibit critical flaws when navigating our safety-critical scenarios in a closed-loop setting. This highlights the need for advancements in the safety and real-world usability of end-to-end planners. By publicly releasing our simulator and scenarios as an easy-to-run evaluation suite, we invite the research community to explore, refine, and validate their AD models in controlled, yet highly configurable and challenging sensor-realistic environments. Code and instructions can be found at https://github.com/atonderski/neuro-ncap

Existing evaluation paradigms for Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) face critical limitations. Real-world evaluation is often challenging due to safety concerns and a lack of reproducibility, whereas closed-loop simulation can face insufficient realism or high computational costs. Open-loop evaluation, while being efficient and data-driven, relies on metrics that generally overlook compounding errors. In this paper, we propose pseudo-simulation, a novel paradigm that addresses these limitations. Pseudo-simulation operates on real datasets, similar to open-loop evaluation, but augments them with synthetic observations generated prior to evaluation using 3D Gaussian Splatting. Our key idea is to approximate potential future states the AV might encounter by generating a diverse set of observations that vary in position, heading, and speed. Our method then assigns a higher importance to synthetic observations that best match the AV's likely behavior using a novel proximity-based weighting scheme. This enables evaluating error recovery and the mitigation of causal confusion, as in closed-loop benchmarks, without requiring sequential interactive simulation. We show that pseudo-simulation is better correlated with closed-loop simulations (R^2=0.8) than the best existing open-loop approach (R^2=0.7). We also establish a public leaderboard for the community to benchmark new methodologies with pseudo-simulation. Our code is available at https://github.com/autonomousvision/navsim.

Indirect prompt injection threatens LLM agents by embedding malicious instructions in external content, enabling unauthorized actions and data theft. LLM agents maintain working memory through their context window, which stores interaction history for decision-making. Conventional agents indiscriminately accumulate all tool outputs and reasoning traces in this memory, creating two critical vulnerabilities: (1) injected instructions persist throughout the workflow, granting attackers multiple opportunities to manipulate behavior, and (2) verbose, non-essential content degrades decision-making capabilities. Existing defenses treat bloated memory as given and focus on remaining resilient, rather than reducing unnecessary accumulation to prevent the attack. We present AgentSys, a framework that defends against indirect prompt injection through explicit memory management. Inspired by process memory isolation in operating systems, AgentSys organizes agents hierarchically: a main agent spawns worker agents for tool calls, each running in an isolated context and able to spawn nested workers for subtasks. External data and subtask traces never enter the main agent's memory; only schema-validated return values can cross boundaries through deterministic JSON parsing. Ablations show isolation alone cuts attack success to 2.19%, and adding a validator/sanitizer further improves defense with event-triggered checks whose overhead scales with operations rather than context length. On AgentDojo and ASB, AgentSys achieves 0.78% and 4.25% attack success while slightly improving benign utility over undefended baselines. It remains robust to adaptive attackers and across multiple foundation models, showing that explicit memory management enables secure, dynamic LLM agent architectures. Our code is available at: https://github.com/ruoyaow/agentsys-memory.

Safety aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks qi2023fine-- a few harmful data mixed in the fine-tuning dataset can break the LLMs's safety alignment. Existing mitigation strategies include alignment stage solutions huang2024vaccine, rosati2024representation and fine-tuning stage solutions huang2024lazy,mukhoti2023fine. However, our evaluation shows that both categories of defenses fail when some specific training hyper-parameters are chosen -- a large learning rate or a large number of training epochs in the fine-tuning stage can easily invalidate the defense, which however, is necessary to guarantee finetune performance. To this end, we propose Antidote, a post-fine-tuning stage solution, which remains \textit{agnostic to the training hyper-parameters in the fine-tuning stage}. Antidote relies on the philosophy that by removing the harmful parameters, the harmful model can be recovered from the harmful behaviors, regardless of how those harmful parameters are formed in the fine-tuning stage. With this philosophy, we introduce a one-shot pruning stage after harmful fine-tuning to remove the harmful weights that are responsible for the generation of harmful content. Despite its embarrassing simplicity, empirical results show that Antidote can reduce harmful score while maintaining accuracy on downstream tasks.Our project page is at https://huangtiansheng.github.io/Antidote_gh_page/

Autonomous coding agents are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, offering capabilities that extend beyond code suggestion to active system interaction and environment management. OpenClaw, a representative platform in this emerging paradigm, introduces an extensible skill ecosystem that allows third-party developers to inject behavioral guidance through lifecycle hooks during agent initialization. While this design enhances automation and customization, it also opens a novel and unexplored attack surface. In this paper, we identify and systematically characterize guidance injection, a stealthy attack vector that embeds adversarial operational narratives into bootstrap guidance files. Unlike traditional prompt injection, which relies on explicit malicious instructions, guidance injection manipulates the agent's reasoning context by framing harmful actions as routine best practices. These narratives are automatically incorporated into the agent's interpretive framework and influence future task execution without raising suspicion.We construct 26 malicious skills spanning 13 attack categories including credential exfiltration, workspace destruction, privilege escalation, and persistent backdoor installation. We evaluate them using ORE-Bench, a realistic developer workspace benchmark we developed. Across 52 natural user prompts and six state-of-the-art LLM backends, our attacks achieve success rates from 16.0% to 64.2%, with the majority of malicious actions executed autonomously without user confirmation. Furthermore, 94% of our malicious skills evade detection by existing static and LLM-based scanners. Our findings reveal fundamental tensions in the design of autonomous agent ecosystems and underscore the urgent need for defenses based on capability isolation, runtime policy enforcement, and transparent guidance provenance.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) swarms offer versatile applications in logistics, agriculture, and surveillance, yet controlling them requires expert knowledge for safety and feasibility. Traditional static methods limit adaptability, while Large Language Models (LLMs) enable natural language control but generate unsafe trajectories due to lacking physical grounding. This paper introduces SkySim, a ROS2-based simulation framework in Gazebo that decouples LLM high-level planning from low-level safety enforcement. Using Gemini 3.5 Pro, SkySim translates user commands (e.g., "Form a circle") into spatial waypoints, informed by real-time drone states. An Artificial Potential Field (APF) safety filter applies minimal adjustments for collision avoidance, kinematic limits, and geo-fencing, ensuring feasible execution at 20 Hz. Experiments with swarms of 3, 10, and 30 Crazyflie drones validate spatial reasoning accuracy (100% across tested geometric primitives), real-time collision prevention, and scalability. SkySim empowers non-experts to iteratively refine behaviors, bridging AI cognition with robotic safety for dynamic environments. Future work targets hardware integration.

To standardize interactions between LLM-based agents and their environments, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) was proposed and has since been widely adopted. However, integrating external tools expands the attack surface, exposing agents to tool poisoning attacks. In such attacks, malicious instructions embedded in tool metadata are injected into the agent context during MCP registration phase, thereby manipulating agent behavior. Prior work primarily focuses on explicit tool poisoning or relied on manually crafted poisoned tools. In contrast, we focus on a particularly stealthy variant: implicit tool poisoning, where the poisoned tool itself remains uninvoked. Instead, the instructions embedded in the tool metadata induce the agent to invoke a legitimate but high-privilege tool to perform malicious operations. We propose MCP-ITP, the first automated and adaptive framework for implicit tool poisoning within the MCP ecosystem. MCP-ITP formulates poisoned tool generation as a black-box optimization problem and employs an iterative optimization strategy that leverages feedback from both an evaluation LLM and a detection LLM to maximize Attack Success Rate (ASR) while evading current detection mechanisms. Experimental results on the MCPTox dataset across 12 LLM agents demonstrate that MCP-ITP consistently outperforms the manually crafted baseline, achieving up to 84.2% ASR while suppressing the Malicious Tool Detection Rate (MDR) to as low as 0.3%.

Automated vulnerability reproduction from CVE descriptions requires generating executable Proof-of-Concept (PoC) exploits and validating them in target environments. This process is critical in software security research and practice, yet remains time-consuming and demands specialized expertise when performed manually. While LLM agents show promise for automating this task, existing approaches often conflate exploring attack directions with fixing implementation details, which leads to unproductive debugging loops when reproduction fails. To address this, we propose CVE2PoC, an LLM-based dual-loop agent framework following a plan-execute-evaluate paradigm. The Strategic Planner analyzes vulnerability semantics and target code to produce structured attack plans. The Tactical Executor generates PoC code and validates it through progressive verification. The Adaptive Refiner evaluates execution results and routes failures to different loops: the Tactical Loop for code-level refinement, while the Strategic Loop for attack strategy replanning. This dual-loop design enables the framework to escape ineffective debugging by matching remediation to failure type. Evaluation on two benchmarks covering 617 real-world vulnerabilities demonstrates that CVE2PoC achieves 82.9% and 54.3% reproduction success rates on SecBench.js and PatchEval, respectively, outperforming the best baseline by 11.3% and 20.4%. Human evaluation confirms that generated PoCs achieve comparable code quality to human-written exploits in readability and reusability.

We introduce an open-source package called QTraj that solves the Lindblad equation for heavy-quarkonium dynamics using the quantum trajectories algorithm. The package allows users to simulate the suppression of heavy-quarkonium states using externally-supplied input from 3+1D hydrodynamics simulations. The code uses a split-step pseudo-spectral method for updating the wave-function between jumps, which is implemented using the open-source multi-threaded FFTW3 package. This allows one to have manifestly unitary evolution when using real-valued potentials. In this paper, we provide detailed documentation of QTraj 1.0, installation instructions, and present various tests and benchmarks of the code.

Hallucinations, outputs that sound plausible but are factually incorrect, remain an open challenge for deployed LLMs. In code generation, models frequently hallucinate non-existent software packages, recommending imports and installation commands for fictional libraries. This creates a critical supply-chain vulnerability: an attacker can proactively register such packages on public registries with malicious payloads that are subsequently installed and executed by developers or autonomous agents, a class of package confusion attack known as slopsquatting. Once a model is deployed, mitigating this failure mode is difficult: full retraining is costly, and existing approaches either cause severe degradation of model utility or rely on a pre-specified forget-set, an assumption that does not apply to the unbounded space of hallucinations. To address this problem, we present Adaptive Unlearning (AU), a post-deployment framework that surgically suppresses hallucinations while preserving general model utility. AU introduces a hybrid token-level objective that simultaneously reinforces valid outputs and suppresses hallucinated ones. Combined with an adaptive discovery loop that continuously surfaces new hallucination-inducing contexts without human supervision, AU enables generalization to unseen prompts and hallucinations. We demonstrate that AU reduces package hallucination rates by 81%, corresponding to a substantial reduction in slopsquatting attack surface, while maintaining performance on standard coding benchmarks. Our analysis shows that distributional changes are concentrated on package-related generations, leaving general coding behavior largely unaffected and confirming that AU's effect is isolated to the targeted distribution. AU operates entirely on model-generated data, requires no human annotation, and generalizes across domains.